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Viewing cable 08DUBLIN64, IRELAND SUPPORTS SINIORA GOVERNMENT WITHIN EU

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DUBLIN64 2008-02-06 14:10 2011-07-22 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Dublin
VZCZCXRO0784
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHDL #0064/01 0371410
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 061410Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8889
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0030
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2018 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PHUM EFIN EINV EI
SUBJECT: IRELAND SUPPORTS SINIORA GOVERNMENT WITHIN EU 
CORRIDORS 
 
REF: A. STATE 10786 
 
     B. STATE 11025 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Section Chief Ted Pierce; 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The Irish Government is under no illusions 
about the "single-minded brutality" of the Syrian regime, 
according to Michael Gaffey, a senior Foreign Affairs 
official.  He added that Ireland and the EU must ensure the 
sovereignty and independence of the Government of Lebanon. 
However, he noted that the isolation and inflexibility of the 
Syrian regime made it unlikely that additional pressure would 
have a positive effect.  Describing Siniora as an 
exceptionally strong individual, Gaffey noted that both the 
Irish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were very impressed 
with him.  Gaffey promised to initiate a discussion within 
the Irish Government regarding funding for the Tribunal; 
which, he said, was likely to be forthcoming.  While the 
Irish Government will push hard within the corridors of the 
EU to garner support for Lebanon, in the end it is likely to 
accede to the consensus that emerges from the EU debate.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) POLOFF delivered demarche (Ref A) on February 6, 
2008 to Michael Gaffey, Director, Middle East and North 
Africa Division, Department of Foreign Affairs.  Beginning by 
noting that the people of Ireland were genuinely sympathetic 
to the Government of Lebanon (having been engaged in UNIFIL 
for many years), Gaffey stated that it is in the interests of 
Ireland and the EU to ensure the sovereignty and independence 
of the Government of Lebanon.  He portrayed Lebanon as a 
victim of instability throughout the region, noting that any 
problem in the Middle East seems to end up being fought out 
in Lebanon.  In Ireland's view, a comprehensive Middle East 
settlement, which achieves peace between Israel and Syria, is 
the best way to resolve the political problems in Lebanon, 
Gaffey said. 
 
3.  (C) Calling on his own experience dealing with Syria -- 
including a visit there in early 2007 with Prime Minister 
(Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern and Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern -- 
Gaffey stated the Irish Government is under no illusions 
about the "single-minded brutality" of the Syrian regime, 
which, he said, was unlikely to hold genuine elections or 
become more accommodating.  He described the regime as 
isolated (even from other Arab states) and interfering in 
Lebanon (e.g., orchestrating the assassination of Lebanese 
leaders) in a manner it thinks best meets its own narrow 
interests.  (Note: Ireland's relations with Syria are 
conducted from their embassy in Cairo.  End note.) 
 
4.  (C) Gaffey stated that the EU must hang tough on Lebanon 
and send a strong message to Syria that Lebanon will not 
become a victim of any peace agreement in the Middle East; 
for example, that Lebanese sovereignty will not be sacrificed 
for an Israeli/Syrian peace agreement.  The EU, he declared, 
must be a guarantor of Lebanese sovereignty.  He noted that 
if Syria chose, it's actions in Lebanon could demonstrate its 
interest in a comprehensive regional peace settlement. 
However, he wondered whether additional pressure on Syria 
would really make any impact as Syria is already immensely 
isolated.  In 2007, when his delegation also visited Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia, Gaffey said that the leaders of those 
nations seemed to be holding Syria at a long arm's length. 
 
5.  (C) Describing Siniora as an exceptionally strong 
individual, Gaffey said that both the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Minister were very impressed with him during their 
meetings in Lebanon last year.  He revealed that Siniora had 
immediately called the Prime Minister in early January to 
express his concern when two Irish troops in Lebanon were 
lightly wounded.  Gaffey voiced the opinion that Siniora has 
been doing an excellent job of cultivating European leaders. 
 
6.  (C) Gaffey stated that Syria seems to fear the Special 
Tribunal on Lebanon.  He indicated that he would initiate a 
discussion within the Irish Government on financial support 
for the Tribunal; a discussion, he said, that has not yet 
occurred.  He voiced his opinion that Ireland would agree to 
pledge funding, noting that the establishment of the Tribunal 
was in keeping with Ireland's position on Lebanon and its 
strong support for human rights throughout the world. 
 
7.  (C)  Comment: Irland's instincts are in the right place. 
 However, as Gaffey pointed out, Ireland is a small nation 
and can influence EU and international policy onl so far. 
While the Irish Government will push had within the 
corridors of the EU to garner suppot for Lebanon, in the end 
it is likely to accede to the consensus decision that emerges 
 
DUBLIN 00000064  002 OF 002 
 
 
from the EU. 
 
FOLEY