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Viewing cable 08JAKARTA265, SECRETARY GENERAL SURIN ON BURMA, CHINA'S ROLE, AND U.S.

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08JAKARTA265 2008-02-08 02:57 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Jakarta
VZCZCXRO2611
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0265 0390257
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080257Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7942
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1503
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4710
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1980
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4393
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS JAKARTA 000265 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP 
BANGKOK FOR RDM/A 
 
E.O. 12598: N/A 
TAGS: ASEAN EAID KDEM KHIV PGOV PREL ID BM CH
SUBJECT: SECRETARY GENERAL SURIN ON BURMA, CHINA'S ROLE, AND U.S. 
ABSENCE 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Secretary General Surin believes that China gains 
a heftier -- undeserved -- stature in ASEAN every time U.S. leaders 
are absent from an ASEAN Summit or high-level meeting, to our 
detriment.  He notes the U.K. has decided to sign ASEAN's Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation; it is not a legally binding document, and the 
United States should follow suit.  He emphasizes the vital role of 
China in nudging Burma forward, and urges us to help press the 
Chinese to become more forceful.  Surin wants us to look for ways to 
engage Burma non-politically; he feels a sanctions-only approach 
makes it impossible for ASEAN to make progress with the junta.  He 
fears that without capacity building in health, education, and other 
social sectors, a post-junta Burma will quickly become a failed 
state.  End Summary. 
 
U.S.-ASEAN Summit: Symbols of Consequence 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) During a meeting with Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN's new 
Secretary General, on February 6, the Ambassador took note of the 
 
SIPDIS 
significance ASEAN places on having a U.S.-ASEAN Commemorative 
Summit.  Surin responded, "Everyone here would like to see Bush 
too". He revealed that during last week's ASEAN Senior Officials 
Meeting in Singapore, Prime Minister Lee specifically mentioned that 
Secretary Rice had twice missed ASEAN Ministers Meetings (AMM).  Lee 
 
SIPDIS 
had noted, however, that ASEAN hoped for a possible Summit with 
President Bush around the dates of the July G8 Summit in Japan or 
Beijing Summer Olympics. 
 
3. (SBU) Dr. Surin emphasized that summits and attending ASEAN 
high-level meetings, although symbolic, have concrete political 
consequences.  The U.S. has a real, substantive, engagement with 
ASEAN countries, he said, yet every time the U.S. is "distant and 
absent" China steps in with a symbolic gesture and reaps the 
accolades and political gains that a real partner like the U.S. 
truly deserves.  Over time, Surin asserted, the U.S. is replaced, 
though Southeast Asia was America's to lose. 
 
Everyone Loves Me (Even the Brits) But You 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) Another example is when other countries with little 
engagement or investment in ASEAN -- like Russia -- sign up to 
ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and gain tremendous 
goodwill.  The treaty is a political document, not a legally binding 
one, Surin continued; the United States only contributes to its slow 
displacement in the region by not signing on to the treaty.  Surin 
revealed that the U.K. has decided to sign the treaty but is 
delaying the formal act due to sensitivities about the issue of 
Burma.  After the U.K., he noted, the United States would be the 
only permanent member of the UNSC that has not signed. 
 
You Most Likely Know It as Myanmar, But It Will Always Be Burma to 
Me 
------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) The Ambassador emphasized how seriously we view the issue 
of Burma, and that we want to work constructively with ASEAN to move 
forward.  Surin believes that the U.N. process is stalling and that 
the search for a solution will return to the ASEAN region.  He 
vigorously emphasized the vital role of China in nudging "Myanmar" 
towards change.  Surin believes that the U.S. should press China to 
be more forceful, and that China might oblige if persuaded of the 
global "PR" benefits -- ASEAN countries alone cannot convince China 
to take this course of action.  For a regional intermediary, Surin 
suggested, a country like Brunei might be more effective and less 
intimidating than a vibrant, vocal democracy like Indonesia. 
 
6. (SBU) Dr. Surin urged the United States to look for ways to 
engage and work with Burma in non-political areas.  He suggested 
infectious diseases/healthcare, education, police training, public 
administration -- anything that might make the regime less stubborn 
and defensive (in the face of only sanctions) and more amenable to 
discussing change with ASEAN neighbors and other interlocutors. Who 
will build Burma's future leadership, Surin asked?  He expressed the 
fear that without serious capacity building in these areas now, a 
post-junta Burmese government and state might simply collapse under 
the weight of its inadequacies. 
 
HEFFERN