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Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD609, ADMIRAL FALLON DISCUSSES SECURITY COOPERATION WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ISLAMABAD609 2008-02-11 11:27 2011-05-30 02:00 SECRET Embassy Islamabad
Appears in these articles:
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/wikileaks-us-cables-expose-pak-f-16s-image-problem/201017
http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/us-cables-expose-pak-f-16s-image-problem-108985
VZCZCXRO4695
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0609/01 0421127
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111127Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5035
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 8127
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2775
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 8913
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 4783
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3472
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3612
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000609 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2028 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR MOPS PK
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL FALLON DISCUSSES SECURITY COOPERATION WITH 
GENERAL KAYANI 
 
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  Admiral William J. Fallon, USCENTCOM 
Commander, met with Pakistan's General Ashfaq Kayani, Chief 
of Army Staff, on 22 January.  Kayani provided a snapshot of 
Pakistan's current overall security situation and described 
the status of counter-insurgency efforts in Swat.  Fallon and 
Kayani also discussed areas for expanded military assistance 
and training, as well as Pakistan's way forward in improving 
close air support.  Finally, Kayani commented on improved 
cooperation with Afghanistan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Admiral Fallon began by offering condolences on the 
December 28 assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto, and asking General Kayani for his assessment of the 
current security situation.  Kayani agreed Bhutto's death was 
a tragedy and a destabilizing event for Pakistan, 
particularly in Sindh province.  Commenting on the overall 
security situation, Kayani noted that, despite the rising 
incidents of suicide attacks, things remained relatively 
normal throughout the country.  The Army had deployed more 
broadly during the recent holy month of Muharram, (a period 
often marked by sectarian violence), but had since returned 
to their cantonments. 
 
3. (C) Regarding Baitullah Mehsud, (generally considered 
responsible for Bhutto's assassination), Kayani said that he 
posed a serious problem for Pakistan.  Mehsud had shifted his 
focus from cross border attacks to internal assaults against 
Pakistan security forces and was conducting training for 
militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 
 
ELECTIONS 
 
4. (C) Regarding security for elections, Kayani stressed that 
the Army should have no role in the February 18 election - an 
exceptionally important election for Pakistan.  It was, he 
said, the Election Commission's duty to ensure free and fair 
elections.  The Army would only be involved if there were a 
need to preserve law and order to facilitate elections. 
 
SECURITY IN SWAT 
 
5. (C) Kayani said the militants had been cleared from Swat's 
population centers.  They were, however, still present in 
Peochar and adjacent tribal areas where pockets of resistance 
remained.  Kayani dismissed media reports of the resurgence 
of extremist group Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi 
(TNSM).  The Frontier Corps had initially been tasked to 
confront the militants in late October 2007, but within a few 
weeks it became clear the Army would be needed.  The Army 
regained control of the area after 2 to 3 weeks. 
 
6. (C) While Kayani felt the Army could not remain a 
significant force there forever, he said there would be a 
continuing need for troops to control entry routes into the 
district.  Also, the perception among some that continued 
security was dependent on the presence of the Army had led to 
plans for a small garrison in the area. 
 
7. (C) The important thing, said Kayani, was that local 
people were against the insurgents and it was key to the 
Army's success to cultivate popular support.  The Army has 
distributed 1 million rupees (approximately 16,700 USD) in 
development aid to Swat.  (Kayani noted the Army had 
previously offered similar assistance in FATA.)  Kayani 
asserted that it was now critical for civilian government to 
take control in Swat. 
 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
 
8. (S) In response to Fallon's questions regarding military 
assistance, Kayani first focused on the need for surveillance 
assets.  Emphasizing the urgent need for tactical SIGINT 
capability for Pakistan's military aircraft, Kayani said he 
understood the U.S. was working on this issue and would have 
an assessment team in Pakistan shortly.  Kayani said he was 
not interested in acquiring Predators, but was interested in 
tactical level Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs).  He noted these 
were expensive and asked if the U.S. could grant or loan them 
to Pakistan. 
 
 
ISLAMABAD 00000609  002 OF 003 
 
 
CHALLENGES IN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 
 
9. (C) Kayani stated that President Musharraf had instructed 
him to examine the various U.S. options available to enhance 
Pakistan's close air support capability, but not to commit to 
any of them.  After considering the issue, Kayani had 
concluded Pakistan could not accept U.S. aircraft in support 
of Pakistan Army operations because it ran counter to the 
Army's need to effectively handle combat operations on its 
own. 
 
10. (C) Kayani also noted his own policy of selective use of 
aircraft in supporting operations as he felt employing combat 
aircraft within Pakistan would send the message that the 
level of conflict had escalated dramatically.  He admitted to 
reluctantly employing F-16s in South Waziristan within the 
past few days, following direct assaults on Laddha Fort, 
including hundreds of rocket attacks.  (Note: The use of the 
F-16s was presumably largely a show of force as the aircraft 
can only be employed during the day, while the attacks were 
at night. End Note.) 
 
11. (C) Referring to the situation in Waziristan, Kayani 
asked if Fallon could assist in providing continuous Predator 
coverage of the conflict area.  Fallon regretted that he did 
not have the assets to support this request, but offered 
Joint Tactical Aircraft Controller (JTAC) support for 
Pakistani aircraft.  Kayani demurred, saying that having U.S. 
JTACs on the ground would not be politically acceptable. 
Fallon then offered JTAC training for Pakistani troops. 
After a brief discussion on the complexity of building a 
night-capable, air-to-ground capability in the Pakistani 
Army, Kayani conceded Pakistan could not currently undertake 
such a big project. 
 
12. (C) Kayani stated his preferred aerial support weapon 
against militants continued to be the Cobra Attack 
Helicopter.  He observed ruefully that maintenance issues 
still plagued the Army; one hour of flight time corresponded 
to 24 hours of maintenance.  Kayani said that only two 
operational Cobras were available in the FATA.  Fallon 
responded that a U.S. Army helicopter maintenance team was 
currently in Pakistan to provide both short and long term 
recommendations to improve Pakistan's rotary sustainment. 
 
OFFER OF ADDITIONAL U.S. TRAINING 
 
13. (C) Fallon offered a more permanent training team at the 
Special Service Group's Tarbela camp to complement the 
current Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program. 
Kayani responded that a steady stream of U.S. Special Forces 
trainers were already directing courses there throughout the 
year.  Fallon explained that the small Special Forces team he 
was proposing could assist in ongoing training management, as 
well as doctrine, command and control issues, and other 
higher-level functions.  Kayani said the Pakistan military 
did not need training and asked Fallon to give priority to 
his equipment requests.  (COMMENT: It is the assessment of 
CENTCOM and Post that the Pakistan military needs and would 
benefit from additional Special Operations Forces and focused 
counterterrorism training. END COMMENT) 
 
FRONTIER CORPS TRAINING 
 
14. (C) Kayani initially said equipping the Frontier Corps 
was a higher priority than training, but LTG Salahuddin 
Satti, his Chief of General Staff, and MG Ahmed Shuja Pasha, 
Director General Military Operations, weighed in regarding 
the importance of training.  Kayani then conceded that 
leadership training for the Frontier Corps was more critical, 
but feared it would take years to show results. 
 
AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
15. (C) Kayani said that the most recent Tripartite meeting 
with ISAF General McNeill and Afghanistan General Bismullah 
Khan on December 31 had gone well.  He added that he had 
given General Khan a ""blank check"" to send Afghanistan 
National Army troops to Pakistan's military schools.  He 
praised the plan to establish multiple Border Coordination 
Centers as a good concept that would enhance cooperation. 
 
 
ISLAMABAD 00000609  003 OF 003 
 
 
16. (U) Admiral Fallon has cleared this cable. 
 
PATTERSON