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Viewing cable 08ATHENS217, GREEK MFA ON RUSSIA/ABKHAZIA AND GREECE/RUSSIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ATHENS217 2008-02-15 16:52 2011-06-11 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens
Appears in these articles:
http://www.tanea.gr
VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0217 0461652
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151652Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1217
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0397
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000217 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2018 
TAGS: GR PGOV PREL GG RU KNAR
SUBJECT: GREEK MFA ON RUSSIA/ABKHAZIA AND GREECE/RUSSIA 
 
REF: SECSTATE 14840 
 
Classified By: A/POLCOUNS JEFF HOVENIER.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Greek MFA Russian affairs directorate chief 
Ambassador Tsamados said Greece had seen little evidence 
indicating Russia was serious about recognizing Abkhazia as 
independent and had no interest in altering Soviet-era 
borders.  The GOG was not pleased by Putin's recent comments 
comparing the situation in Kosovo with that in northern 
Cyprus.  On Greek-Russian relations overall, Tsamados said 
they were not driven by ideological or cultural factors, such 
as the common Orthodox heritage, but by pragmatism and 
commerce, particularly energy pipelines.  Putin's 
authoritarianism was of concern, but Greece was not a 
"Russian Trojan Horse."  END SUMMARY. 
 
ABKHAZIA 
-------- 
 
2. (C) On February 15, DepPolCouns delivered reftel points on 
possible Russian recognition of Abkhazia to MFA A5 
Directorate for Russia and CIS Countries Director Ambassador 
Nikolaos Tsamados, A5 First Counsellor for Georgian affairs 
Stella Bezirtzoglou, and A5 Counsellor for Russia affairs 
Elisabeth Fotiadou. 
 
3. (C) Tsamados said his office had seen little evidence that 
the Russians were seriously considering recognizing Abkhazia. 
 In fact, they had noticed an upswing in Russian-Georgian 
relations.  A UDI by Kosovo followed by recognition by 
Western countries could complicate the situation, and Russia 
might want to "throw some salt into the wounds." 
Nevertheless, Tsamados believed any Russian noise on Kosovo 
would represent nothing more than saber rattling since Russia 
had little real interest in allowing alteration of old Soviet 
borders.  Any alteration of Soviet borders, he argued, could 
set a precedent not only in Georgia but also for Chechnya, 
Dagestan, Yakutia, and other autonomy-minded Russian 
provinces. 
 
4. (C) Tsamados said Athens took particular note of Putin's 
comments comparing the declaration of independence for Kosovo 
with a declaration of independence for northern Cyprus.  Such 
comments, he pointed out, did little to win Greeks over to 
the Russian view. 
 
GREECE-RUSSIA 
------------- 
 
5. (C) Tsamados also took the opportunity to discuss the 
broader Greek-Russian relationship.  He said the relationship 
had little to do with ideology and was not really based on 
the Orthodox religion, which often amounted to a common faith 
dividing them.  Greek-Russian relations, rather, were 
"business-like" and focused on pragmatic commercial deals, 
such as the pipelines.  DepPolCouns noted that PM Karamanlis 
had lately been speaking positively about the Russian South 
Stream project but had not been as outspoken on the 
Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) gas interconnector, which could 
send investors a wrong signal.  Tsamados and Fotiadou 
retorted that TGI was already well on its way to completion 
while South Stream was much earlier in the planning stages. 
 
6. (C) They also characterized the recent Greek agreement to 
purchase Russian BMP armored personnel carriers from Moscow 
as driven by political factors surrounding PM Karamanlis's 
December visit to Moscow -- "any high-level visit needs to 
have some deliverables."  It was also driven, in part, by the 
Greek arms industry, which had been in serious decline 
recently but would now participate in manufacturing the BMPs. 
 
7. (C) DepPolCouns noted that the U.S. too wanted good, 
business-like relations with Russia and welcomed good 
Greek-Russian relations, but history demonstrated that an 
increasingly authoritarian Russia was an increasingly 
dangerous Russia, so commercial deals should be approached 
with caution.  Tsamados granted the logic of this argument 
and said Putin's statements in his annual press conference 
yesterday contained some particularly worrisome statements. 
Nevertheless, Tsamados argued that Greece kept its national 
interests front and center and was not concerned that it was 
being drawn into a relationship that it could not control. 
"We are not a Russian Trojan horse," he stated. 
 
8. (C) Finally, Tsamados noted that Greece and Russia were 
close to completing an agreement that would return Jewish 
Thessaloniki archives stolen by the Germans and captured by 
the Soviets at the end of WW II.  He provided no further 
details on the archives. 
SPECKHARD