Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08TUNIS142, TUNIS ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ)

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08TUNIS142.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TUNIS142 2008-02-14 09:04 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tunis
VZCZCXYZ0011
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0142/01 0450904
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140904Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4427
INFO RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS TUNIS 000142 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PTER TN
SUBJECT: TUNIS ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 
SPRING 2008 
 
REF: SECSTATE 7551 
 
1.  (U) Embassy Tunis responses to ACEQ keyed to paragraphs 
in reftel: 
 
2.  (paragraph 6) (U) (E) CRIMINAL ELEMENTS ROAM FREELY DAY 
OR NIGHT AND TARGET EMBOFF AND AFFLUENT RESIDENTIAL AREAS FOR 
BURGLARY. 
 
Although the Tunisian police are omnipresent, criminals take 
advantage of vacant residences in Emboff and affluent 
neighborhoods during regular business hours when the 
residents are at work.  Criminals are known to ring doorbells 
of residences and wait.  If there is no response, they enter 
the yard and search for an unsecured window or door in order 
to gain entry to the home.  If someone answers the bell, they 
make a ruse as if they are with the municipality and move on. 
 Criminals also move on if the residence cannot be easily 
entered. 
 
The headquarters for the African Development Bank (ADB) is in 
Tunis and its 1000 or so employees' homes are scattered 
throughout metropolitan Tunis.  The ADB security officer 
reported to the RSO that residences which are burglarized are 
usually unsecured. 
 
In 2007, one Embassy home was burglarized.  While the owners 
were out, thieves took advantage of an improperly secured 
door grill and forcibly entered the residence.  They stole 
some jewelry.  The visit of the local guards may have 
disturbed the thieves since the home's electronics were still 
in place. 
 
Although the American Cooperative School of Tunis (ACST) is 
not under Chief of Mission authority, it is located across 
the highway from the Embassy compound and a majority of 
Mission children attend ACST.  In March 2007 a teaching 
assistant had her purse snatched by two men on a speeding a 
motorbike as she exited the school's front gate. 
 
Car theft is uncommon and carjacking is unheard of.  Smash 
and grab thefts are more common should the vehicle owner 
leave a valuable item, such as a laptop computer, in plain 
sight. 
 
3.  (paragraph 7) (U) (A) SURROUNDED BY LOW-CRIME BUFFER 
ZONES, WHICH DETER CRIMINAL ELEMENTS FROM ENTERING EMBOFF 
NEIGHBORHOODS. 
 
It is generally safe to walk day or night in Emboff 
neighborhoods.  The majority of Embassy-leased residences are 
located in north suburban Tunis.  High crime areas are 
located closer to Tunis proper. 
 
4.  (paragraph 8) (U) (A) ARE DETERRED BY RISK OF 
CONFRONTATION AND ENGAGE PRINCIPALLY IN CRIMES BY STEALTH; 
BURGLARIES OF OCCUPIED RESIDENCES ARE USUALLY AVOIDED. 
 
The most common criminals are pickpockets, purse-snatchers 
and snatch-and-run cell-phone thieves who primarily work in 
the high-traffic tourist areas such as the Tunis medina and 
the central market, as well as other large Tunisian cities. 
 
Burglaries do not exclusively focus on the expatriate 
community, the growing Tunisian middle class offers criminals 
more opportunity for theft.  Since most burglaries are crimes 
of opportunity, a well-secured home is often reason enough 
for the thieves to move on.  With this in mind, middle class 
Tunisian families have taken measures to improve their 
residential security by installing grillwork over their 
windows and doors, something the Embassy also does. 
Residential break-ins occur often during the day when homes 
are unoccupied, although occupied break-ins are not unheard 
of.  It can be assumed that burglars are prepared for 
confrontation, but are generally not predisposed to it. 
 
5  (paragraph 9) (U) (A) UNARMED OR ARMED WITH NON-LETHAL 
WEAPONS. 
 
Although criminals are prepared to be confrontational, most 
generally avoid gratuitous violence.  For the most part, 
crimes of stealth are usually committed by a thief who is 
unarmed or armed with non-lethal weapons.  However, it has 
also been noted that criminals will rifle through a woman's 
purse on a crowded bus or train, undeterred by onlookers. 
For this reason, the RSO discourages Embassy personnel from 
using the public buses or overcrowded trains.  It is also 
becoming more common for victims to notice their bag or 
 
jacket was sliced open and valuable contents stealthily 
removed after walking through or standing in a crowded area. 
 
Violent crime remains relatively rare in affluent areas where 
most expatriates reside.  It is illegal to possess a firearm 
without government approval and the government will authorize 
approval to carry a firearm only in the most grievous and 
extreme circumstances.  Even then, a heavy burden is placed 
upon the citizen to justify the request. 
 
6.  (paragraph 10) (U) (B) OPERATE IN GROUPS OF TWO TO FOUR 
INDIVIDUALS, ARE PREPARED TO BE CONFRONTATIONAL, BUT 
GENERALLY AVOID GRATUITOUS VIOLENCE. 
 
7.  (paragraph 11) (U) (B) LOCAL POLICE OR NEIGHBORHOOD 
ASSOCIATIONS ARE PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE AT DETERRING CRIME, AND 
RESPONSES TO ALARMS OR EMERGENCY CALLS ARE SUFFICIENTLY 
PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE TO DISRUPT/NEUTRALIZE BURGLARIES. 
 
Beside the police, the Embassy local guard force is an 
effective tool for preventing burglaries.  Their regular, yet 
random, visits to Embassy residences include checking the 
yard for unauthorized people and ensuring that vehicles are 
properly secured.  The guards are also made aware when 
residents are out of town to check that the home is secured. 
Embassy guards also have a quicker response time than the 
police and can be dispatched by the RSO, Post One or FSNI at 
any time. 
 
The most effective deterrent is the resident.  Emboffs are 
encouraged to use home alarms and instructed to use all 
security devices including locks and grills.  Guards are 
dispatched to activated alarms when notified. 
 
8.  (paragraph 12) (U) (A) POLICE ARE PROFESSIONAL, WELL 
TRAINED, UNFAILINGLY COOPERATIVE, AND RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTS 
FROM POST. 
 
The Tunisian police are relatively well trained and 
professional.  Many senior officials have received advanced 
training in Western Europe or the United States.  Embassy 
requests for assistance and investigation of Embassy 
residence and vehicle burglaries are prompt and thorough. 
Tunisian police have relatively good success capturing these 
criminals. 
GODEC