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Viewing cable 08BEIRUT302, LEBANON: SAAD CALLS ARAB LEAGUE MEETINGS "USELESS"

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BEIRUT302 2008-02-26 13:13 2011-07-21 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16545
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16461
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16545
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16546
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16605
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16606
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16703
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16793
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16794
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16636
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16635
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17148
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17149
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17150
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17152
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17155
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17156
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17157
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17158
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17159
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17160
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17161
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17163
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17164
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17165
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17166
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17167
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17169
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17170
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17171
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16723
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16635
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16636
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16637
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16638
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16639
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16640
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16641
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16642
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16643
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16644
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16645
VZCZCXRO8612
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0302/01 0571313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261313Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1126
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 1096
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2002
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2264
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000302 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PRM/FO, AND PM/FO 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO 
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY 
DEPT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM PINR PREF MASS SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD CALLS ARAB LEAGUE MEETINGS "USELESS" 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 296 
 
     B. BEIRUT 292 
     C. BEIRUT 286 
 
BEIRUT 00000302  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for Reasons: Sec 
tion 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C)  On February 25, Majority leader Saad Hariri called 
the February 24-25 round of Arab League meetings "useless." 
Michel Aoun continued to insist on a blocking third in the 
cabinet, and Syria does not want the presidential election to 
take place.  Hizballah, meanwhile, was escalating its 
activities.  Saad pressed for more U.S. and UNRWA assistance 
in rebuilding Palestinian refugee camps to root out 
terrorism, and reiterated his calls for more sophisticated 
U.S. military equipment.   End summary. 
 
2. (C) Charge Sison, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with 
majority leader Saad Hariri, along with advisors Ghattas 
Khoury and Nader Hariri and notetaker Nadine Chehab, on 
February 25, immediately following a separate meeting with 
Arab League SYG Amr Moussa (Ref A). 
 
ARAB LEAGUE MEETINGS "USELESS" 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) Saad called the February 24-25 round of Arab League 
meetings "useless."  Aoun was still focused on becoming 
president himself, and the opposition continued to insist on 
a blocking third in the cabinet, mainly to enable it to block 
any decisions on the Special Tribunal.  There had, however, 
been some agreemnt on the electoral law, i.e., to use the 
1960 lw as a basis for discussion, but disagreements 
rmained on districting.  Saad saw no point in continuing to 
talk to Aoun or even Parliament Speaker Berri, other than to 
help ease Sunni-Shia tensions. 
 
4. (C) In separate conversations with the Charge, Druse 
leader Walid Jumblatt and Telecom Minister Marwan Hamadeh 
each called the summit a "total failure."   Using almost 
identical language, they each said, "We want a president, but 
not at any price," and, "Amr Moussa's goal seems to be the 
summit, not Lebanon."  In a separate meeting with Pol/Econ 
Chief on February 27, March 14 SYG Fares Suaid also said Amr 
Moussa was looking for a diplomatic victory for the Damascus 
summit.  In Suaid's view, Moussa, afraid of being labeled 
pro-American, accepted the opposition's draft points and was 
focusing on the details in an attempt to paint to the problem 
as an internal Lebanese one, rather than admit that Syria was 
the real problem.  The real issue at stake, Suaid said, was 
Hizballah's arms. 
 
5. (C) The Syrians do not want a president, Saad continued. 
The Asad regime is more concerned with the Lebanon file than 
the March 27-29 Arab League summit, he explained, because it 
views Lebanon as Syria's arena for its fight with Israel. 
Unfortunately, Israel is content with keeping the Asad regime 
in power.  The U.S. needs a Syria policy, he added;  "You 
have ten times more evidence against Syria than you did 
against Saddem Hussein!  He further warned that Syria might 
decide to follow Turkey's example of entering northern Iraq 
by engaging in cross-border operations in Lebanon.  Syria's 
agenda is to regain control of Lebanon via Hizballah, he 
said; it is their "force majeure" and it will happen in the 
long run. 
 
6. (C) Commenting on his recent trip to Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE, Saad said Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and 
UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed were "pretty 
solid vis-a-vis Lebanon" and were trying to help.  Everyone 
in the Arab world is concerned about where we are going, Saad 
said, adding, what pressure can be exerted on Syria? 
 
7. (C) Saad planned to travel to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt 
and possibly Morocco before the Arab League summit in 
Damascus to seek more support for Lebanon.  He believed the 
Egyptians would follow the Saudi lead in deciding whether to 
attend the summit, but cited Libya and Qatar as problematic, 
saying the U.S. should push the Qataris.  The Kuwaitis 
"probably will be solid," he said, but he still "had a 
question mark" about the Jordanians' position.  Saad also 
said he planned to travel to Turkey soon. (Note:  Saad 
departed for Saudi Arabia on February 26.  End note.) 
 
8. (C) Saad dismissed press reports claiming the Saudi's were 
withdrawing $4.8 billion in investments from Lebanon.  If 
anything, the Saudis may have decided not to pursue potential 
real estate deals, Nader suggested. 
 
HIZBALLAH WILL RETALIATE 
FOR MUGHNIEH ASSASSINATION 
------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Saad said he did not know how much the assassination 
of Hizballah military leader Imad Mughnieh would affect 
Syrian-Iranian relations, but he did believe Hizballah would 
take some sort of retaliatory action against Israel. 
Hizballah had been sending him messages to this effect, in 
addition to escalating its public rhetoric.  Furthermore, 
recent statements by IRGC and Iranian leaders revealed how 
involved they are with Hizballah, as well as Al-Qaeda, which 
was responsible for the 1996 Khobar Towers attack.  The 
Iranians and Syrians are deeply involved with Al-Qaeda, he 
repeated, asking, why are the Syrians investigating who 
killed Mughnieh, but not how he was killed on Syrian soil? 
 
10. (C) Meanwhile, Hizballah was entering people's homes in 
Lebanon, nearly causing security incidents and forcing Saad 
to bring all of "our people of the Future Movement" to 
control the clashes.  Showing the Charge pictures, Saad said 
that Future Movement headquarters had been hit by over 300 
bullets in a February 11 incident that had not been reported 
in the media.  Hizballah is preparing something, Saad warned. 
 Noting that the Iranian Ambassador had canceled a scheduled 
meeting with him a few weeks ago after Saad attacked Iran in 
a speech, Saad said he would make another speech soon that 
would be equally tough on Iran. 
 
RAMI MAKLOUF DESIGNATION 
------------------------ 
 
11. (C) Saad asked whether the recent U.S. Treasury 
designation of Rami Maklouf had resulted in any actions yet, 
adding that Maklouf had financial transactions in Romania and 
the Cayman Islands.  A lot of Hizballah funding comes from 
Africa, carried in cash by people who are 90 percent Shia, he 
said, promising to provide the Embassy with names. 
 
PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO NORTH 
LEBANON, PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 
----------------------------- 
 
12. (C) The conversation then turned to Saad's recent trip to 
north Lebanon, where he announced a $52 million grant to help 
build schools for 10,000 students in Tripoli and another 
8,000 in Akkar, where there were no public schools.  The 
money would also go towards a university in Akkar, which 
would be a "serious" religious university belonging to Dar 
al-Fatwa (the residence of Sunni Grand Mufti Mohamad 
Qabbani).  Saad said he also was providing 10,000 meals a day 
to Palestinians displaced from the Nahr al-Barid camp 
following last summer's conflict. 
 
13. (C) Saad acknowledged that the "scarecrow" of "tawteen" 
(Palestinian settlement) was always there.  Lebanon could not 
afford to settle the Palestinian refugees on its soil.  It's 
a delicate balance, he said.  Israel recognizes Lebanon's 
demographic problem, and in 2000 then Israeli PM Barak agreed 
with President Clinton and Yasser Arafat that Lebanon's 
refugees would be the first to return to their homeland.  But 
now President Bush's statement in Israel has "ticked everyone 
off," he said. 
 
14. (C) I believe we must rebuild the camps, he continued, to 
give people hope and prevent them from becoming breeding 
grounds for terrorists.  But this stirs up negative reactions 
from the Christians.  The U.S. and UNRWA could do a lot more 
to help if they put some "heavy" money into it, he said.  The 
Charge noted that she had discussed recently with UNRWA 
Director Richard Cook the political impact of this issue. 
Saad said UNRWA must be more "forward-leaning," using its 
legal authority under UNSCR 194.  It's the only way to fight 
terrorism, he said.  Two to three hundred million dollars is 
all that is needed.  PLO Executive Representative in Lebanon 
Abbas Zaki, with funding from Abu Mazen, was doing a great 
job trying to reestablish the Fatah movement inside the 
camps, to avoid the Hamas situation whereby the IRGC entered 
the camps. 
 
CALLING FOR COBRAS 
------------------ 
 
15. (C) The Nahr al-Barid conflict would have been less of a 
mess, he added, if the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had had 
more sophisticated weaponry, such as Cobra attack 
helicopters, which were still needed.  The PFLP-GC camp in 
Qousaya was boosting its arsenal, with the Syrians providing 
all kinds of weaponry, either to destabilize the Biqa, or in 
preparation for an attack from Israel.  Qousaya was up on a 
hill, Saad explained, and can only be attacked by air.  We 
have the pilots, but need helicopters and training, he said. 
The U.S. has talked a lot about this, but so far has only 
approved light weapons, even for control of the 450 km 
border.  Furthermore, we have police stations that have no 
cars, he complained.  If we'd had better equipment before the 
2006 war, we wouldn't be where we are today.  Saad also said 
the Internal Security Forces (ISF) needed closed circuit 
televisions, which would cost between $25 - 40 million. 
 
16. (C) The Charge pointed to the recent visit of USD/P 
Edelman -- the first high-level U.S. visit since she assumed 
charge -- as evidence that the U.S. was serious about helping 
the Lebanese Armed Forces with equipment and training.  In 
addition, 300 police cars provided by the U.S. would arrive 
next month, she said, and would be turned over to the ISF. 
SISON