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Viewing cable 08USUNNEWYORK122, SUDAN CONTACT GROUP AGREES TO FOCUS ON SECURITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08USUNNEWYORK122 2008-02-11 15:13 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED USUN New York
VZCZCXRO5142
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHDU RUEHFL
RUEHGI RUEHIK RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHPOD RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUCNDT #0122/01 0421513
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111513Z FEB 08 ZDK
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3685
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000122 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
IO AND AF FOR FRONT OFFICE; PLEASE PASS TO SE WILLIAMSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU MOPS
SUBJECT: SUDAN CONTACT GROUP AGREES TO FOCUS ON SECURITY 
 
 
1.(SBU) Summary.  The Sudan Contact Group (SCG) during a 
February 7 meeting discussed the Assessment and Evaluation 
Commission's (AEC) staffing needs and agreed to push for 
confirmation of new AEC Chair Derek Plumbly.  The group also 
agreed to lobby for a session on the Darfur political track 
during or adjoining the upcoming Sudan Consortium conference. 
 The group decided to document specific Sudanese actions 
impeding UNAMID deployment to prepare for possible UNSC 
sanctions.  The group concurred that members should push 
China to pressure Khartoum to cooperate with UNAMID.  Group 
members also agreed to continue to address UNAMID's 
transport, logistics, and helicopter needs. 
 
2. (SBU) Continue Summary.  UN Special Envoy for Darfur Jan 
Eliasson said that security in Sudan needed to improve before 
serious political talks could begin.  He also called for 
regional engagement and said that an international observers 
meeting would be held in March.  The SCG told Eliasson it 
supported AU/UN leadership of the Darfur political process 
and accepted that formal talks would not be imminent.  The 
group encouraged engagement on multiple tracks, including 
continuing to work with the rebel factions, building security 
from the ground up, and focusing on civil society. End 
Summary. 
 
 
FOCUS ON ENABLING THE AEC 
------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The Sudan Contact Group (SCG) met on February 7 at 
USUN for six hours.  In attendance were delegations from the 
US, UK, EU, France, Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands, as 
well as UN Special Envoy for Darfur Jan Eliasson.  The SCG 
agreed to place a high priority on enabling the Assessment 
and Evaluation Commission (AEC) to fulfill its mission of 
monitoring the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) and conducting a mid-term evaluation of unity 
arrangements established under the CPA.  Members agreed to 
lobby for Sir Derek Plumbly to be accepted as AEC chair by 
the end of February.  The UK, US, and Norwegian delegations 
agreed to draft 4-5 key objectives for the AEC and to 
circulate the draft to the group for review.  UK Special 
Representative for Sudan Michael O'Neill highlighted the 
AEC's staffing shortages, specifically in economic positions, 
and asked members for personnel contributions. 
 
4. (SBU) SCG members agreed that Sudan's elections were not 
likely to take place in July 2009 as scheduled in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  Although members agreed 
to lobby for timely elections, several members cautioned that 
Sudanese parties perceived the elections as driven by the 
international community's interests and therefore were not 
committed to the timeline. Members also were concerned about 
pushing for on-time elections because of the post-election 
violence in Kenya, as well as the belief that the National 
Congress Party (NCP) would not allow elections unless it was 
assured of winning. 
 
5. (SBU) Members agreed to press GOS for progress on the 
technical aspects of election preparation including 
implementing the census (and educating citizens about it), 
passing the electoral law, and establishing a national 
electoral commission. Members also highlighted the need to 
address public perceptions if the election is delayed. 
AF/SPG D/Dir Jason Small called for $6M to be released from 
the EU/Danish AID for census development issues. 
 
6. (SBU) Members agreed to use the upcoming Sudan Consortium 
meeting to highlight Darfur political issues and planned to 
hold a preparatory meeting in 4-5 weeks with the UN and the 
World Bank.  (NOTE: The Sudan Consortium consists of 
officials from Sudan, UN, World Bank, IMF, international 
donors, and civil society who meet to examine the progress of 
the CPA and the challenges facing implementation. END NOTE.) 
Members agreed to lobby to include discussions of Darfur at 
the Consortium or at a meeting prior to or following the 
Consortium. 
 
7. (SBU) Members discussed proposing an expansion of the 
UNMIS mandate to cover the Kordofan regions during 
discussions of the mandate's renewal in March, but did not 
reach final agreement. 
 
REMOVING OBSTACLES TO UNAMID DEPLOYMENT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Members noted that many small issues were delaying 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000122  002 OF 003 
 
 
UNAMID deployment, making it difficult to pressure Khartoum 
into compliance.  Members agreed to document specifics of 
Sudanese actions impeding UNAMID deployment to give the UNSC 
a stronger basis for action should it decide to pursue 
sanctions.  Members agreed that successful UNSC action would 
require pressuring China to use its leverage with Khartoum to 
secure rapid deployment. 
 
9. (SBU) UK and US Milads highlighted UNAMID's need for 
helicopters, heavy transport, and logistics support, but 
noted that the volatile security situation discouraged 
nations from making pledges to UNAMID.  The US stressed the 
importance of transport and multi-role logistics units, which 
should not be overshadowed by the need for helicopters. 
Members also noted that soon-to-be-deployed African troops 
need training and equipment assistance in preparing for the 
mission. 
 
BRIEFING FROM JAN ELIASSON 
-------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) UN Special Envoy for Darfur Jan Eliasson argued 
that security needs to be improved before political progress 
would be possible.  He highlighted the negative impact on 
Sudan of regional crises in Kenya and Chad and said that 
there will be no peace in Sudan without regional cooperation. 
 He plans to schedule an international observers meeting in 
March. Eliasson recommended securing a cessation of 
hostilities agreement and using workshops as a springboard to 
launch formal talks. He said rebels would have to form a 
representative group of critical mass before moving forward 
with formal meetings. 
 
11. (SBU) Eliasson said that he and AU envoy Salim Ahmed 
Salim had agreed on a list of candidates to be the UN/AU 
joint mediator and are working to have their top candidate 
accepted by the UN Secretary General and AU President. 
 
12. (SBU) Eliasson called for the international community to 
begin planning for early recovery so that development 
activities could start immediately after normalization. 
 
DARFUR POLITICAL PROCESS 
------------------------ 
 
13. (SBU) Members informed Eliasson of their support for 
UN/AU leadership of the Darfur political process, and 
suggested the process move on three tracks: 1) continuing 
engagement with rebel factions and the Government of Sudan, 
including holding issue-focused workshops to avoid 
disagreements on leadership issues and leaving the door open 
for Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) unification efforts; 2) 
building security from the ground up, including implementing 
confidence-building steps and involving rebel leaders with 
UNAMID; and 3) engaging with civil society, linked with the 
UN's communication strategies. The UK Special Representative 
called for involving Arabs in the process and embedding the 
Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) into UNAMID. Members 
agreed with Eliasson that there was no possibility for 
political negotiations until security improves. 
 
14. (U) AF/SPG cleared this message. 
 
MEETING PARTICIPANTS 
-------------------- 
 
EU: Torben Brylle (EU Special Representative for Sudan), 
Steen Hansen 
 
Canada: Suehila Elkateb (Special Envoy for Sudan), Mark 
Richardson (Political Officer) 
 
France: Helen Le Gal (Assistant Director at Africa desk) 
 
Netherlands: Ed Craanen (FM Special Representative for 
Africa, Bartjan Wegter (Africa Expert) 
 
Norway: Kjell Hodnebo (Special Representative for Sudan), 
Berit Enge (Political Affairs Minister Counsellor), Bengt 
Holmen (Military Adviser), Elin Eikeland (Assistant Counselor) 
 
UK: Michael O'Neill (Special Representative for Sudan) 
 
UN: Jan Eliasson (UN Special Envoy for Darfur) 
 
SPG: Jason Small, Kemi Yai, Marti Flacks 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000122  003 OF 003 
 
 
USUN: USUN Political Counselor, political officers, and MSC. 
KHALILZAD