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Viewing cable 08USEUBRUSSELS248, P3 DISCUSSES 1540 COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 5

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08USEUBRUSSELS248 2008-02-13 16:30 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USEU Brussels
VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #0248/01 0441630
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131630Z FEB 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
UNCLAS USEU BRUSSELS 000248 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL AORC KPAO UNSC UK FR
SUBJECT: P3 DISCUSSES 1540 COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 5 
 
REF: A. STATE 8246 
 
     B. USUN 93 
     C. USUN 1186 (07) 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY 
 
1.  (U)   Summary.  UK hosted a P3 discussion on continuation 
of the 1540 Committee on February 5 in response to REF A 
demarche at its EU Mission with U.S. 1540 Coordinator and 
French MFA reps.  Both UK and Fance expressed their 
appreciation for the U.S in taking the lead to draft 
essential eleents, and indicated that they would strive to 
have final views back to Washington and/or New Yrk before 
February 13.  The consultations undrscored all three share 
an interest in a longer term extension, although UK and 
France admitted their capitals have not devoted the same 
level of policy formulation to the renewal preparation and 
had no objection to the U.S. providing the initial ideas for 
further delivery to Russia, China, and then the rest of the 
Security Council.  They suggested that the building blocks 
should tactically precede a draft resolution which could be 
co-sponsored by the U.S. and Russia, and other Security 
Council members.  See nonpaper in para 4 that was discussed. 
End summary. 
 
2 (SBU) At the P3 discussions, the following objectives were 
emphasized: 
 
-- The U.S. commitment to securing a resolution authorizing 
the continuation of the Committee established for UNSCR 1540, 
which is set to expire in April 2008, and that Washington had 
two extensive interagency discussions among nonproliferation 
experts to develop practical objectives. 
 
--  Our desire to quickly gain UK and French support for 
including additional measures designed to increase the 
Committee's and Member States' ability to implement the 
resolution's basic requirements. 
 
-- In obtaining these objectives, the U.S. view that we are 
seeking a consensus agreement within the Security Council to 
include measures beyond simple Committee extension - and that 
this would require P3 support to bring various views 
together.  See REF B for UN challenges among Committee 
members. 
 
3.  (SBU) In general terms, both UK and France agreed with 
more than a technical rollover.  UK rep Nick Low, Head of the 
Nuclear Issues Section in the United Kingdom's Counter 
Proliferation Department, professed his view that based on 
previous consultations with South African nonproliferation 
experts (see REF C) the building blocks were achievable but 
he sought more information on both the voluntary fund and 
proliferation financing.  French reps, Thomas Guibert 
(Disarmament and Nonproliferation Department) and Jay 
Dharmadhikari (International Organizations) were in agreement 
with the majority of the nonpaper but also expressed interest 
in more information regarding proliferation financing. 
Neither P3 member had any strong view on who should take the 
lead on drafting the resolution but indicated they would 
confirm with their capital before February 13.  Other key 
points stressed by UK and France included: 
 
a.  A 5 year extension should not be an end state but leave 
open further work.  Neither UK nor France supported language 
that implied the mandate for the Committee would end in 5 
years - they wanted to keep all options open so States could 
not theoretically wait out for 5 years the Committee being a 
resource for furthering implementation. 
 
b.  Action plans and matching of donors was seen as an 
important step.  Although both UK and France supported road 
maps or implementation plans, they agreed that we should 
draft language that cites this as a useful way without making 
such mandatory.  France also suggested language that 
concentrates outreach by region, e.g., with a 5 year renewal 
the Committee could target each of the five geographic UN 
regions for 6 months to create focused follow up. 
 
c.  Voluntary fund -- France has no objection and believes 
the idea has merit.  UK was undecided but thought details 
could be worked out if the concept was agreed based on the 
ideas in the outgoing 1540 Committee Chair's remarks. 
 
d.  Proliferation Financing.  Both UK and France thought a 
reference to ongoing Financial Action Task Force (FATF) work 
could be used based on previous involvement of the 1540 
Committee with the FATF.  As noted in the building block 
points, the specific details on ways to strengthen financial 
obligations were requested as an additional paper in order to 
see more details to share with their Treasury counterparts. 
 
e.  Both UK and France supported a comprehensive review in 
2009 as a good midpoint objective to maintain momentum with a 
longer mandate for the Committee.  Although UK was concerned 
that such a review could not be accomplished without 
additional reporting, France opined that if countries worked 
on road maps and updating matrices there may not need to be 
another round of reporting. 
 
f.  There were no firm views on tactics to introduce 
essential elements into P5, but UK and France suggested they 
were comfortable with the U.S. efforts to develop essential 
building blocks.  France also reiterated its belief that if 
many of these elements were reflected in the draft report 
being prepared by the 1540 Committee on implementation since 
2006, they may face less opposition from those calling for 
simple extension of the current mandate which would mean no 
new language from UNSCR 1673 that last extended the Committee 
for two years. 
 
4.  (U) Text of paper used for P3 discussion. 
 
Essential building blocks in order of general priority 
 
A.  The United States supports extension of the 1540 
Committee's mandate for 5 more years. 
 
Supporting Points: 
 
-- A 5-year mandate would allow the 1540 Committee to make 
and carry out long-term plans for activities designed to 
promote states' implementation of resolution 
1540. 
 
-- For example, a longer horizon would enable the Committee 
to plan, carry out, and follow up on workshops and outreach 
in a more sustained and comprehensive manner.  (The outreach 
in 2006-2007, while outstanding, exceeded many countries' 
staff capacity to effectively participate from capitals -- 
because of the short timeframe for planning these events, the 
Committee was not always able to lay the appropriate 
groundwork to ensure that the right people attended, or two 
events related to UNSCR 1540 occurred in close proximity.) 
 
-- Extending the mandate period is also important to account 
for the time that, from experience, we now understand is 
devoted to administrative and organizational matters 
immediately after the Committee's mandate is renewed.  Both 
after its initial establishment and then after its first 
mandate renewal, the Committee spent almost half of the 
2-year extension period negotiating work programs, hiring 
experts, reducing the effective implementation time. 
 
-- Long-term extension provides sufficient time to focus on 
Committee management priorities but more importantly permits 
the Committee and its experts, as well as donors and 
recipients, the time necessary to make plans for and to 
execute activities to promote implementation of resolution 
1540. 
 
-- A five-year period would allow time for the Committee to 
consolidate its most recent awareness-raising efforts in the 
Middle East and Southern African States, along with previous 
efforts in other regions into the critical task of 
facilitating the delivery of technical assistance by matching 
states with technical assistance needs to donors that can 
meet them. 
 
-- Longer extension is also beneficial because of the lead 
times needed for programmatic/budgetary considerations; many 
countries' budget cycles are a year or two ahead of the 
actual work year, so it would be helpful to have a longer 
time to plan our budgets accordingly to support 1540 
activities in the out years. 
 
B.  The resolution should mandate states to prepare action 
plans, where appropriate, that focus on implementation of the 
key provisions of the resolution within one year (but not 
longer than 2), and allow the Committee to facilitate the 
matching of partner nations (i.e., donors and recipients) 
with these plans to meet assistance needs. 
 
Supporting Points: 
 
-- This would shift the focus of the Committee and capitals 
from reporting and analysis to implementation efforts that 
are designed to build capacity. 
 
 
-- "When appropriate" is language to indicate that action 
plans are not a requirement but a national responsibility - 
but without a plan to follow through on technical assistance 
requests, it is unlikely that partner donor nations will be 
willing to commit additional resources. 
 
-- These plans would support the overall approach of 
expanding the Global Partnership, as one example.  (UK and 
French nonproliferation experts are familiar with the G8 
discussion on expanding Global Partnership - if needed, 
Washington can provide additional background) 
 
C.  The resolution should call on the Committee to strengthen 
its ties to relevant regional organizations that can promote 
their members' implementation of resolution 1540; it should 
compliment the work that regional organizations have already 
undertaken. 
 
Supporting Points: 
 
-- Regional organizations are comfortable working with a UN 
Committee. 
 
-- The strengthened relationship supports the limited staff 
capacity of the Committee and avoids duplication of effort. 
 
D.  The resolution should take note of the work being done in 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as an important means 
to limit nonproliferation by and to non- state actors. 
 
E.  The draft should include specific financial measures and 
controls which states could elect to adopt to implement the 
resolution. 
 
Supporting points: 
 
-- Washington is developing separately a paper outlining 
these ideas. 
 
-- Member states face challenges in determining how best to 
implement the financial obligations that currently exist 
under UNSCR 1540. 
 
-- Language presenting specific financial measures and 
controls that could be used to implement UNSCR 1540 would 
draw on the work of the FATF in this area and resemble 
financial measures and controls that Member States widely use 
to implement resolutions related to counter-terrorism and 
other threats. 
 
F.  The resolution should encourage the creation of an 
outside voluntary fund for Committee use in supporting 
implementation, e.g., tapping into cost-free experts. 
 
Supporting Points: 
 
-- Washington's initial thinking is that this fund would be 
voluntary in nature, with agreed procedures for Committee use 
- a separate paper is being prepared. 
 
-- Donors outside of the Committee, particularly Norway and 
EU, support this as an effective way to shape long- term 
implementation efforts. 
 
-- Many states see the only output of the Committee as asking 
for reports with no reciprocal payback - such a fund enables 
the Committee to play a more supportive role in 
implementation. 
 
G.  The resolution should call for a comprehensive review of 
the status of implementation by the Security Council by the 
end of 2009 and seek ways to broaden stakeholder involvement 
in the implementation of resolution 1540 through caucus 
meetings with interested states both in capitals and within 
the United Nations. 
 
Points To Be Used As Necessary 
 
-- Outreach should be an important element of the Committee's 
mandate and should focus more on implementation of the 
resolution rather than on raising awareness and encouraging 
states to report to the Committee. 
 
-- The Committee's outreach must be better coordinated with 
activities being offered bilaterally and through regional 
organizations. 
 
-- The resolution should be as specific as possible in 
 
defining the role the Committee will play in facilitating 
technical assistance.  Among other things, it should endorse 
the four decisions the 1540 Committee has already agreed to 
concerning technical assistance, as well as the remaining two 
decisions that the Committee has not yet endorsed. 
 
-- The resolution could make clear that the Committee should 
not/not request any more reports. 
 
End text 
 
5.  (U) Please contact U.S. 1540 Coordinator Tom Wuchte at 
(202) 736-4275 for any further background. 
 
MURRAY