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Viewing cable 08COLOMBO177, NGOS IN LTTE-CONTROLLED AREA BRIEF ON GROWING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08COLOMBO177 2008-02-20 10:31 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0177/01 0511031
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201031Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7714
INFO RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 5913
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4260
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1849
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4264
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3360
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 8340
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0738
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2622
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS COLOMBO 000177 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/INS 
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
AID/W PLEASE PASS USAID/OFDA, USAID/ANE, USAID/CMM 
KATHMANDU FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WILLIAM BERGER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL PTER CE
SUBJECT: NGOS IN LTTE-CONTROLLED AREA BRIEF ON GROWING 
RISKS AND ACCESS PROBLEMS 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  In a February 19 briefing at the EU 
Commission for selected Heads of Mission, international NGOs 
operating in the northern area of the Vanni still controlled 
by the LTTE reported growing constraints on their operations, 
including increasing restrictions on access both to and 
within the Vanni, growing risk to their staffs as a result of 
the Government's intensive air campaign and the LTTE's 
location of strategic targets near NGO facilities, and 
increasing GSL efforts to tax and limit the visas of INGO 
expatriate staff.  The INGOs also reported that forced 
conscription of INGO local staff by the LTTE has diminished, 
the incidence of civilian casualties from the GSL's intense 
bombings remains relatively low, while LTTE representatives 
remain upbeat about their chances of countering the GSL's 
military campaign.  The Ambassador and EU Head of Mission 
Wilson undertook to raise with appropriate GSL interlocutors 
the access, tax and other problems INGOs are experiencing as 
a result of GSL actions.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) A group of international NGO staff representing 95 
percent of the INGOs operating in the LTTE-controlled area of 
the Vanni briefed Ambassador, the EU Head of Mission, the 
Ambassador of Switzerland, and the Deputy Chiefs of Mission 
of India and Norway on February 19 on the growing operational 
constraints they face from both the Government of Sri Lanka 
and the LTTE. 
 
Access 
------ 
 
3. (SBU) INGOs reported growing constraints on their access, 
both into and within the Vanni.  With respect to the movement 
of food and other supplies into the Vanni, the GSL has set up 
a new check point at Medawachchiya (south of the principal 
check point at Omanthai).  Effectively, this new check point 
means that every vehicle must be offloaded and inspected 
twice before entry into the Vanni, thereby slowing down 
considerably shipment of essential commodities and supplies. 
The government has also limited the number of vehicles that 
are allowed through the Omanthai check point to only six to 
eight per day.  The third problem has been that the local 
commanders inspecting vehicles at Omanthai ignore written 
approvals issued by relevant GSL agencies in Colombo. 
 
4.  (SBU) The INGOs also reported that access within the 
Vanni also has diminished considerably.  Whereas INGOs 
enjoyed relatively free access to most parts of the Vanni in 
early 2007, they are now able to travel only on the main 
north-south A-9 road, the road east from Killinochchi to 
Mullaittivu, and to some limited areas west of Killinochchi. 
The INGOs attributed the new restrictions to the significant 
fighting that is now occurring between GSL and LTTE forces 
along most parts of the southern forward defense line marking 
the southern boundary of the LTTE-controlled area. 
 
Risks to INGO Staff From Bombings 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  The INGOs expressed concern about the growing 
risks to their staff from the almost daily aerial bombings by 
the Sri Lankan Air Force.  They noted that while the Air 
Force was reasonably accurate in its targeting, LTTE and INGO 
offices are intermingled all over Killinochchi so that even 
small variances on target accuracy had potentially 
devastating impacts for the INGOs.  They noted, for example, 
that a recent large bomb dropped on an LTTE facility in 
Killinochchi had landed only 170 meters from a UN office. 
The INGOs and the UN have already provided the GPS 
coordinates marking the locations of their facilities in the 
north to the Sri Lankan military.  They have also taken steps 
to establish fallback operational centers in Akkarayan, 
southwest of Killinochchi.  They complained however that the 
LTTE had begun to rebuild in Akkarayan the previously bombed 
Voice of Tigers Transmitter Station, presumably to take 
advantage of the INGO presence there to shield it from 
 
additional air force bombings. 
 
Growing Visa, Tax and Other Restrictions on INGOs 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
6.  (SBU)  The INGOs complained of a host of continuing and 
new operational and administrative constraints from the 
Government of Sri Lanka.  Expatriate INGO staff are 
experiencing significant delays in receiving their visas, 
while work permits are only being renewed for three month 
periods.  They were also concerned that for the first time 
ever the visa request for an INGO Head of Office (Norwegian 
People's Aid) to enter the country was denied.  An additional 
constraint is that the income tax for expatriate staff will 
be increased to 35 percent in April of this year from the 
previous level of 15 percent.  This will further discourage 
expatriates from working in Sri Lanka, which the INGOs 
believe is the government's objective.  Finally, they 
complained of huge Inland Revenue tax bills.  INGOs are now 
being obliged to pay income tax on all money that is brought 
into the country for project implementation.  The only 
exemptions are for infrastructure development projects in 
conflict areas, humanitarian programs related to the tsunami, 
medical relief, and rehabilitation for children mentally 
harmed by the conflict or the tsunami.  One INGO has received 
a tax bill of $200,000 for projects implemented in 2005 and 
2006; another received a tax bill for $310,000.  The 
Ambassador and EU Head of Mission Wilson responded that such 
revenues should be exempt and undertook to raise this with 
the GSL. 
 
7. (SBU)  INGOs also expressed concern about an ever 
increasing number of requests and demands from the government 
for information.  For example, the NGO Secretariat recently 
requested information on all NGO assets as well as names and 
addresses of all staff.  The government also established more 
than a year ago a Parliamentary Select Committee for the 
Investigation of the Operations of NGOs and Their Impact. 
While the INGOs have cooperated with the Committee's request 
for information they have been dismayed that almost 
immediately after meetings with the Committee, information 
they have furnished appears in the media in an often biased 
and distorted manner.  Attempts to correct these distorted 
reports only fuel further intimidation and criticism. 
Ambassador and Wilson noted they had successfully persuaded 
the Coordinating Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (CCHA) to 
express publicly in mid-December the government's support for 
UN operations and INGO agencies and undertook to continue to 
defend the importance of INGO operations in Sri Lanka. 
 
Forced LTTE Conscription of INGO Staff Down 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU)  With respect to the forced recruitment of local 
INGO staff by the LTTE the INGOs reported that a total of 51 
local staff had been forcibly recruited by the LTTE between 
August 2006 and November 2007.  Of those, 44 had been 
released by the LTTE following representations by the INGOs, 
while seven remain conscripted.  The INGOs reported that most 
of the 44 had been released quite quickly and that forcible 
conscription by the LTTE had diminished overall in recent 
months. 
 
LTTE Surprisingly Upbeat 
------------------------ 
 
9.  (SBU)  Asked about the mood of the population and the 
LTTE in the Vanni, the INGO representatives responded that 
LTTE representatives were surprisingly "upbeat" about the 
LTTE's military prospects.  The Ambassador noted this was not 
that surprising given reports that the LTTE had inflicted 
heavier-than-expected casualties on the government, forcing 
GSL leaders to extend their own deadline for defeating the 
LTTE until the middle of 2009.  INGO representatives 
commented that most schools and businesses continue to 
 
operate normally and that lots of supplies appear to be 
coming to the Vanni from India, particularly diesel fuel and 
some consumer and other goods.  They also commented that the 
level of civilian casualties from government bombings 
continues to be relatively low, considering the intensity of 
the bombings. 
 
Presidential Advisor Promises to Ease Check Point Problems 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
10.  (SBU)  Later the same day Ambassador, EU Head of Mission 
Wilson and the Norwegian DCM met with Presidential Advisor 
Basil Rajapakse to raise concerns about the new check point 
at Medawachchiya and the shrinking number of vehicles that 
were being inspected each day at Omanthai, from a daily 
average of 25-30 vehicles to only 6-8 at present.  Such 
restrictions could constrain food supplies in the Vanni, they 
noted.  Rajapakse said that the new check point at 
Medawachchiya had been temporarily put in place following the 
spike in terrorist attacks by the LTTE prior to the February 
4th independence day celebrations.  He candidly admitted that 
the government had considered canceling the independence day 
celebrations, but instead instituted new security measures, 
one of which was additional screening of vehicles into and 
out of the Vanni.  He said he had met with UN Resident 
Representative Buhne earlier in the day to discuss this same 
issue and had agreed that the UN would provide to the Army 
Commander, the Ministry of Defense and Basil, a daily list of 
all UN vehicles going through the Omanthai the next day. 
Such vehicles would not be subject to the same stringent 
security searches, and would not be counted against the daily 
allocation of 6-8 vehicles.  In addition, all vehicles owned 
by the Government Agent of Killinochchi, the Road Development 
Authority, and other government agencies would get permanent 
passes.  The slots for the 6-8 vehicles going into the Vanni 
on a daily basis could therefore be allocated mostly to 
INGOs.  Rajapakse anticipated that the Medawachchiya check 
point would be dismantled in approximately one week.  He said 
he also had instructed the government agent to purchase paddy 
in Killinochchi which will reduce the amount of food that 
must be imported from the south, ease congestion at the 
checkpoints and raise incomes in the north. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (SBU) The new operational and other constraints on INGOs 
reflect a combination of operational needs by the GSL and 
LTTE to keep INGOs out of conflict areas, a quiet effort by 
the Government to diminish the role of INGOs who often are 
among the few willing to criticize the GSL, and a growing 
campaign against foreign influences spurred by the 
nationalist JVP party.  The Government has allowed efforts 
such as the Parliamentary Select Committee in part because of 
its own concerns about INGOs, but also because the GSL needs 
the JVP's support in the war effort.  The GSL fears the JVP's 
power to bring people out on the streets and knows it can do 
so anytime because of popular unhappiness about the high rate 
of inflation.  Embassy will continue to counter this campaign 
against INGOs, but anticipates it will get worse as the 
conflict intensifies. 
BLAKE