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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM259, JUBA PEACE TALKS DEADLOCKED OVER POWER SHARING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM259 2008-02-22 10:53 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4627
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0259/01 0531053
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221053Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0012
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000259 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV SU UG
SUBJECT: JUBA PEACE TALKS DEADLOCKED OVER POWER SHARING 
 
 
1. (SBU) The Juba Peace Talks between the Government of Uganda and 
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) resumed on January 30. If an 
agreement is signed in the next week as hoped for, it is an 
historical step that will bring an end to a conflict that has lasted 
more than 20 years, resulted in extensive suffering and loss of life 
and hampered development in northern Uganda. 
 
2. (SBU) The initial talks lasted for just a few days, broke off, 
and then resumed again on February 18 to consider five annexes to 
the original agreement.  The negotiations, which are being held in 
Juba, are between a delegation of the Ugandan Government, led by 
Minister of Internal Affairs Rugunda and State Minister for 
International Affairs Oryem-Okello, and an LRA delegation led by 
David Matsanga.  The talks are chaired by the vice-president of 
Southern Sudan, Dr. Rieck Machar, and co-chaired by the UN special 
envoy and former president Joaquim Chissano.  Official observers at 
the talks include representatives from the DRC, Mozambique, South 
Africa, Kenya and Tanzania; the EU, the U.S. and Norway.  Besides 
the official observers, who will sign the agreements as witnesses, a 
number of other observers are present, including UN agencies, 
Ugandan MPs, and representatives from Ugandan civil society. 
 
3. (SBU) Two of the five annexes have been signed so far, one 
extending a ceasefire between the LRA and the GoU until the end of 
this month, and the other the Accountability and Reconciliation 
Annex, which was signed February 19. Deliberations on that Annex 
were intense, but both parties seemed determined to conclude the 
agreement and were willing to make concessions. Largely owing to 
intensive shuttle diplomacy by the chief-mediator and UN envoy 
Chissano, the agreement was concluded by 3 AM on February 19.  The 
international observers signed as witnesses, including the U.S.  The 
sticking point in this Annex revolved around the issue of arrest 
warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for three 
LRA leaders, including Kony. The LRA position was that the Ugandan 
government should take the case to the Security Council to suspend 
the indictments for one year to give time for Ugandan justice to 
deal with Kony. In the final text, however, this was not mentioned 
and the reference to the requirements of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
now contained in the agreement was satisfactory to the parties and 
the international community present. 
 
4. (SBU) While the peace talks in Juba are proceeding, a group of 
LRA fighters is allegedly moving from Garamba national park in the 
DRC along the border at the Sudanese side towards the Central 
African Republic. If this is proven true, it constitutes a clear 
breach of the cessation of hostilities agreement. A second group of 
rebels is attacking villages in South Sudan, close to the Imatongas 
mountain range and is, according to the UN and local authorities, a 
LRA-related group. The LRA denies responsibility and the official 
report from the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team does not 
attribute these acts of violence to the LRA. The reasons behind this 
can be either that the attacks are either not carried out by the LRA 
or that all parties are keen on avoiding further complications now 
that the signing of an agreement is within reach. (Comment: We 
believe some factions of the LRA have splintered away from Kony and 
have joined with local bandits and SPLA deserters to form new 
groups.  One combatant was captured that we know of, and he turned 
out to be a SPLA deserter of Dinka origin. End comment) 
 
5. (SBU) Currently, the talks are now deadlocked around the issue of 
power-sharing and the integration of former LRA combatants into the 
Ugandan army.  The LRA is insisting that five Northern Ugandans be 
appointed to ministerial level positions, although they do not have 
to be from the LRA, and that LRA soldiers be admitted into the army 
at their current rank.  The GoU delegation does not want to set a 
precedent of rewarding a rebel movement by agreeing to appoint new 
ministers, especially not this rebel movement, and it insists that 
the structure of the LRA is not the same as in the regular army and 
therefore LRA officers would have to be assessed and assigned 
appropriate rank to be admitted into the regular armed forces.  Both 
sides have agreed to let these two points go for the time being in 
an attempt to settle on all other disputes.  They will return to 
them at the end.  The feeling is that the GoU might make some 
concessions if it knows that only these two points remain to be 
settled in order to conclude a peace agreement.  However, at one 
point the LRA delegation walked out of the talks on Thursday night. 
Intensive shuttle diplomacy continues between the two sides, 
however, and there is reason to believe the walk-out was for 
dramatic effect. 
 
6. Comment: If no agreement can be concluded by the end of next 
week, the talks will likely collapse.  The Sudanese are doing their 
best to pressure each side to make accommodations for the sake of 
peace, but it is difficult to predict the outcome at this time.  For 
the Juba Peace Talks to succeed, continued engagement and pressure 
by the international community is essential. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000259  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
 
FERNANDEZ