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Viewing cable 08DILI65, SECURITY MISSTEPS DAMAGE DILI' S RECENT PERFORMANCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DILI65 2008-02-28 09:52 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dili
O R 280952Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3886
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
USPACOM HONOLULU HI
NSC WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY DILI
UNCLAS DILI 000065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS; BANGKOK PLEASE PASS A/S HILL AND DAS MARCIEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TT
SUBJECT: SECURITY MISSTEPS DAMAGE DILI' S RECENT PERFORMANCE 
 
REF: DILI 61 
 
Summary 
 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU)  Serious missteps by the Timorese security forces, 
both the national police and the military, have dented the 
government's performance in recent days.  UNMIT has reported 
several credible reports of human rights violations of varying 
severity by the police since February 11, including the 
unprovoked beating of a journalist.  The surrenders of two 
alleged participants in the February 11 attacks on the President 
and Prime Minister have been handled very badly, including in 
one case the drawing of weapons by the Timorese military on 
UNPOL personnel.  Three other alleged perpetrators have been 
among more than 400 "petitioners" that have gathered in Dili; 
only late on February 28 were the five presented to a court. 
More than twenty other attackers remain at large, although 
reports suggest they are increasing desperate and preparing for 
surrender.  Six did so today.  Dili and the rest of Timor-Leste 
remain calm.  The ever-growing crowd of petitioners in Dili 
gives the government a big opportunity to resolve one of the 
nation's priorities.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU)  In reftel, we had a relatively positive assessment of 
the government of Timor-Leste's (GOTL) performance since the 
attacks on the president and prime minister on February 11, 
2008.  While we saw several potential vulnerabilities and the 
possibility of renewed instability due to government inaction or 
maladministration, we judged performance overall as reassuringly 
good.  In brief, the GOTL since 2/11 implemented emergency and 
other measures in accordance with the constitution and law, 
institutions continued to function, Timorese security agencies 
cooperated to maintain stability and capture the 2/11 
perpetrators, and the country's leadership focused on resolving 
the military petitioner and IDP priorities.  Regrettably, some 
of the GOTL's recent actions seriously undermined our 
confidence.  Highlights follow. 
 
Human rights abuses 
 
------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU)  UNMIT human rights officials state there have been 
between ten and fifteen reports of credible violations of human 
rights by the Timorese national police (PNTL) since February 11, 
including physical abuse.  Full investigations by UNMIT are 
pending.  Prominent among the allegations are the arrest and 
beating of a journalist apprehended on February 24 during curfew 
hours and, though not widely reported, the nighttime and 
uninvited entry into a house used as a residence by UNPOL 
officers and the beating of a Thai UNPOL member.  The Secretary 
of State for Security promptly issued a public apology regarding 
the PNTL's ill-treatment of the journalist. 
 
4.  (SBU)  On February 25, UNPOL took into custody a suspect for 
whom an arrest warrant had been issued due to his involvement in 
crimes committed by Alfredo Reinado's group in 2006.  The 
suspect surrendered to UNPOL voluntarily, was brought by UNPOL 
to the Dili detention center where he stayed overnight and, on 
February 26, was handed over to the prosecutor general for 
judicial processing.  Later that day, the prosecutor general 
released the suspect prior to his appearance before a court into 
the personal "custody" of one of the petitioners now in an 
encampment in Dili. 
 
5.  (SBU)  On February 27, another 2/11 suspect voluntarily 
surrendered himself to the police in Oecussi, the Timor-Leste 
enclave in Indonesia.  UNPOL provided helicopter transportation 
back to Dili and UNPOL police accompanied.  Upon arrival at the 
Dili airport, the suspect was placed in an UNPOL vehicle and the 
party proceeded towards the airport exit.  A Timorese military 
(F-FDTL) truck blocked their departure, however, and fourteen 
troops with weapons drawn surrounded the UNPOL car and seized 
the suspect.  He, too, was dropped at the petitioners' 
encampment without having first been delivered to the judicial 
authorities.  Beyond the outrageous and wholly improper threat 
against UN personnel, and the arguable commission of an act of 
armed kidnapping, the F-FDTL troops violated Timor law as they 
do not have police powers of arrest.  (Note: this incident has 
not yet made it into the local press.) 
 
6.  (SBU)  There also have been a number of worrisome actions by 
F-FDTL personnel on February 11 and thereafter, as well as 
apparent GOTL forbearance of impunity by soldiers and others. 
Questions surrounding the actions of the president's F-FDTL 
close protection unit on February 11 are legion.  As of February 
27, F-FDTL commanders had denied permission to F-FDTL troops 
present at the president's residence and eyewitness to the 
events on February 11 to undergo interviews with police 
investigators and provide evidence.  (Note: the prosecutor 
general told us yesterday that permission finally had been 
granted and the F-FDTL soldiers would soon present their 
accounts, but we have not been able to confirm that they have 
done so.)  In November 2007, four F-FDTL soldiers were sentenced 
to 12 years in prison for committing murder during the 2006 
crisis.  Although all of their appeals have been heard and 
denied, none have been turned over to prison authorities, and 
one has been seen manning the security detail at President 
Horta's residence(!).  In addition to the two suspects mentioned 
above, UNMIT confirms that three others with outstanding 
warrants for either the 2/11 events or Reinado-related 2006 
activities were among the petitioners now assembled in Dili. 
 
Still moving forward 
 
-------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU)  Despite the serious bruises that the rule of law and 
respect for human rights in Timor-Leste suffered over the past 
few days, overall the situation remains positive.  Dili and the 
remainder of the country are calm, stores are open, and markets 
are bustling as normal.  All members of the U.S. embassy family 
are safe as are members of the American community.  Surprisingly 
large numbers of petitioners have assembled in Dili, a startling 
development (and opportunity) not predicted even a week ago. 
Numerous reports have Salsinha, the leader of the remaining 2/11 
attackers, feeling increasingly isolated, fearful of capture and 
preparing himself for surrender.  Six of his band surrendered to 
police in a district outside of Dili today.  Senior UNMIT 
representatives told us that the PM responded to the February 27 
incident (para 5 above) with a letter to the SRSG promising to 
investigate fully, the President twice has formally apologized, 
and the PM and SRSG will meet the evening of February 28 to 
discuss.  The five suspects in Dili finally were turned over to 
UNPOL late on February 28 and presented before a court. Other 
functions of government roll on, albeit at the low levels to 
which we are accustomed.  Ministers in charge of economic/social 
development have been pushing us hard to advance assistance in 
areas from roads to IDP housing. 
 
8.  (SBU)  As always in this volatile country, we face a great 
deal of unpredictability going forward.  The capture/surrender 
of the remainder of the 2/11 attackers could be prolonged or go 
badly.  Coordination among the four security agencies (F-FDTL, 
PNTL, UNPOL and the Australian-led International Stabilization 
Force) has been strained, sometimes sharply so, and could yield 
an unhappy or tragic outcome.  There is great public uncertainty 
regarding the events of 2/11, the motivations of the attackers 
and the extent and prominence of their supporters.  Once the 
truth is revealed, the political consequences could be 
significant and destabilizing.  There are also dangers of an 
official cover-up, failure to fully pursue the truth, or 
enjoyment by the perpetrators or their supporters of impunity. 
The petitioners that have presented themselves in Dili give the 
GOTL an enormous opportunity to resolve a set of grievances that 
have tragically undermined the nation's stability for more than 
two years.  But will the government be able to effectively mount 
a decisive response?  We remain alert both to the dangers 
present in Timor's forlorn political landscape, and eager to 
assist those leaders committed to the strengthening and 
development of Timor's democratic institutions and rule of law. 
KLEMM