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Viewing cable 08TOKYO498, PHYSICAL PROTECTION: MOFA SUPPORT FOR US/JAPAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TOKYO498 2008-02-26 04:45 2011-05-07 05:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #0498/01 0570445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260445Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1998
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0469
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000498 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/J, ISN FOR BURKART 
PASS TO DOE FOR AOKI, KROLL, GOOREVICH, KRUPA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018 
TAGS: ENRG JA KNNP MNUC
SUBJECT: PHYSICAL PROTECTION:  MOFA SUPPORT FOR US/JAPAN 
DIALOG 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer.  Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
 1.  (C) Summary.  MOFA official Yasuyoshi Komizo, meeting 
February 18 with a visiting interagency delegation, conveyed 
strong support for continuing U.S.-Japan cooperation on the 
physical protection of nuclear materials.  He also noted GOJ 
willingness to send representatives to the U.S. to 
participate in a proposed workshop on radiological emergency 
preparedness.  Regarding the revision of INFCIRC/225, Komizo 
noted that before deciding whether to join the ""core group"" 
of countries working on that effort, the GOJ would want to 
find out whether Japan could have any influence on the 
outcome of the revision process.  He also said progress 
toward a comprehensive bilateral agreement for sharing 
sensitive physical protection information would be slow, 
given domestic political sensitivies in Japan.  End summary. 
 
2.  (U) A DOE/NNSA-led interagency delegation met February 18 
with Yasuyoshi Komizo, Director of MOFA's International 
Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division, on the first day of a 
week-long series of meetings with GOJ ministries and 
technical organizations regarding the physical protection of 
nuclear material.  The meetings, which ran through February 
22 and included site visits to the Tokai Unit 2 power reactor 
and the Tokai Reprocessing Plant, continued U.S.-Japan 
technical-level consultations aimed at strengthening Japan's 
regulatory and technology infrastructure for the security of 
nuclear materials and facilities.  Melissa Krupa (NNSA) led 
the U.S. side, accompanied by J. Mentz (State), B. Westreich 
(NRC), J. Glaser (NNSA), J. Hill (NNSA), and Energy Attache 
R. Cherry.  MOFA officer Yukari Aosa accompanied Komizo. 
 
3.  (SBU) The delegation thanked Komizo for MOFA's support of 
the bilateral consultations on physical protection issues. 
Komizo noted in response that MOFA strongly supports the 
U.S.-Japan dialog and a more active role by Japan in 
international efforts to strengthen nuclear security.  While 
MOFA has no direct role in physical protection matters 
domestically, it is willing and able to play an active role 
in getting the appropriate Japanese organizations involved 
and in coordinating GOJ positions on physical protection. 
 
4.  (SBU) Komizo noted Japan's interest during its G8 
presidency to promote efforts to strenthen the nuclear 
infrastructure in countries interested in developing peaceful 
nuclear power programs.  A paper drafted by Japan is 
presently being coordinated in both the Nonproliferation 
Director's Group and the Nuclear Safety and Security Working 
Group. 
 
5.  (C) From his comments on the G8 process, Komizo gave a 
brief status update on Japan's negotiations with Russia on an 
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation.  In frank 
comments, Komizo observed that Russia needed western 
technology, which was only available from France or Japan. 
Since the French would not agree to share the technology, 
Russia had to come to Japan.  Komizo pointed out that Russia 
had accepted many of Japan's conditions for the negotiations, 
including the separation of military and civilian activities 
at facilities directly related to its commercial nuclear 
program.  Russia is also in discussions with the IAEA about 
the application of international safeguards at Angarsk (with 
Russia to pay the cost of safeguards).  Finally, Komizo said 
that a Russian decision to move up the schedule for shutting 
down its last two plutonium production reactors was in 
response to a Japanese demand. 
 
6.  (SBU) When asked about the U.S. proposal to hold a 
workshop on radiological emergency preparedness, Komizo said 
Japan was prepared to send a small (5-6 person) delegation to 
participate in the workshop in the U.S.  Japan would like the 
workshop to take place in April 2008, if possible.  Before 
accepting an invitation to attend the workshop, Komizo said, 
Japan would like to know how the workshop in the U.S. would 
differ from one held in China last December. Del promised to 
inform NNSA/NA-40 of the Japanese interest in sending a team 
to the U.S. in April.  Del also noted the workshop in the 
U.S. would involve more hands-on experience with emergency 
response equipment and techniques than the one held in China. 
 
7.  (C) Del inquired about GOJ views on prospects for a 
bilateral agreement for the sharing of classified physical 
protection information, noting that the absence of a formal 
mechanism could hamper more detailed information exchanges 
the U.S. and Japan may wish to have in the future.  In 
response, Komizo was frank in explaining that information 
sharing on nuclear security issues was a very sensitive 
 
matter in Japanese domestic politics.  Transparency and 
openness are very important for Japanese public acceptance of 
nuclear power, he said.  To enter into an agreement that 
provided for the sharing of classified information about the 
security of nuclear facilities and material could detract 
from the perception of transparency and openness, possibly 
undermining public acceptance.  If, for example, the 
information sharing concerned potential insider threats, that 
could be interpreted as suggesting that some segment of the 
Japanese population was a problem.  A comprehensive 
information sharing agreement would likely have to be 
submitted for Diet approval.  In the event any such issues 
arose in the Diet debate, the political fallout could negate 
any potential benefit from having the agreement.  That said, 
Komizo didn't rule out information sharing, but stressed that 
the GOJ would want to proceed deliberately, first to identify 
specific issues on which Japan would like to share 
information, and then to discuss the appropriate means to 
share that information.  Identification of limited areas of 
information sharing might not require Diet approval, Komizo 
said. 
 
8.  (SBU) When asked for his views on possible roles that 
nongovernmental bodies could play in facilitating the sharing 
of physical protection best practices, Komizo said, ""You mean 
something like WINS.""  He went on to say that, while the 
Japan Atomic Energy Agency has participated in international 
discussions on the concept of WINS (World Institute for 
Nuclear Security), governments should proceed with caution in 
considering whether to set up a body that would deal with 
physical protection -- which is universally viewed as being 
the responsibility of sovereign governments.  Komizo said the 
analogy between WINS and WANO (World Association of Nuclear 
Operators), which promotes best practices for safety, is not 
entirely accurate.  For example, he noted, safety cooperation 
with India and Pakistan continued following the 1998 nuclear 
tests.  ""Physical protection is different,"" he said. 
 
9.  (SBU) Del asked about Japanese interest in sharing 
information on non-lethal use of force, a topic introduced in 
the last high level consultations on physical protection, in 
July 2007.  Komizo confirmed the Japanese National Policy 
Agency is interested in having discussions and would welcome 
a concrete proposal from the U.S. 
 
10.  (C) Komizo was noncommittal regarding the timing of the 
next round of high level consultations.  He pointed out that, 
if the aim was to engage the broadest range of Japanese 
organizations, then it would be more effective to have the 
meetings in Japan.  In another frank comment, he went on to 
say that both he and Ambassador Nakane, the Japanese 
principal in the high level discussions, have been in their 
current positions for several years and would likely rotate 
to new positions following the G8 Summit this July.  Komizo 
suggested scheduling the next high level meeting early after 
the new team is installed, so they can more quickly become 
acquainted with the U.S. and Japanese efforts. 
 
11.  (SBU) Finally, Del informed Komizo that the U.S. was 
interested in Japan joining the ""core group"" of countries 
(U.S., UK, France, Australia, Canada) that has been meeting 
to discuss possible revisions to the international physical 
protection guidelines in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4.  Komizo replied 
that he was aware of longstanding interest in certain 
(unspecified) countries in updating the guidelines, but he 
declined to say whether Japan would join.  Rather, he noted 
that METI and MEXT -- the two ministries with primary 
responsibility for nuclear security in Japan -- would first 
want to understand the status of the core group discussions. 
The GOJ would then be able to determine the likelihood of 
influencing the revision process and making substantive 
contributions to it. 
 
12.  Del cleared this cable prior to departure. 
SCHIEFFER