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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM192, UN JOINT MEDIATION SUPPORT TEAM STILL GROPING TO FIND A WAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM192 2008-02-07 10:17 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2947
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0192/01 0381017
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071017Z FEB 08 ZDK CTG RUEHNM 0209 0381518
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9909
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000192 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: UN JOINT MEDIATION SUPPORT TEAM STILL GROPING TO FIND A WAY 
FORWARD WITH DARFUR PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 112 
 
(B) KHARTOUM 95 
 
KHARTOUM 00000192  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) UN JMST member Hideo Ikebe opined that neither Darfur's 
rebel groups nor the GoS are willing to seriously engage in a peace 
process, and organizational and leadership deficiencies within the 
UN's structures in Sudan continue to hamper its effectiveness. 
Without a long-term, clearly-articulated approach to the political 
track and greater engagement with civil society, Darfur peace 
process efforts will continue to sputter. 
 
----------------------------------- 
CONDITIONS NOT RIPE FOR PEACE TALKS 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) TDY Poloff met February 4 with UN Joint Mediation Support 
Team (JMST) member Hideo Ikebe to discuss the status of the Darfur 
peace process and JMST activities.  Ikebe assessed that the timing 
is simply not ripe to engage in a serious political process in 
Darfur.  Neither the various rebel factions nor the GoS demonstrate 
genuine political will to negotiate or compromise.  Under these 
conditions, he held, some members of the JMST believe it a waste of 
time and resources to try to push parties to the table - 
particularly if not all the "right" rebel representatives (military 
and political) are present. 
 
3. (SBU) Ikebe contended that the JMST and international community 
could help foster more suitable conditions for a viable political 
process by adopting a longer-term approach.  He said the tactic of 
setting artificial deadlines has proven ineffective.  Instead the 
JMST should focus on strengthening civil society (including Arab 
tribes) and enhancing the links between these groups and the rebels 
as a means of making the rebels more "accountable" to Darfurians. 
(Note: Though such a logical step would be seen very suspiciously by 
the paranoid regime in Khartoum. End note.) 
 
4. (SBU) The JMST member also suggested that the international 
community should concentrate on cultivating second-tier leadership 
in many of the rebel movements, pointing out that most of them still 
lack capacity, which will work against them in any eventual 
negotiating process.  Developing second-tier leadership could have 
the secondary benefit of expediting the transition of armed groups 
to political entities. 
 
5. (SBU) Ikebe was unaware of any upcoming benchmarks in the 
political process (workshops, conferences, etc.) and explained that 
the Special Envoys would continue to remain in touch with the 
various rebel groups and encourage them, where possible, to 
consolidate their political agendas.  (Note: Other recent informal 
meetings with the JMST indicate that the Special Envoys are leaning 
toward a shuttle diplomacy approach to the process, possibly 
focusing on the elements of a comprehensive ceasefire, while 
avoiding mediation meetings set on arbitrary dates in which the main 
rebel groups will not participate.  The JMST does not believe that 
further rebel unification at this point is possible, and is focusing 
the five major rebel groups - JEM, URF, SLA/U, Shafie, 
SLM-Abdelwahid. End note.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
UN ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEADERSHIP DYSFUNCTION 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Ikebe described ongoing frictions between the JMST, 
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) and UNAMID Civil 
Affairs.  He observed that all three entities have a mandate to 
engage civil society, causing significant overlap and - without good 
coordination mechanisms in place - bureaucratic friction. 
 
7. (SBU) Poloff and Ikebe lamented that many of the internal 
coordination problems within the Hybrid structure stemmed from 
abysmal leadership, particularly on the part of Joint Special 
Representative (JSR) Adada, "who doesn't do anything," he observed. 
Ikebe was subtly critical too of both UN/AU Special Envoys Jan 
Eliasson and Salim Salim, remarking that their part-time presence 
and uncertainty about the length of their tenure further undermine 
the UN's ability to effectively manage a political process.  Without 
competent management at senior levels, many of the structural 
challenges and underlying bureaucratic tensions will be impossible 
to overcome, Ikebe opined. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
KHARTOUM 00000192  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) Ikebe's comments re-confirm many of the obstacles to the 
efficient functioning of UNAMID and the Darfur peace process that 
Post has highlighted in the past.  The full deployment of UNAMID, 
while necessary to stabilizing the region, may not succeed in 
fundamentally improving the situation in Darfur unless UNAMID 
leadership is strengthened.  JSR Adada desperately needs a stronger 
political team to advise him.  Additionally, there is a clear need 
for UN headquarters to accelerate recruitment of civil and political 
affairs personnel.  In Khartoum, Washington, New York, and Addis, we 
should collectively continue to urge the mediation team - which has 
recently indicated a greater willingness to entertain input - to 
outline a clear strategy that leads to a political settlement of the 
conflict.  Shuttle diplomacy is fine in the short term, but a chief 
mediator supported by a capable team needs to be in Darfur fulltime 
to achieve any progress. 
 
FERNANDEZ