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Viewing cable 08TUNIS7, Civil Society Success: Finally Hitting the Target at the

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TUNIS7 2008-01-03 09:22 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tunis
VZCZCXRO3741
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHTU #0007/01 0030922
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030922Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4257
RUEHMEP/THE MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0330
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0163
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1396
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1868
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0160
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0066
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3353
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 000007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM KMPI GE PREL PGOV YM
SUBJECT: Civil Society Success: Finally Hitting the Target at the 
BMENA Parallel Civil Society Event 
 
Ref: a) 07 Sanaa 2313 
 
     b) 07 Tunis 109 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified.  Handle accordingly. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) This year's BMENA Parallel Civil Society Forum 
(PCSF - ref a) - an annual event that prepares civil society 
participation in the annual Forum for the Future ministerial meeting - 
was a significant improvement over its predecessors.  Last year's 
parallel forum in Jordan was particularly weak: bad organization, 
lack of focus, a rival civil-society event that opposed the whole 
BMENA process, and no concrete results or conclusions. Following last 
year's experience, ref b laid out a number of recommendations to 
improve these events, including early engagement and support for the 
local organizer, better selection of participants and moderators, 
and a focus on concrete results.  Many of these recommendations were 
implemented, with MEPI support, and resulted in a professional, 
focused event that clearly advanced civil society's role and agenda 
within the BMENA process.  Most of the credit goes to the Yemeni 
organizer, the Human Rights Information and Training Center (HRITC) 
and the ROYG for its full support of the civil society event. 
Both were engaged, organized and willing to accept outside 
help/advice.  The signal achievements of the event were: 
 
-- the adoption of a "State of Democracy Report," assessing 
democratic reforms in the region, which is slated to be updated 
annually; 
 
-- creation of a steering committee of prominent civil society 
figures to act as an interface with the G8 regarding BMENA follow-up; 
and 
 
-- establishment of a rotating organizing committee, made up of the 
previous, current and upcoming organizers of the PCSF, to ensure 
continuity and quality. 
End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Picking up the Pieces 
--------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The 2006 third PCSF in Amman revealed the shortcomings of 
holding an annual civil- society event without a structure in place 
to ensure continuity, advance planning and quality control.  Although 
the event was attended by 350 civil society representatives (a 
majority from Jordan), many leading figures were missing, Islamists 
appeared heavily represented and few participants seemed aware of the 
purpose of the event.  Sessions were poorly organized and poorly 
managed and, for the most part, drifted off topic and devolved into 
lamentations/complaints about either governments in the region or 
regional hot-button issues.  The third PCSF produced no concrete 
conclusions or other positive results to speak of.  Because of this 
poor showing by the official PCSF, public attention shifted to a rival 
anti-BMENA, anti-US gathering, "The Anti-hegemony Conference" held 
one day later, which focused much of its time on Iraq and Palestine. 
This rival conference was no better organized or concrete in its 
results, but the very existence of the two events highlighted how 
easily civil society can become fragmented and ineffective. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Laying the groundwork for improvement 
------------------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Following last year's negative experience, we laid out in 
ref B a number of recommendations to improve these events. Many of 
these recommendations were implemented, with MEPI support, and 
resulted in a professional, focused event that clearly advanced civil 
society's role and agenda within the BMENA process. The most 
important reason was the early selection of the Yemeni Human Rights 
Information and Training Center (HRITC) as the organizer, with the 
full support of the ROYG.  HRITC held several meetings with key 
regional civil society reps to strategize for the PCSF, including a 
May 2-3 gathering in Amman funded by MEPI and attended by then-NEA 
DAS Carpenter. 
 
4. (SBU) NEA/PI remained in close contact with HRITC behind the 
scenes and provided significant funding for its organizing activities. 
HRITC established a strong coalition of 28 Yemeni civil society 
 
TUNIS 00000007  002 OF 002 
 
 
organizations and included them in preparations, which headed 
off any possibility of a "rival" civil society event.  Participant 
selection for the PCSF was the other key ingredient, as the turnout 
included an overall higher caliber of civil society representatives, 
including a large number of prominent figures from across the region. 
Septel reports on a group of MEPI alumni who prepared in advance for 
the PCSF and made a significant contribution to the proceedings. 
 
------------- 
Night and Day 
------------- 
 
5. (SBU) The fourth PCSF in Sana'a was professional and focused. 
Thematic panel discussions, interactive working groups and plenary 
sessions made the gathering more interesting and efficient. 
Participants seemed pleased with the agenda, which focused on 
concrete reform topics, and spent their time debating the way ahead 
rather than complaining about extraneous issues.  Recommendations 
were practical and led to the development of work plans to present to 
foreign ministers of the region and the G8 during the upcoming Forum 
for the Future.  Working groups selected their own delegates 
to the represent them at that ministerial meeting. 
 
---------------- 
Concrete Results 
---------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The Sanaa PCSF produced significant accomplishments on both 
the administrative and substantive front.  It agreed to a new 
institutional structure for communication, follow up and organizing 
events.  This includes a steering committee that will be the civil 
society interface with the G8 presidency on follow-up to civil society 
recommendations. (Comment: The Steering Committee is a welcome 
innovation, although we expect that selection of its membership could 
be treacherous.  End comment.) There also will be an organizing 
committee -- made up of the previous, current and upcoming PCSF's 
organizers -- to oversee preparation of future PCSFs. 
 
7. (SBU) Substantively, the PCSF produced a potentially landmark 
document as an answer to previous recommendations to monitor reform 
progress.  The concise "State of Democracy" Report assesses democratic 
reforms in the region over the past three years. This report helps to 
benchmark reform progress on two key topics: freedom of association 
and organization, and the legal environment of NGOs. Given the large 
number of reform issues, participants stressed the need to produce 
an annual report on a small number of critical reform areas as a means 
to change the dynamic of interaction between governments and civil 
society at the Forum for the Future. In past years, civil 
society presented its recommendations; governments took note, but 
felt no pressure to take further action on the recommendations.  It 
is hoped that an annual report will expose governments who are not 
supporting real reform.  Participants recognized that maintaining a 
set of reform indicators will be very challenging. Nonetheless, they 
felt it important to be able to effectively benchmark progress and 
ensure continuity throughout the Forum for the Future process. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Comment: Back on Track - For Now 
-------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) All involved in supporting the PCSF rightly should be 
pleased with the results. The new institutional structures agreed to 
should make future events easier, but it will be important to ensure 
they receive adequate attention and support from the new Japanese 
G8 Presidency and the host of the next Forum for the Future.  As 
with this year, early selection of the next organizer and early 
consultations with key players will be the prerequisites for building 
on this year's success. 
 
GODEC