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Viewing cable 08SEOUL347, COMPROMISE REACHED: GOVERNMENT DOWNSIZING BILL SET

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SEOUL347 2008-02-21 07:52 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0347/01 0520752
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY TEXT ADX: 607BEC MSI9632 600)
P 210752Z FEB 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8600
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3863
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8520
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4007
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2511
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
UNCLAS SEOUL 000347 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (ADDED SENSITIVE TO SLUG LINE) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS
SUBJECT: COMPROMISE REACHED: GOVERNMENT DOWNSIZING BILL SET 
TO PASS 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: On February 20 the United Democratic Party 
(UDP) and the Grand National Party (GNP) broke a month-long 
deadlock and came to a compromise on Lee Myung-bak's 
government reform plan.   The compromise includes the 
survival of the Unification and Gender Equality Ministries. 
The reform bill is expected to pass the National Assembly 
plenary on February 21 or 22, but this still does not give 
the National Assembly enough time to hold hearings and 
approve Lee Myung-bak's cabinet nominees in advance of his 
inauguration on February 25.  Roh's cabinet will instead 
remain in office until the new ministers are through the 
confirmation process, which could be late next week.  Both 
sides are, of course, blaming each other for the mess. 
True, UDP's 146 seats out of 299 (compared to 130 for the 
GNP) allowed them to block the reform bill, and drag out 
negotiations.  Still, many are faulting Lee Myung-bak for 
putting forward an overly aggressive reform proposal before 
the inauguration.  On balance, the UDP comes out on top by 
having stood up to Lee, who now must stagger through the 
first days of his term with the Roh cabinet, rather than take 
off as anticipated at the helm of a streamlined 
Administration.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) UDP leader Sohn Hak-kyu changed his position 
February 20 and announced in a press conference that his 
party would accept the GNP's request to close the Maritime 
Affairs Ministry, paving the way for National Assembly 
approval of the proposed cabinet restructuring bill. 
President-elect Lee's original government reorganization plan 
would have downsized the current 18 ministries to 13.  In the 
face of strong UDP opposition, the GNP agreed to retain the 
Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Gender Equality 
and Family but refused to compromise further.  Sohn's 
announcement comes after Lee had pulled the plug on 
negotiations thereby calling the UDP's bluff.  The UDP was 
left with little choice but to acquiesce or be seen as an 
obstacle to the incoming president's reform agenda. 
 
---------------- 
Experts Weigh In 
---------------- 
 
 
3.  (SBU) Political consultant Jeong Chan-soo told poloff the 
negotiations over the reform bill showed Lee still had much 
to learn in dealing with the National Assembly.  The reality, 
Jeong noted, was that the National Assembly had as much as 
the Blue House and Lee must realize this or he will be 
stymied time and again in attempts to push through his 
projects.  Rather than force a showdown over controversial 
proposals, as he did with the reform plan, Lee should instead 
learn to explain and convince the National Assembly.  Some 
other experts like Professor Jaung Hoon said in press reports 
that the result showed Lee Myung-bak's resolve to change the 
government despite the UDP's upper hand in the Assembly but 
admitted that it did show that Lee should further develop his 
ability to convince detractors.  Overall, many pundits agreed 
the process was more about jockeying for the April 9 National 
Assembly elections than about what form the Cabinet should 
take.  Both Lee and the UDP did not spend sufficient time 
explaining why their plan was the best; the result was other 
than those directly affected, there was no large outcry one 
way or the other about the cabinet reorganization plan. 
 
-------------------------- 
Double Cabinet For a While 
-------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Debate over the restructuring legislation delayed 
the president-elect's announcement of his cabinet nominees, 
making it virtually impossible for the new cabinet to take 
office by the inauguration on February 25, even if the 
National Assembly expedites the process.  The schedule: 
Plenary vote on the government restructuring bill on February 
21 or 22; bill sent to the administration; 
approval/promulgation by the incumbent government; Transition 
Team then requests confirmation hearings; and finally, 
hearings by the relevant committees.  At the earliest, the 
hearings would start February 27 since the Confirmation 
Hearing Act stipulates that all requests to nominees for 
hearing materials should be made five days prior to the 
actual hearing.  Even with speedy hearings, most incumbent 
 
Cabinet ministers will remain in office for one week to ten 
days after the inauguration.  While this will be awkward, it 
will not be unprecedented.  This year would have been the 
first year the cabinet could have taken office the same time 
as the president due to a 2006 law change allowing hearings 
for ministers during the transition. 
 
---------- 
Roh's Role 
---------- 
 
5.  (SBU) President Roh seems to be doing his part to 
facilitate a smooth transition.  Following a surprising 
February 18 meeting between the incumbent and incoming 
presidents, the two sides announced that they would not 
accept the resignations of incumbent ministers until the new 
ones were appointed in order to prevent a vacuum in state 
affairs.  (NOTE: Previous administrations have also had to 
retain ministers for a few days due to delays in forming a 
new cabinet.)  Given the UDP's support of the retooled 
restructuring plan, Roh, who initially said he might veto the 
reorganization plan, will back down from his earlier 
opposition and sign the bill when it comes for his signature. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Failure to have a cabinet in place by inauguration 
is a setback for the Lee Myung-bak presidency, but likely 
only in the short term.  It is less than ideal to have to 
work with Roh's ministers for the first week or two of his 
administration, but the encounter will be pro forma and 
minimal.  The consensus view from the pundits is that Lee 
must to learn to effectively explain his policy initiatives 
and manage relations with the National Assembly if he wants 
to push through any reforms. 
VERSHBOW