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Viewing cable 08ADDISABABA596, ELECTIONS HERALD 3: SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA HIGHLIGHTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ADDISABABA596 2008-03-04 06:45 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO4204
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0596/01 0640645
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040645Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9799
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC 0100
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000596 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E, DRL FOR SJOSEPH 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA AND CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM KJUS KDEM PGOV ET
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS HERALD 3: SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA HIGHLIGHTS 
COUNTRY'S BACKWARD DEMOCRATIC MARCH 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 261 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000596  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. From January 28 to February 1, Poloff and 
senior political FSN visited several areas in the Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) and the 
southern portion of the Oromiya region, to meet with 
opposition leaders, government administrators and NGOs in 
order to evaluate preparations for the April 13 and 20 
elections that will be largely viewed as a litmus test for 
progress in Ethiopian democracy following the post-2005 
election conflict.  Emboffs found that formerly 
heavily-challenged districts in SNNPR will likely see very 
little competition.  Opposition party leaders in both regions 
were highly pessimistic about their chances, saying that the 
ruling Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) was interfering in both voter and candidate 
registration, making it nearly impossible for them to field 
candidates.  They did not anticipate being able to compete in 
the majority of contests.  Alleged techniques used by the 
EPRDF ranged from "bribing" voters to register as EPRDF party 
members to threats on the life of registered opposition 
candidates, and generally were much for severe in Oromiya 
than SNNPR.  While Post has no concrete evidence of such 
harassment, reports are persistent in many areas of Ethiopia. 
 SNNPR and southern Oromiya, both heavily represented in the 
federal parliament by opposition parties, will undoubtedly 
remain governed by the EPRDF following what will be a mostly 
pro-forma local election process.  END SUMMARY 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
SNNPR: OPPOSITION EXPRESSES SOME HOPE, BUT LITTLE CONFIDENCE 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
2. (SBU) Meetings with government officials, opposition 
leaders and NGOs in SNNPR revealed severe complications and a 
poor competitive environment in the run-up to the April local 
elections.  The zones (districts) visited-)Hadiya and 
Kembatta Tembaro, as well as the regional capital of 
Awassa--are areas that have had a significant opposition 
presence for several years and, following the 2005 federal 
elections, are majority (80 percent) represented in the 
federal parliament by the opposition United Ethiopian 
Democratic Forces (UEDF) party.  However, the ruling EPRDF 
maintains control over all the thousands of zonal, woreda 
(county) and kebele (community) governmental council seats up 
for election in April. 
 
3. (SBU) With the strong showing by the opposition in 2005, 
it would be expected that the areas visited would be hotly 
contested in the local elections.  However, opposition 
leaders report that since the 2005 national elections, and 
particularly in recent months, the EPRDF has made a strong 
push to lure voters through a combination of traditional 
political campaigning and intimidation of opposition voters 
and potential candidates.  In fact, during the visit 
opposition leaders expressed their longing for the political 
openness that prevailed before the 2005 elections, likening 
the current environment to the (largely undemocratic) 2000 
elections.  Typical complaints from the opposition included: 
 
-  Most, if not all, local National Election Board (NEB) 
employees are EPRDF nominees; 
-  Continued restrictions on opposition gatherings, dating 
back to the post-2005 clamp down; 
-  Extended closure of several party offices (though the 
majority of offices were open at the time of the visit); 
-  EPRDF cadre intimidation of farmers, threatening to 
withhold fertilizer, Productive Safety Net and Protecting 
Basic Services support if they do not register to vote and 
pledge support for the EPRDF; 
-  EPRDF cadres threatening to fire civil servants, including 
teachers, if they choose to run as opposition candidates; 
-  NEB local officials restricting known opposition 
supporters from registering to vote; 
-  EPRDF cadres gathering voters and "bribing" them to 
simultaneously register to vote and as EPRDF members; and 
-  Threats of violence from local EPRDF cadres against 
potential opposition candidates. 
 
Opposition leaders in each of the areas visited reported 
that, due to the above interference in the democratic process 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000596  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
on the part of the EPRDF, they have been unable to field 
candidates for most seats in their areas, despite their 
perceived strong support from voters.  Most said that they 
would be able to put forth candidates for some zonal and 
woreda seats, while foregoing kebele elections altogether. 
They pointed out that, absent the current levels of 
harassment, they would be able to field more candidates, 
particularly given the support they have in the region, but 
it is unclear whether they would have the capacity to field 
candidates for every open position. 
 
4. (SBU) Zonal and regional officials (all EPRDF) 
contradicted all the opposition's criticisms, saying that the 
voters will turn out in April to vote for EPRDF candidates 
not because of alleged intimidation, but rather as a result 
of the strong push they have made to appeal to voters 
following the 2005 elections.  Almost unanimously, EPRDF 
officials admitted that their party has made "mistakes" and 
had been "arrogant" before the 2005 elections, leading to the 
strong showing by the opposition, but that since that time 
they have corrected their course.  They denied all reports by 
the opposition of harassment of either voters or potential 
candidates.  Improvement in standards of living, stemming 
from improved roads, better education and more jobs are 
certain to lead the EPRDF to victory in the April elections, 
they said, not the harassment alleged by the opposition. 
Moreover, zonal and regional administrators report that 
following outreach by the EPRDF, the region's politically 
savvy voters had "come back to their senses," changing 
alliances to the EPRDF.  They reported that the EPRDF has 
been able to field candidates for all zonal, woreda and 
kebele seats up for election. 
 
5. (SBU) NEB officials similarly denied opposition charges, 
saying that NEB employees are unaffiliated with any political 
party.  They reported that voter registration has been 
successful thus far, with over 90 percent of eligible voters 
registered, and no reports of interference or intimidation in 
the registration process.  On the contrary, regional 
directors from NGOs, the Ethiopian Human Rights Council 
(EHRCO) and Action Professionals for the People (APAP), both 
involved in voter education and election observation in 2005, 
reported numerous problems leading up to the April elections. 
 They supported many of the opposition claims of voter and 
candidate intimidation, opining that, come election day, many 
voters will cast ballots not because they want to, but 
because they are forced to.  Both organizations lamented the 
lack of open competition, saying that most voters have "given 
up on democracy" following the post-2005 GoE crackdown and 
subsequent lack of political openness.  EHRCO and APAP 
officials reported that they would like to continue their 
role in voter education and election observation, but 
question whether they will be granted the freedom to do so 
and how much voter interest there will be in the April 
elections. (NOTE: While NGOs may have the capacity and desire 
to conduct both voter education and election observation, the 
new Electoral Law passed in June 2007 permits organizations 
to conduct either one or the other, but not both, of these 
functions. END NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
OROMIYA: HEAVY HAND OF GOE KEEPS OPPOSITION DOWN 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
6. (SBU) In contrast with SNNPR, neighboring southern Oromiya 
has a much more limited record of opposition participation, 
freedom and success in recent elections.  Though many 
districts were won by the opposition Oromo Peoples Congress 
(OPC) and Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM) in the 
2005 federal elections, several election winners have since 
quit or left the country due to severe harassment. 
 
7. (SBU) The severity of reports of intimidation and 
persecution from opposition leaders in southern Oromiya was 
much more dramatic than those in SNNPR.  Though separated by 
only a few miles, the nature of the alleged harassment by 
government cadres was dramatically more brutal.  In addition 
to reports of bribing of, and threats to, voters, both major 
opposition parties reported violent intimidation of possible 
candidates, leading them to keep candidates lists secret 
until the last possible day to register, providing them 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000596  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
limited immunity to arrest.  Such reports include: 
 
-  Arrests by local police of party organizers and potential 
candidates without charges or opportunity for bail; 
-  Threats on the life of registered candidates by GoE 
security forces; 
-  Continued closure of opposition party offices; 
-  Outright refusal of NEB officials to register opposition 
supporters; and 
-  Intimidation by EPRDF cadres of friends and family of 
known opposition organizers or registered candidates. 
 
In meetings with Poloff and senior FSN, nearly all Oromo 
opposition leaders were visibly nervous to be seen with 
foreigners.  During one meeting, individuals who appeared to 
be plain clothes security were seen taking pictures of the 
meeting from a distance.  At least one party office in which 
a meeting took place has since been closed down by local GoE 
officials. 
 
8. (SBU) Similar to SNNPR government officials, however, 
officials in southern Oromiya outright denied claims by the 
opposition of intimidation or of illegal influence over the 
voter registration process. They claim to have reached out to 
opposition parties in an attempt to ensure that they 
participate in the elections, but report that disorganization 
and lack of support may very well lead to an opposition 
withdrawal from the elections.  They report that former 
supporters of opposition parties are unsatisfied with the 
accomplishments of their elected officials, leading to a 
large-scale return of voters to the EPRDF. 
 
9. (SBU) The Embassy team was unable to visit NEB offices in 
Oromiya, as had been scheduled.  The NEB visits *- the first 
by any diplomatic mission during this election season -- had 
been scheduled through the national office of the NEB. 
However, at the same time the team was visiting southern 
Oromiya, a team from the British Embassy was inquiring with 
the national NEB office about visiting local offices in 
western Oromiya.  NEB leaders apparently became uneasy with 
the idea of numerous diplomatic missions visiting NEB offices 
throughout the country and canceled the team's scheduled 
meetings, saying that in the future, all diplomatic mission 
must formally request in writing to visit offices, submitting 
letters to the Foreign Ministry, which will then pass the 
request on to the NEB. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
COMMENT: DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN REVERSE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Following the 2005 elections and subsequent unrest, 
domestic politics have remained tense, with little space 
allowed for opposition parties.  The local elections, 
originally planned for 2006 but repeatedly delayed, have been 
informally billed as the next test in Ethiopia's march 
towards multi-party democracy.  However, in what would 
otherwise be expected as a hotly contested and widely debated 
election season, it now appears that most of the thousands of 
open seats in zonal, woreda (country) and kebele (community), 
and city councils will be uncontested, remaining with the 
ruling EPRDF.  Opposition party leaders and NGOs allege that, 
following losses in the 2005 federal elections, the EPRDF 
embarked on a heavy-handed campaign to ensure that the same 
would not happen in the local elections.  Widespread reports 
of voter intimidation and severe harassment of potential 
opposition candidates, together with a biased NEB and media, 
ensure that few local-level government seats will change 
hands.  NGOs involved with voter education and election 
monitoring in 2005 believe that a repeat of the violence seen 
after the last election is unlikely however, due to the fact 
that voter apathy is rampant.  While government officials are 
confident about their prospects in the elections, believing 
that they will be reelected, opposition parties and NGOs 
report feeling that long-gone are the days of political 
openness that prevailed prior to the 2005 elections and that 
the country has returned to the restricted political 
environment of 1995 and 2000. 
 
11. (SBU) Though the alleged harassment and intimidation by 
EPRDF cadres has apparently restricted the opposition's 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000596  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
ability to field large numbers of candidates, it is unclear 
whether even in the absence of such limitations they would 
have the capacity to compete for all open positions.  The 
fact that the opposition does not operate as one cohesive 
group has made it easier for the well-organized EPRDF to 
dominate the pre-election preparation period.  It is clear 
that the donor community needs to work closely with the GoE 
to open political space.  Otherwise, the more important 2010 
national elections could turn more violent than post-2005 
election period, due to voter frustration and opposition to 
the ruling EPRDF.  END COMMENT. 
YAMAMOTO