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Viewing cable 08BOGOTA736, SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 29-MARCH 2 VISIT OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BOGOTA736 2008-02-28 00:16 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #0736/01 0590016
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280016Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1565
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 8416
UNCLAS BOGOTA 000736 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
MEXICO FOR SECRETARY GUTIERREZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD EFIN PGOV EAID CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 29-MARCH 2 VISIT OF 
COMMERCE SECRETARY GUTIERREZ, SBA ADMINISTRATOR PRESTON AND 
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO COLOMBIA 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) Your visit comes as Colombia experiences a dramatic 
transformation, fostered by targeted U.S. assistance. 
Colombia finds itself safer, economically stronger, better 
governed and more democratic than it has been in decades. 
Rates of murder, 
kidnapping, and violence nationwide, including against union 
members, have fallen dramatically.  Increased security has 
led 
to an economic boom that has reduced poverty by 20 percent 
since 2002, lowered unemployment 25 percent, and attracted 
record levels of investment.  More than 40,000 combatants, 
mostly paramilitaries, have laid down their arms and are 
participating in GOC reintegration programs. Desertions among 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) increased 
in 2007. 
 
2.  (SBU) Nevertheless, Colombia remains a work in progress. 
Consolidating recent gains and making further advances on 
human rights, security, and poverty reduction--while also 
managing increasingly tense relations with Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez--represent the greatest challenges for 
the remaining 2.5 years of the Uribe Administration. 
Our continued commitment to Colombia--through approval of the 
U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Act (CTPA) and support 
for Plan Colombia--will help lock in Colombia's democratic 
security gains, promote regional stability, and contribute 
to a Colombia that povides security and opportunity to all 
its citizens.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
CTPA Solidifies Advances: 
Investment, Poverty, and Security 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) President Uribe's democratic security policy and free 
market economic reforms have spurred the economy.  GDP growth 
approached seven percent in 2007 after averaging more than 
five percent annually since 2003.  Colombia's trade volume 
grew more than 65 percent in the same period.  The United 
States remains Colombia's largest trade partner 
(approximately 40 percent of exports and 26 percent of 
imports), though Colombia's trade with Venezuela has soared 
in the last two years, and Colombia could shift to greater 
agricultural imports from Canada and the European Union when 
free trade negotiations with them conclude in 2008.  Nearly 
93 
percent of Colombia's exports already receive duty-free 
access to the U.S. under the Andean Trade Preferences Act 
(ATPA), 
which expires February 29, 2008, while U.S. exports to 
Colombia face an average tariff of 12.5 percent.  Investors 
from 
around the world boosting investment in Colombia in 
anticipation of the CTPA.  In 2007, Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) exceeded $7.5 billion, 350 percent greater than FDI in 
2002. 
 
4. (SBU) The Colombian Congress ratified the CTPA in 2007 by 
a substantial margin, and it remains the Colombian 
government's 
highest economic priority.  Delays in U.S. approval or 
rejection of the accord would deal severe political and 
economic blow to Uribe and his policy of strengthened ties 
with the United States -- especially given recent tensions 
with Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez.  Colombia's second 
largest trading partner, Venezuela, has already begun 
commercial retaliation over Uribe's decision to 
end Chavez' formal facilitator role in a humanitarian 
exchange with the FARC.  Venezuela has restricted automobile 
imports from Colombia and deployed troops to the border to 
stop unofficial cross border trade. 
 
5. (U) Analysts estimate the agreement with the United States 
would add between one and two percent annual GDP growth to 
the local Colombian economy.  This growth would add the new 
jobs in the formal sector employment that Uribe needs to meet 
his goal of cutting the poverty rate from 45 percent 
to 35 percent by 2010.  Trade-based formal sector growth will 
also provide the GOC with additional fiscal resources to 
shoulder a larger portion of its security costs as USG Plan 
Colombia support falls. 
 
------------------- 
 
 
Democratic Security 
------------------- 
 
6. (U) The establishment of greater Colombian government 
territorial control and the paramilitary demobilization have 
created the space for civil society and political parties to 
operate more openly than ever before.  The GOC maintains a 
police presence in all 1099 municipalities for 
the first time in history.  Increased security of roads and 
highways have allowed for greater freedom of movement for 
people and commerce.  Murders fell from over 29,000 in 2002 
to less than 17,000 in 2007, and kidnappings fell from over 
2800 a year to less than 600 during the same period. Local 
elections in October 2007 reflected the improved security with 
over 86,000 candidates participating.  The leftist Polo 
Democratico Party (PDA) won 1.2 million more votes than in 
2003, and its candidate won the key Bogota mayoral race. 
 
-------------- 
Labor Violence 
-------------- 
 
7. (U) Labor violence and impunity remain major concerns, 
with the government making greater progress than is regularly 
reported. Since 2002, labor union data demonstrates that 
murders of unionists for political reasons or common crime 
have fallen 
more than 75 percent.  A resident International Labor 
Organization (ILO) representative arrived in Colombia in 
January 2007 to 
help implement the tripartite agreement committing the GOC to 
provide $4 million to finance the ILO Special Technical 
Cooperation program and to provide $1.5 million a year to the 
Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia).  The Fiscalia 
operates 
as an independent agency responsible for prosecuting cases of 
violence against trade unionists.  The additional funding 
enabled the Fiscalia to create a special sub-unit with nearly 
100 prosecutors and investigators to investigate 187 priority 
cases.  Since 2001, the Fiscalia has resolved 56 cases of 
labor violence, leading to 118 convictions.  For 2008, the 
Fiscalia has received an additional $40 million in GOC funds 
that has allowed it to add 1,072 new positions, including 175 
prosecutors and 200 investigators. 
 
8. (U) In addition to gains stemming from its democratic 
security policy, the GOC has taken specific steps to protect 
labor leaders and other vulnerable individuals.  In 2007, the 
Ministry of Interior and Justice's $34 million Protection 
Program helped protect more than 6,900 human rights 
activists, journalists, politicians, and other threatened 
individuals, including 1720 trade unionists.  The murder rate 
for unionists is now lower than that for the general 
population. 
 
-------------------- 
Human Rights Record 
-------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress 
on human rights cases involving military abuse or 
collaboration with paramilitaries.  All members of the 
military and police receive mandatory human rights training. 
In October 2006, Defense Minister Santos named the first 
civilian -- and the first woman -- as director of the 
Military Criminal Justice System.  Santos has strongly backed 
initiatives to deter extrajudicial killings, changing 
promotion criteria to favor demobilization or capture of 
illegal fighters and ordering military personnel to 
facilitate civilian investigations of all combat deaths. 
Human rights groups allege that security forces committed 955 
extrajudicial killings over the last five years. 
 
10.  (U) The Fiscalia has made advances in prosecuting 
military personnel alleged to have committed human rights 
abuses. In August 2007, a court convicted three military 
personnel for the murder of three unionists in Arauca in 
2004. In November 2007, the Fiscalia ordered the detention of 
Army Captain Guillermo Gordillo for his participation in the 
massacre of eight civilians near San Jose de Apartado in 
February 2005.  The Fiscalia has set up a special 
prosecutorial team to investigate cases of alleged 
extrajudicial killings. 
 
--------------- 
U.S. Assistance 
--------------- 
 
 
 
11. (SBU) In January 2007 the GOC government presented a Plan 
Colombia "consolidation strategy" pledging a Colombian 
investment of $78 billion through 2013.  The proposal 
emphasizes the importance of building social cohesion, 
assigning substantial resources to help strengthen local 
governance, protect human rights, and help displaced people, 
Afro-Colombians, and indigenous communities.  It also aims to 
reintegrate more than 45,000 demobilized ex-fighters and 
deserters and to 
promote Colombia's licit exports.  The GOC seeks funding from 
the United States and European countries to complement its 
own resources. 
 
12.  (SBU) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more 
than $5 billion in assistance, including $800 million in 
economic and social assistance. USG security assistance 
combats drug trafficking and terrorism through training, 
equipment, and technical assistance.  It supports Colombian 
military aviation, essential for all programs - civilian or 
military - outside Colombia's major cities.  U.S. social and 
economic aid focuses on alternative development, displaced 
and other vulnerable communities, human rights and democratic 
institutions, and reintegration of demobilized fighters. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Drug Eradication and Interdiction 
---------------------------------- 
 
13. (SBU) Eradication of coca and poppy crops and 
interdiction of cocaine and heroin reached near-record levels 
in 2007.  President Uribe supports greater manual 
eradication, but understands that manual eradication cannot 
replace aerial eradication without a sharp increase in 
spending.  He seeks a complementary approach using both 
methods.  In 2007, the National Police and military forces 
seized almost 150 metric tons of cocaine and coca base, and 
destroyed 200 cocaine laboratories.  We continue to work with 
the Colombian government to refine our eradication strategy 
and determine how best to transfer key tasks from the USG to 
the GOC. 
 
----------- 
Extradition 
----------- 
 
14. (SBU) Since taking office, President Uribe has approved 
over 614 extraditions to the United States, including a 
record number of 164 in 2007.  Among those extradited in 2007 
were 11 members of the FARC and three members of the United 
Self Defense Forces of 
Colombia (AUC). 
 
--------------------------------- 
Demobilization and Peace Process 
--------------------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) Over 32,000 former paramilitaries have demobilized 
since 2002, and a further 14,000 have deserted from other 
illegal armed groups (about one-half from the FARC).  The OAS 
estimates there are 30 emerging criminal groups with a 
combined membership of over 3000 persons.  Reintegration 
programs and targeted law enforcement are working to counter 
these groups.  Under the Justice and Peace Law (JPL) process, 
over 50 former paramilitary leaders have been jailed, and 
many have confessed their participation in violent crimes. To 
date, the JPL process has revealed the location of the 
graves of almost 1200 paramilitary victims and provided 
information on 3600 crimes.  Almost 100,000 victims have 
registered under the JPL, with the GOC working on measures to 
accelerate the payment of reparations. The Supreme Court 
and the Fiscalia--with GOC support--continue to investigate 
politicians with alleged paramilitary ties. Fifty-two 
Congressmen, 19 mayors and 11 governors have been implicated 
in the scandal. 
 
16. (SBU) The National Liberation Army (ELN) has negotiated 
with the Colombian government for over two years on a 
cease-fire agreement, but ELN infighting and FARC pressure 
have prevented a deal.  The ELN kidnap civilians to fund its 
operations, but its military capability is declining.  The 
FARC has rebuffed GOC initiatives to engage in any meaningful 
peace talks, and killed eleven state legislators held hostage 
in July 2007.  The GOC authorized Venezuelan President Chavez 
to facilitate peace talks between the Colombian government 
and the FARC and ELN in late August 2007, but subsequently 
suspended his role after Chavez intervened in Colombia's 
 
 
internal politics.  The GOC issued a communiqu in January 
2008 
urging Chavez to "stop his aggression towards Colombia" after 
Chavez proposed that the international community grant the 
FARC "belligerent status" and remove the group from worldwide 
terrorism lists.  Chavez subsequently announced the 
militarization of Venezuela's 2200 kilometer border with 
Colombia. 
 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
17. (SBU) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in 
February 2003 are the longest held U.S. hostages in the 
world.  A November 2007 video seized by the GOC from a FARC 
urban cell showed proof-of-life of the three Americans. 
Their safe release remains a top priority.  President Uribe 
has assured us that any humanitarian exchange will include 
the U.S. hostages.  In January, the Colombian Government 
authorized the International Committee of the Red Cross -- 
working with Venezuela -- to recover FARC-held hostages. The 
FARC released four additional Colombian hostages on February 
27, again working with the ICRC and Venezuelan Government. 
Brownfield