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Viewing cable 08WELLINGTON66, NEW ZEALAND ACCEPTS U.S. PROPOSAL ON DEFENSE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08WELLINGTON66 2008-02-25 21:29 2011-04-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Wellington
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWL #0066/01 0562129
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 252129Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5093
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 5116
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0192
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0321
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE PRIORITY 0123
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY 0650
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
PACOM PASS FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2023 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL US NZ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND ACCEPTS U.S. PROPOSAL ON DEFENSE 
ENGAGEMENT 
 
Classified By: Embassy Wellington Ambassador William McCormick, 
reasons 1.4 (a), (b) and (d( 
 
 1. (C/N) SUMMARY. DCM contacted MFAT to express once again 
our concern at New Zealand's continuing delay in formally 
accepted the proposed U.S. streamlining of our mil-mil 
relationship. On February 21, MFAT responded with a non-paper 
formally welcoming the U.S. proposal, and promising that NZ 
Ambassador Ferguson would call on DASD James Clad shortly to 
provide additional detail. The New Zealand response 
emphasized that it is committed to avoiding publicity and it 
remains concerned that the high "ops tempo" of its military 
may make it difficult for them to expand their activities. 
Clearly NZ domestic political sensitivities could make it 
increasingly difficult to consider any high-profile bilateral 
activities; this limitation could actually help give both 
sides the space to build patterns of operational cooperation 
out of public and political view. END SUMMARY 
 
 
U.S. Discomfort at NZ Delay 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (C/N) On February 20, I spoke to Deputy Secretary John 
MacArthur of New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MFAT) about the importance the U.S. side attaches to 
receiving GNZ acceptance of the change in our mil-mil 
relationship we first proposed in October, 2007. It has 
become clear that the problem is no longer, to the extent it 
ever was, getting a paper through the PM's in-box. John 
MacArthur referred repeatedly to the need to complete "the 
process" of developing New Zealand's response. I noted with 
John and later with Carl Worker, MFAT Americas Division 
Director, that U.S. internal discussions in preparation for 
the AUSMIN had raised to senior levels awareness of New 
Zealand's continued non-response. I suggested that this 
risked tarnishing what should be a real positive for the 
relationship. They both acknowledged this point with some 
discomfort. Clearly they would have liked to see things move 
more quickly. I made it clear that now is the time to provide 
an answer and dispel any concerns a 
t senior levels of the USG. They promised to do what they 
could to provide a response before the AUSMIN. 
 
3. (C/N) DCM was called back to MFAT Thursday afternoon, 
February 21, to meet with John MacArthur and Carl Worker and 
receive the following response to the paper DASD James Clad 
presented to the New Zealand Embassy on October 25, 2007. DCM 
was told that this response had been cleared with MFAT CEO 
Simon Murdoch, who is currently in Canberra, and therefore 
represents an official response. 
 
o Ambassador Roy Ferguson has been back in Wellington for 
consultations during the last week and will be conveying New 
Zealand's response to the US advice of the outcome of its 
"internal review of defense and security policy with New 
Zealand" on return to Washington next week. In response to 
the US request for guidance ahead of the AUSMIN meeting this 
weekend, we are pleased to convey the key points of the 
response that the Ambassador will outline in Washington in 
more detail. 
 
o In the context of the major improvement that has taken 
place in the bilateral relationship through the joint efforts 
of both sides, and as a further contribution to that effort, 
New Zealand welcomes that such a review was undertaken and 
that the outcome has been a positive US decision to introduce 
additional flexibilities into the operation of its waiver 
system applying to defence cooperation with New Zealand with 
a view to encouraging and facilitating scope for new 
cooperation initiatives in a range of multilateral areas to 
mutual benefit. 
 
o We understand that this has been undertaken and remains 
within the existing overall framework set by relevant US 
policy guidelines. 
 
o New Zealand's welcome of the new flexibilities and 
potential opportunities also is framed within the current 
realities of the very high operating tempo of our defence 
forces and the contingencies within our immediate region for 
which we need to remain prepared. 
 
o We share the US assessment that there is no requirement for 
the advice of the outcome of the US review to enter the 
public domain. Our own broad public comment has been confined 
to recent speeches by the Minister of Trade and Defence 
(Speech to Christchurch/Seattle Sister City Association, 
Seattle, 7 November 2007) and the Secretary of Defence 
(Speech to 4th Annual Armistice Day Symposium, Auckland, 9 
November 2007). 
 
(NOTE: DCM has forwarded to EAP/OSD and OSD/ISA Powers 
relevant excerpts of both speeches. END NOTE.) 
 
o In the event that public comment at any stage nevertheless 
were required, we have taken note of the US defensive talking 
points and would expect to consult closely at that time on 
the shape of any public comment. 
 
21 February 2008 
 
4. (C/N) As John MacArthur summarized this paper, it comes 
down to three points. 
-- New Zealand agrees to and welcomes the U.S. proposal and 
is eager to work within it. 
-- New Zealand is eager to avoid any publicity about this new 
approach, will only say anything under "extreme duress," and 
will coordinate closely with the U.S. side before saying 
anything. 
-- New Zealand is very conscious that its forces are 
stretched thin and does not want to mislead the U.S. about 
its ability to undertake new missions. 
 
5. (C/N) DCM thanked MacArthur and Worker for their efforts 
to secure this response. He noted that the extended delay in 
receiving a response could only make those on the U.S. side 
wonder what lay behind the delay. Each of them said privately 
in the course of the day how frustrated they had been by the 
delays in securing consensus for this response. It was clear 
that even saying that much was sufficiently sensitive that 
neither wanted to say it in front of the other. 
 
6. (C/N) DCM assured both MFAT officials that we completely 
shared their interest in avoiding publicity. On the issue of 
ops tempo, He suggested that one outcome of this new approach 
would be cooperation in training and exercises that would 
actually assist NZDF in improving its capabilities with less 
expenditure of time and resources. Without anticipating too 
much the specific outcomes of this new approach, we all 
agreed that the NZ Navy might benefit from USN experience in 
bringing its new multi-role vessel the Canterbury up to full 
capability. 
 
The Political Atmosphere 
------------------------ 
 
7. (C/N) In a side conversation, John MacArthur noted that 
those working on this response were particularly conscious 
that both sides are moving into a political year, and it 
would be best to focus on improving cooperation in areas 
which remained below the level of political visibility. DCM 
agreed, observing that we had found Simon Murdoch's summary 
to A/S Hill at the Partnership Forum in September to be very 
thoughtful and persuasive. 
 
8. (C/N) It remains clear though unstated that negotiating 
this response to our proposal was not as easy as we had 
thought it might be. Clearly there were those who were 
hesitant, either for political or operational reasons, and 
needed to be brought along. With that in mind, it will be 
important that we find ways to demonstrate that this new 
arrangement is working, because that will help those within 
the New Zealand government who want to improve relations with 
us and who want to cooperate operationally with us to the 
benefit of both sides. 
MCCORMICK