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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA144, Evangelical bishop's meeting with Nkunda February 6

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA144 2008-02-11 09:31 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO4569
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0144/01 0420931
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110931Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7507
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS CG
SUBJECT: Evangelical bishop's meeting with Nkunda February 6 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Evangelical Bishop J. M. Runiga, an informal 
intermediary with Nkunda, reported that Nkunda may, for the time 
being, be willing to stay the course but will not accept several 
elements of the "Amani" decree of February 2, particularly what he 
sees as inadequate representation of the international community and 
CNDP in the structures.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Bishop Apostle J. M. Runiga Lugerero, National President of 
the Association of Churches of the Awakening, President of the 
Church Jesus Christ the Only Savior, and National Coordinator of the 
National Conference of Evangelical Churches, met Laurent Nkunda for 
four hours on the evening of February 6.  MONUC flew him from 
Kinshasa to Goma February 5 and helicoptered him to and from 
Kirolirwe February 6.  He provided a read-out to Chief of Staff John 
Almstrom and Steven Jackson of MONUC and to Poloff upon his return 
to Goma February 7. 
 
3. (SBU) Runiga said that this time, unlike his several previous 
meetings with Nkunda from September until January, he had had no 
mandate from President Kabila or his counselors.  No one had asked 
him to come, but he felt that it was his mission to continue the 
intermediation process he had begun.  Runiga is originally from 
South Kivu, although he now has churches all over DRC.  Apparently, 
Nkunda, himself an evangelical preacher, attended Runiga's church in 
Kisingani in past years. 
 
4. (SBU) Runiga said that Nkunda affirmed his support for the Acte 
d'Engagement but had grave doubts about the willingness of the 
government to fulfill the letter or spirit of the Acte.  Nkunda 
cited what he called repeated attacks on CNDP by PARECO, which he 
saw as under the control of the government.  (Note:  Another view is 
that PARECO serves as a front for FDLR, but Nkunda did not express 
this view.  End note.) 
 
5. (SBU) Nkunda also cited the communique of the recent meeting of 
the defense ministers of DRC and Uganda in Beni, which he said 
referred to the CNDP as a negative force that had to be eliminated. 
Nkunda said that this was a very serious provocation.  MONUC's copy 
of the communique, which is provided to the CNDP delegation which 
met Etumba February 6, refers to negative forces but does not 
mention CNDP.  However, that delegation had not yet debriefed 
Nkunda, as it only returned to his headquarters in Kirolirwe as 
Runiga was finishing his meeting with Nkunda. 
 
6. (SBU) Runiga said that Nkunda cited a third, but less clear, 
reason for his conclusion that the government was not acting in good 
faith.  Nkunda spoke of the government's "unwillingness to deal with 
the core political questions."  Runiga interpreted this part of 
Nkunda's discourse to mean that he objected to the government's 
refusal to speak to him directly and to address, in particular, his 
own status. 
 
7. (SBU) Nkunda had several objections to Kabila's decree of 
February 2 establishing the "Peace Program" for the Kivus). 
Overall, he told Runiga that it did not respect the spirit of the 
Kivus Conference.  In particular -- and these were points that 
Runiga said Nkunda came back to repeatedly -- the decree did not 
adequately involve the international community or the CNDP.  This 
criticism applied across the board, but Nkunda focused especially on 
the Steering Committee, the highest organ of the Peace Program, 
composed of the interior, foreign, defense, justice, finance, 
budget, and social affairs ministers and an -- as yet unnamed -- 
National Coordinator of the Peace Program.  Nowhere was the 
international community or CNDP mentioned in this most powerful 
organ of the program.  Most of these ministers, in Nkunda's view, 
were "extremists" opposed to the Acte d'Engagement.  He particularly 
questioned why Vital Kamerhe was not included, both in his role as 
National Assembly President and as key leader of the Kivus 
Conference.  Nkunda saw Kamerhe as having been shunted aside and 
took this as a bad omen. 
 
8. (SBU) Regarding the Technical Committee on Peace and Security, 
Nkunda scoffed at the idea of two delegates each for CNDP and FRF 
and one each for other armed groups.  According to Runiga's account, 
it was not clear whether Nkunda was more annoyed at being put on the 
same level with FRF ("how can a force of 7,000 men be compared to 
one with a few hundred?") or at what he perceived as too much 
representation for the Mai Mai (most of which he deemed 
insignificant and fabricated by the government).  Nkunda said that 
he would refuse CNDP participation in any forums that included a 
significant presence of "these little groups."  Nkunda suggested 
that an appropriate formula would be fifty percent participation for 
the government, forty percent for CNDP, and ten percent for the 
others, in all commissions established by the program. 
 
 
KINSHASA 00000144  002 OF 002 
 
 
9. (SBU) Runiga said that, in the meeting, Nkunda was accompanied by 
key political (rather than key military) figures:  CNDP Secretary 
General Deogratias Nzabarinda, Head of Delegation to the Kivus 
Conference Kambasu Ngeve, Head of Humanitarian and Health Affairs 
Dr. Alexis Kasanzu, and one military officer, Colonel Mucho.  Nkunda 
said that he had met earlier in the day with his high military 
command and would do so again the following day to brief them on his 
meeting with Runiga.  Runiga said that the other participants in the 
meeting appeared to take a harder line than Nkunda on all the key 
issues, including the inadequacies of the Peace Program structure, 
the Beni communique, and PARECO attacks, and it appeared that Nkunda 
sought the meeting with Runiga as a way to convince the others to be 
less negative.  For his part, Runiga said that he stressed 
repeatedly to Nkunda that it was essential for Nkunda to stay the 
course, not to be deterred by Mai Mai activity or acts or statements 
by extremists in the government. 
 
10. (SBU) Runiga said that he had no plan to meet anyone in the 
government.  He would have sought to debrief Naval Force chief of 
staff Vice-Admiral Didier Etumba, who had led meetings with armed 
groups over the past two weeks, but Etumba had departed for Kinshasa 
February 7 and Runiga did not plan to return to Kinshasa until 
February 12.  He said might try to see Kamerhe if Kamerhe were still 
inspecting earthquake damage in South Kivu, where one of Runiga's 
churches had collapsed on its congregation. 
 
GARVELINK