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Viewing cable 08TOKYO127, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/16/08

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TOKYO127 2008-01-16 08:35 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO3239
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0127/01 0160835
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 160835Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1009
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7906
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 5512
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 9177
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 4185
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6118
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1119
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7186
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7840
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 14 TOKYO 000127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/16/08 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, new antiterror law 
(Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(2) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, new antiterror law 
(Asahi) 
 
(3) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, new antiterror law, 
permanent SDF dispatch legislation (Nikkei) 
 
(4) Sense of alarm spreading in ruling camp over policy of keeping 
provision tax rate, given declining public support for Fukuda 
cabinet (Yomiuri) 
 
(5) Cornered ruling parties to once again apply measure of last 
resort: Determined to adopt amendment to gas tax in second vote in 
Lower House; Passage of bill within current fiscal year uncertain 
(Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(6) 2008 Hokkaido Lake Toya Summit: NGOs to assemble in Hokkaido to 
provide policy proposals to G-8 leaders (Mainichi) 
 
(7) Seiron (Opinion) column by Hisahiko Okazaki: Hope for DPP-led 
government to bring peace to the Taiwan Strait (Sankei) 
 
(8) Koga, Tanigaki factions to formally agree today to merger plan; 
Factional realignment to be accelerated with eye on Lower House 
dissolution (Mainichi) 
 
(9) Extraordinary session of divided Diet closes without breaking 
away from 1955 political framework (Asahi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, new antiterror law 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Abridged) 
January 13, 2008 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage. Parentheses denote the results of the 
last survey conducted Dec. 15-16 last year.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Fukuda cabinet? 
 
Yes 41.4 (35.3) 
No 42.8 (47.6) 
Don't know (D/K) + no answer (N/A) 15.8 (17.1) 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the previous question) 
What's the primary reason for your approval of the Fukuda cabinet? 
Pick only one from among those listed below. 
 
The prime minister is trustworthy 20.5 (22.9) 
Because it's a coalition cabinet of the Liberal Democratic Party and 
New Komeito 8.4 (7.5) 
The prime minister has leadership ability 4.3 (4.4) 
Something can be expected of its economic policies 5.6 (3.2) 
Something can be expected of its foreign policies 6.2 (5.9) 
Something can be expected of its political reforms 3.3 (2.3) 
Something can be expected of its tax reforms 1.9 (1.9) 
 
TOKYO 00000127  002 OF 014 
 
 
Something can be expected of its administrative reforms 3.3 (2.4) 
There's no other appropriate person (for prime minister) 45.1 
(46.6) 
Other answers (O/A) 0.3 (0.9) 
D/K+N/A 1.1 (2.0) 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the first question) What's 
the primary reason for your disapproval of the Fukuda cabinet? Pick 
only one from among those listed below. 
 
The prime minister is untrustworthy 7.9 (12.5) 
Because it's a coalition cabinet of the Liberal Democratic Party and 
the New Komeito 9.8 (8.4) 
The prime minister lacks leadership ability 19.6 (16.5) 
Nothing can be expected of its economic policies 25.9 (21.6) 
Nothing can be expected of its foreign policies 3.6 (2.7) 
Nothing can be expected of its political reforms 12.6 (13.5) 
Nothing can be expected of its tax reforms 8.3 (8.4) 
Nothing can be expected of its administrative reforms 4.7 (8.7) 
Don't like the prime minister's personal character 6.5 (5.2) 
O/A 0.7 (1.7) 
D/K+N/A 0.4 (0.8) 
 
Q: The Diet has now enacted a new law that replaces the 
Antiterrorism Special Measures Law. This law is for the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force to back up U.S. and other foreign naval vessels 
in the Indian Ocean with fuel and water supply. Do you appreciate 
this law? 
 
Yes 44.1 
No 43.9 
D/K+N/A 12.0 
 
Q: This law was voted down in the House of Councillors with the 
opposition bench voting against it, and it was enacted in a second 
vote of the House of Representatives with the ruling coalition of 
the Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito voting for it with a 
majority of two-thirds. Do you think the lower chamber's overriding 
of the upper chamber's decision was appropriate? 
 
Yes 41.6 
No 46.7 
D/K+N/A 11.7 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the foregoing question) Why? 
(One choice only) 
 
Because there's no need for refueling activities 25.0 
Because the Diet did not fully deliberate on it 48.8 
Because it should have been scrapped without the House of 
Representatives' second vote 22.3 
O/A 1.4 
D/K+N/A 2.5 
 
Q: Would you like the current LDP-led coalition to remain in office, 
or would you otherwise like it to be replaced with a coalition 
centering on the Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto)? 
 
LDP-led government 35.0 (28.5) 
DPJ-led government 41.5 (44.7) 
D/K+N/A 23.5 (26.8) 
 
 
TOKYO 00000127  003 OF 014 
 
 
Q: The House of Representatives' current membership is up until 
September 2009. When would you like the next election to take place 
for the House of Representatives? 
 
During the first half of this year 22.9 
During the latter half of this year 29.6 
During the first half of next year 8.4 
Upon the current term's expiry in September next year 31.8 
D/K+N/A 7.3 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 32.0 (25.2) 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 27.0 (28.5) 
New Komeito (NK) 4.4 (3.1) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2.3 (3.6) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1.5 (1.5) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.6 (0.3) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0.4 (0.2) 
Other political parties, groups --- (---) 
None 30.5 (36.0) 
D/K+N/A 1.3 (1.6) 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted across the nation on 
Jan. 11-12 by Kyodo News Service on a computer-aided random digit 
dialing (RDD) basis. Among randomly generated telephone numbers, 
those actually for household use with one or more eligible voters 
totaled 1,470. Answers were obtained from 1,027 persons. 
 
(2) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, new antiterror law 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Full) 
January 13, 2008 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. Bracketed figures denote 
proportions to all respondents. Figures in parentheses denote the 
results of the last survey conducted Dec. 19-20, 2007.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Fukuda cabinet? 
 
Yes 34 (31) 
No 45 (48) 
 
Q: Why? (One reason only. Left column for those marking "yes" on 
previous question, and right for those saying "no.") 
 
The prime minister is Mr. Fukuda 19(6) 4(2) 
It's an LDP-led cabinet 32(11) 36(16) 
From the aspect of policies 21(7) 50(22) 
No particular reason 26(9) 8(4) 
 
Q: Which political party do you support now? 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 26 (27) 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 25 (25) 
New Komeito (NK) 3 (3) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 1 (2) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1 (1) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 (0) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) 
Other political parties 0 (1) 
 
TOKYO 00000127  004 OF 014 
 
 
None 37 (33) 
No answer (N/A) + don't know (D/K) 7 (8) 
 
Q: The U.S. and other countries have sent naval vessels to the 
Indian Ocean for antiterror operations in Afghanistan. The 
Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, which was for the Self-Defense 
Forces to back up their naval operations in the Indian Ocean, 
expired on Nov. 1, and the SDF discontinued its activities there. Do 
you think Japan should resume SDF activities there? 
 
Yes 34 (37) 
No 48 (48) 
 
Q: The Diet has now enacted a new law that replaces the 
Antiterrorism Special Measures Law. This law limits SDF activities 
in the Indian Ocean to fuel and water supply for a period of one 
year, and it does not require the government to ask the Diet for its 
approval of SDF activities there. Do you support this law? 
 
Yes 36 
No 40 
 
Q: This law was enacted in a second vote of the House of 
Representatives with a majority of two-thirds after it was voted 
down in the House of Councillors. Do you think the ruling 
coalition's overriding of the upper chamber's decision was 
appropriate? 
 
Yes 41 
No 41 
 
Q: A bill voted down in the House of Councillors is passed in a 
second vote of the House of Representatives for enactment into law 
with a majority of two-thirds. Do you support this way of doing 
things for other bills? 
 
Yes 18 
No 35 
Can't say which 44 
 
Q: The Diet has now enacted a law to provide across-the-board relief 
to all hepatitis C victims of government-approved blood products 
over their class action lawsuits against the government. Do you 
support Prime Minister Fukuda's response to this issue? 
 
Yes 71 
No 19 
 
Q: Do you appreciate the Fukuda cabinet for its way of handling the 
pending issue of unaccounted-for pension records? 
 
Yes 26 (36) 
No 55 (46) 
 
Q: Do you think the House of Representatives should be dissolved as 
soon as possible for a general election, or do you otherwise think 
there is no need to do so? 
 
Dissolve as soon as possible 34 (39) 
No need to do so 54 (48) 
 
Q: If you were to vote now in a general election, which political 
 
TOKYO 00000127  005 OF 014 
 
 
party would you like to vote for in your proportional representation 
bloc? 
 
LDP 25 (23) 
DPJ 36 (38) 
NK 3 (3) 
JCP 3 (3) 
SDP 3 (1) 
PNP 0 (0) 
NPN 0 (0) 
Other political parties 0 (1) 
N/A+D/K 30 (31) 
 
Q: Would you like the current LDP-led coalition government to 
continue, or would you otherwise like it to be replaced with a 
DPJ-led coalition government? 
 
LDP-led coalition government 27 (28) 
DPJ-led coalition government 35 (41) 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted Jan. 11-12 over the 
telephone on a computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis. 
Respondents were chosen from among the nation's voting population on 
a three-stage random-sampling basis. Valid answers were obtained 
from 956 persons (60 PERCENT ). 
 
(3) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, new antiterror law, 
permanent SDF dispatch legislation 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
January 13, 2008 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage. Parentheses denote findings from the 
last survey conducted in December last year.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Fukuda cabinet? 
 
Yes 42 (43) 
No 46 (46) 
Can't say (C/S) + don't know (D/K) 12 (11) 
 
Q: Which political party do you support or like now? 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 36 (38) 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 30 (34) 
New Komeito (NK) 4 (4) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (4) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 3 (2) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 (1) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) 
Other political parties 1 (0) 
None 16 (12) 
C/S+D/K 6 (5) 
 
Q: The Diet has now enacted a law to resume the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. A bill 
for this law was voted down in the House of Councillors, and the 
ruling coalition passed it in a second vote of the House of 
Representatives for enactment into law. Do you support this 
legislation? 
 
 
TOKYO 00000127  006 OF 014 
 
 
Yes 43 
No 38 
 
Q: The LDP and the DPJ have plans to create a permanent law for 
Japan to send the Self-Defense Forces for overseas missions whenever 
necessary. Do you support this legislative initiative? 
 
Yes 35 
No 46 
 
(Note) The total percentage does not become 100 PERCENT  in some 
cases due to rounding. 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was taken on Jan. 11-12 by Nikkei 
Research Inc. over the telephone on a random digit dialing (RDD) 
basis. For the survey, samples were chosen from among men and women 
aged 20 and over across the nation. A total of 1,277 households with 
one or more eligible voters were sampled, and answers were obtained 
from 744 persons (58.3 PERCENT ). 
 
(4) Sense of alarm spreading in ruling camp over policy of keeping 
provision tax rate, given declining public support for Fukuda 
cabinet 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
January 16, 2008 
 
The latest opinion poll by Yomiuri Shimbun found a drop in public 
support for the Fukuda cabinet. Even while showing a cool response 
to the survey result, the government and the ruling camp are 
becoming nervous about future moves by the opposition camp over the 
government's bill amending the Special Taxation Measures Law and 
public reactions to it. 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura said in a press conference 
yesterday: "Without being affected by public support rates for the 
cabinet, we will continue to do our best. This basic stance remains 
unchanged." 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary General Ibuki said the same 
day: "If the public opinion survey results lead politicians to 
determine politics, the result would be that lawmakers will lower 
themselves." On the approach taken by the ruling camp of using its 
two-third lower chamber overriding vote to pass the new 
antiterrorism bill, the ayes and nays are equally divided among the 
public. In reference to this, Ibuki commented: "Criticism of both 
ruling and opposition camps for leading to the use of an overriding 
vote is included in negative replies." 
 
Learning that about 60 PERCENT  said they were against the ruling 
coalition's policy of keeping the current provisional high tax rate 
on gasoline, many in the government and the ruling camp harbor a 
sense of alarm. A first-time-elected lawmaker of the LDP grumbled: 
"If the party takes a wrong step on this issue, public support for 
the cabinet may plummet at one stroke." 
 
In this connection, LDP Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Tadamori 
Oshima told reporters in the Diet building: "(If asked,) (the 
people) are expected to say that it is desirable to see (the prices 
of) gasoline drop, but such replies are different from their 
comprehensive judgment." He then stressed that the government will 
give a full explanation to the opposition bloc and the public to 
 
TOKYO 00000127  007 OF 014 
 
 
have them understand the ruling camp's policy. 
 
Speaking before reporters at party headquarters, Democratic Party of 
Japan Secretary General Hatoyama spoke of the public opinion survey 
result on the provisional gas tax rate and indicated that his party 
will step up its attack on the government over the issue in the 
ordinary Diet session to open on Jan. 18. He said: "The result 
showed that most respondents think that the provision tax rate 
naturally should be scrapped when it expires. Our party, together 
with the public, will fight against the ruling camp to protect the 
people's livelihood." 
 
(5) Cornered ruling parties to once again apply measure of last 
resort: Determined to adopt amendment to gas tax in second vote in 
Lower House; Passage of bill within current fiscal year uncertain 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
January 16, 2008 
 
The ruling parties yesterday decided to pass a bill amending the 
Special Tax Measures Law, including the maintaining of the 
provisional rate added to the gasoline tax, out of a sense of alarm 
that the Fukuda Cabinet would suffer a major blow if it fails to 
maintain that tax. However, it will not be an easy task for the 
government and the ruling parties to maintain the provisional tax 
and prevent gasoline prices from falling even resorting to using its 
last card, putting the bill to a second vote in the Lower House. 
 
Liberal Democratic Party Diet Policy Committee Chairman Tadamori 
Oshima speaking to a meeting of secretaries general and Diet Affairs 
Committee chairmen of the ruling parties yesterday, appealed that 
the provisional tax rate be maintained, "Let's tackle it with 
resourcefulness and solidarity so that we can resolve the issue by 
the end of March." 
 
The ruling parties even decided to resort to a second vote in the 
Lower House, which could bring about a backlash from the public. 
They made the judgment that giving up on  maintaining the 
provisional tax would deal a greater blow to the Fukuda cabinet than 
approving the bill again in the Lower House. The government and the 
ruling parties intend to maintain the provisional tax for another 
decade as special-purpose road construction resources. They are 
concerned that failure to obtain Diet approval for the bill amending 
the Special Tax Measures Law would affect various fields in such a 
way as to cause commotion in the financial market, triggered by a 
drop in gasoline prices. 
 
However, their last resort of approving the bill again in the Lower 
House backed by the overwhelming two-third majority of the ruling 
parties could not be used unless the bill is voted down in the Upper 
House or 60 days pass after the bill was sent to the Upper House. 
 
As such, the ruling parties want to submit the bill around Jan. 25, 
although it used to do so in February in the past. It intends to 
finish deliberations in about 20 days so that the measure clears the 
Lower House in mid-February instead of early March as has been the 
pattern in the past. This is in order to secure sufficient 
deliberation time in the Upper House so that conditions for the DPJ 
to take a vote on the bill within the current fiscal year can be 
set. 
 
The DPJ yesterday formed a gasoline price cut force consisting of 
 
TOKYO 00000127  008 OF 014 
 
 
junior lawmakers with eye on even applying physical resistance in 
the Diet. 
 
Deputy President Naoto Kan during the inauguration ceremony 
encouraged members, "Do your best in a clean-slate state with the 
determination to press hard when necessary." 
 
LDP Secretary General Bunmei Ibuki during a press conference 
yesterday sought to check the DPJ from increasingly becoming 
hard-lined, noting, "It is strange for the Upper House to spend 50 
days on deliberations on the bill, when the Lower House can take a 
vote on it in some 20 days." However, the DPJ is increasingly 
turning up its voltage. The ruling parties' troubles will likely 
continue for some time to come. 
 
(6) 2008 Hokkaido Lake Toya Summit: NGOs to assemble in Hokkaido to 
provide policy proposals to G-8 leaders 
 
Mainichi online (Full) 
January 12, 2008 
 
? G-8 summit a test case for central and Hokkaido governments to 
establish ties with NGOs 
 
Various groups, including nongovernmental organizations (NGO), are 
proactively pushing ahead with preparations to have civic voices 
reflected in the upcoming Lake Toya Summit (the annual major 
industrialized countries' summit to be held on July 7-9). In recent 
G-8 summits, NGOs demonstrated their enhanced presence, for 
instance, by presenting policy recommendations to the G-8 leaders. A 
number of groups, including the G-8 Summit NGO Forum, a community 
composed of domestic NGOs based in Tokyo, have decided to gather 
together in Hokkaido in conjunction when the Lake Toya Summit and 
send a message to the world. Administrative organizations are 
remotely related to civic groups in Japan, compared with those in 
Western countries. The upcoming summit will serve as a test case for 
the central and Hokkaido governments to establish relations with 
NGOs. 
 
The G-8 Summit NGO Forum was set up in January of last year, with an 
eye to the Lake Toya Summit, as the nation's first cross-sectional 
organization with 103 NGOs and other groups addressing international 
tasks as its members. The forum plans to compile a package of 
recommendations covering the areas of (1) the environment; (2) 
poverty and development; and (3) human rights and peace. The group 
will present the report to the governments of the G-8 countries. The 
group is preparing to hold an alternative summit (tentative name) in 
Sapporo on July 6-8 in cooperation with the G-8 Summit Civic Forum 
Hokkaido in Sapporo - composed of 40 groups inside and outside 
Hokkaido. 
 
Plans have also been made to hold a summit of indigenous peoples 
across the world and another summit of religious leaders from about 
20 countries, both in Sapporo, in order to offer opinions to the 
leaders. 
 
NGOs - well versed in the actual state of assistance for developing 
countries - have increased their influence in the international 
community recently. In the Cologne Summit in Germany in 1999, the 
G-8 leaders agreed to relinquish their loan claims on poor countries 
in response to a call from NGOs. In the St. Petersburg Summit in 
2006 in Russia and the Heiligendamm Summit in 2007 in Germany, 
 
TOKYO 00000127  009 OF 014 
 
 
representatives from NGOs met government representatives from the 
G-8 countries and also met even with the president and the prime 
minister of the host nation in each summit. The G-8 Summit NGO Forum 
Secretariat has continued negotiations with the Foreign Ministry in 
 
SIPDIS 
hopes of being given an opportunity to make policy advice directly 
to the Japanese prime minister this time, too. 
 
In Heiligendamm, 100,000 persons linked to NGOs assembled in 
neighboring towns. During the session, camping grounds were opened 
for NGO members, and admission cards to the International Media 
Center (IMC) were issued to 100 members of 50 groups. Although there 
was a scene in which an anti-globalism demonstrative gave rise to 
confusion, International Cooperation NGO Center President Masaaki 
Ohashi said: "Only violent demonstrations were focused on in 
reporting, and most were peaceful activities." 
 
An official of the Foreign Ministry's G-8 Summit Preparation Office 
said: "Since there are geographical restrictions, unlike Europe, we 
cannot forecast how many people will gather this time." But the 
secretariat expects several thousand people to enter Hokkaido. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
In the Kyushu / Okinawa Summit in 2000, the Foreign Ministry 
provided NGOs a base of operations but did not allow them to enter 
the IMC. An NGO member claimed: "We were isolated diplomatically." 
President Ohashi stated: "Most NGOs are against the use of violence. 
We want the government to give us a chance to make an appeal in 
Hokkaido, without becoming too nervous." 
 
Major events planned by NGOs in Hokkaido: 
 
? Alternative summit (July 6-8) to be co-sponsored by the G-8 Summit 
NGO Forum and the G-8 Summit Civic Forum Hokkaido. Symposiums on 
"the environment," "poverty and development," and "human rights and 
peace" will be held during the session. 
 
? Summit of indigenous peoples: (from June 28 through July 4) to be 
sponsored by the Indigenous People Summit Ainu Mosir 2008, inviting 
about 20 natives from the United States, Latin America, and Asia. 
Reports with recommendations will be compiled on three themes: "the 
environment;" "the recovery of rights;" and "education and women." 
 
? G-8 summit of various religious leaders: (July 1-4) to be 
sponsored by the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP). More 
than 100 representatives of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and other 
religions from about 20 countries will participate in the summit to 
work out action programs on the environment, poverty, nuclear 
nonproliferation, and other issues. 
 
? G-8 summit of university presidents: (from June 29 through July 1) 
to be sponsored by Hokkaido University, bringing together more than 
30 university presidents inside and outside Japan to draw up a 
statement focusing on both efforts for environment protection and 
economic development, with "sustainability" as the buzzword. It will 
also hold symposiums intended for citizens. 
 
The university summit will be held at a Sapporo hotel, and other 
meetings are planned to be held at the Sapporo Convention Center. 
 
(7) Seiron (Opinion) column by Hisahiko Okazaki: Hope for DPP-led 
government to bring peace to the Taiwan Strait 
 
SANKEI (Page 13) (Slightly abridged) 
 
TOKYO 00000127  010 OF 014 
 
 
January 11, 2008 
 
Hisahiko Okazaki, former ambassador to Thailand 
 
Proposal for abandonment of arms? 
 
The following passage, which was not given wide press coverage, was 
included in a report President Hu Jintao made to the 17th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China last fall. 
 
"We would like to make a solemn appeal: On the basis of the 
one-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of 
hostility between the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct 
a framework for peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and 
thus usher in a new phase of peaceful development." 
 
Since the moment I heard of that passage, I have considered it an 
important proposal. 
 
Taiwan has previously called on China to abandon the option of using 
armed force, but China rejected Taiwan's call. If a peace agreement 
as stated in Hu's report means renouncing the use of armed force, it 
is a landmark proposal and meets the Japanese and American policy 
goals of seeking a peaceful solution of the Taiwan Strait issue. 
 
Neither the reunification of two Chinas nor Taiwan's acceptance of 
"one country, two systems" is made a condition. What (Hu) made a 
basis is the "one-China principle." "One China' is indeed the very 
basis of the Taiwan issue and an adaptable concept. 
 
When both sides across the Taiwan Strait decided in 1992 to hold a 
dialogue, China made it a condition for (Taiwan) to accept the 
"one-China principle." But the result was that without reaching a 
clear agreement on what one China actually means, bilateral talks 
between Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan took place in April 1993. 
 
Afterwards, China noted that Taiwan accepted the "one-China 
principle," while Taiwan asserted: "Both sides of the Taiwan Strait 
have not reached any specific conclusion about the expression 'one 
China' neither in the Hong Kong talks set by the (Beijing-based) 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the 
(Taiwan-based) Straits Exchange Foundation, both of which were 
authorized by their respective governments to arrange the talks, nor 
in the development that followed the talks.'" (Taiwan Weekly Review 
issued on May 5, 2005) 
 
Kuomintang would follow China's lead 
 
Reportedly, the Taiwanese side suggested that both China and Taiwan 
interpreted one China in their own ways respectively. At any rate, 
the talks between both sides of the Taiwan Strait were held, setting 
aside China's assertion that the condition for the talks to be held 
is for both sides to reach agreement on one China. 
 
My conclusion is that if the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wins 
in the next presidential election, it will be good for Taiwan to 
start negotiations with Beijing on the basis of Hu Jintao's 
proposal. Why the DPP? The reason is that negotiations with China 
will be delicate as seen in the question of one China, so I believe 
persons who have principles about Taiwan's identity like those 
members of the DDP should engage in negotiations. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000127  011 OF 014 
 
 
This does not mean I do not trust Ma Ying-jeou. In fact, Ma 
reportedly states he does not favor reunification and that it is no 
problem that China and Taiwan have their respective interpretations 
of one China. 
 
What Ma has said, however, is different from what the Kuomintang has 
asserted in the past. And I also can't sweep away the worry that the 
Kuomintang-led government may follow the lead of China. 
 
Tough negotiator necessary 
 
Hu Jintao declared a one-China principle, but because of complex 
domestic circumstances, China has yet to spell it out. It would do 
so but only after discussing it with Taiwan in the future and 
coordinating views at home. Until then, China and Taiwan can be 
expected to engage in tough-minded, fierce negotiations. Given this, 
I think it is necessary for a person with a strong beliefs about 
Taiwan's identity to engage in such talks. 
 
If the DPP serves as a negotiator with China, I think it is not a 
bad idea for Taiwan to come to terms with China on the term "one 
China." 
 
Specifically, the best policy is that Taiwan will add the condition 
that China must agree to Taiwan's membership in the United Nations 
in return for Taiwan conceding on the one China principle. If that 
is realized, a number of principles stated in the U.N. Charter, such 
as sovereign equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and a 
peaceful solution of the dispute, would come true. 
 
If that condition is set as an absolute condition, I do not care if 
someone backed by Kuomintang assumes the post of the president of 
Taiwan. It would be good if no such unnecessary conditions as "being 
neutral" or "future reunification" are added. In the case of Hong 
Kong, "one country, two systems" has been introduced. As a result, 
no popular election has taken place for the past 10 years (after 
Hong Kong's reversion to China). What has made me worry is the fact 
that there are only 40 years in which Hong Kong can enjoy a free 
society. 
 
Hu Jintao is rumored to be flexible in his political approach toward 
other countries. 
 
Hu may come to seek to settle the cross-strait issue in a couple of 
years upon judging that it would be unavoidable that the Taiwanese 
public would become more Taiwan-oriented year after year. If he does 
so, Taiwan will have an upper hand. Taiwan will not have to 
compromise at all on the issue of obtaining UN membership. 
 
If Hu is such an insightful person and has strong political power 
enough to be flexible in political approach, East Asia can realize 
the dream of bringing peace to the region after a half century of 
hostility. 
 
(8) Koga, Tanigaki factions to formally agree today to merger plan; 
Factional realignment to be accelerated with eye on Lower House 
dissolution 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
January 16, 2008 
 
The Koga and Tanigaki factions in the ruling Liberal Democratic 
 
TOKYO 00000127  012 OF 014 
 
 
Party (LDP) will formally agree on a merger in May in a meeting 
today of their heads, Makoto Koga, chairman of the LDP Election 
Committee, and Sadakazu Tanigaki, chairman of the party's Policy 
Research Council. The two factions were derived from the former 
Miyazawa faction (Kochikai). The move is in anticipation of a 
possible dissolution of the House of Representative for a snap 
general election. It is apparently aimed at the group becoming a 
force to support Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. The new faction will 
advocate that it is a liberal force and that its policy will be to 
give priority to the daily lives of people. There is a move in 
conservative forces to support the policy line of former Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe. As a result, the trend of factional realignment 
is now accelerating. 
 
"As showed in former Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda's income-doubling 
plan, the mission of Kochikai is to focus on the daily lives of 
people," Tanigaki stressed in a speech delivered on Jan. 12 in Ayase 
City, Kyoto. 
 
The membership of Koga and Tanigaki factions totals 61, making it 
the third largest LDP faction, following the second largest Tsushima 
faction (membership of 68). 
 
Kochikai was founded by former Prime Minister Ikeda in June 1957. As 
former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's following, it followed a 
dovish policy line of placing more priority on the economy than on 
Japan arming itself. 
 
Kochikai later changed its name to the Miyazawa faction. The 
Miyazawa faction was divided into two groups -- one headed by Koichi 
Kato and the other led by Yohei Kono. The Kono group is now called 
the Aso faction. Because of the so-called Kato rebellion in November 
2000, in which he called on then Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to step 
down, the Kato faction split into the Koga and Tanigaki factions. 
The factions have been prevented from recommending their members for 
cabinet posts since the inauguration of the Koizumi government. 
Seiwakai, the Machimura faction, from which the past three premiers 
and the incumbent prime minister hailed, has sharply grown in its 
strength. The political presence of the former Kochikai has been on 
the decline. 
 
The aim of the merger of the two factions is to restore their 
assertiveness in the LDP. It is difficult for them to secure public 
support by advocating the principle of being "liberal." Tanigaki 
indicated in his remarks that he wants to promote instead a policy 
of giving priority to the daily lives of people, which the Fukuda 
government has underscored, and use this principle to realign the 
LDP. Former Vice LDP President Taku Yamasaki said in a meeting of 
his faction: "The new core of forces giving consideration to the 
daily lives of people will definitely rise up." Meanwhile, the 
conservative force, which suffered a setback due to Abe's 
resignation, aims at recovering its position. Shoichi Nakagawa, a 
member of the Ibuki faction, launched last December a 
cross-factional study group. Although the group includes many 
lawmakers who support former Secretary General Taro Aso, it 
generally gives favorable consideration to Abe's policy of building 
a "beautiful country." One member said: "When it is time to find a 
candidate to succeed Prime Minister Fukuda, I will move to support 
Aso." As a result, LDP members supporting Fukuda feel alarmed by 
such a development. 
 
(9) Extraordinary session of divided Diet closes without breaking 
 
TOKYO 00000127  013 OF 014 
 
 
away from 1955 political framework 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Abridged) 
January 16, 2008 
 
The divided Diet, in which the opposition Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ or Minshuto) is the largest party in the House of Councillors, 
presented Japanese politics with a good opportunity to replace the 
"1955 framework" of choosing postponement or the rule of majority, 
symbolized by the Liberal Democratic Party's dominated system dating 
back to 1955 when the party was formed, with a 2007 system. But in 
handling the government-sponsored refueling support bill, neither 
the ruling camp nor the opposition bloc took action to find common 
ground, placing importance on managing the Diet. The Diet is 
required to make concessions in order to find the answer, while 
playing the role of making contentious points clear through 
standoffs. The task of creating a new system for managing the Diet 
by nurturing the move that emerged in the just-ended Diet session 
has been carried over to the next regular session. 
 
Enacting priority bills by the rule of majority and postponing less 
important legislation is the basic style that has been widely 
accepted by the ruling and opposition blocs under the 1955 
framework. The opposition camp has constantly played up its 
opposition to taking votes on bills by protracting Diet 
deliberations. One example was the enactment in 2006 of the Basic 
Education Law with a majority vote of the ruling parties after a 
total of 190 hours of deliberations in the two houses of the Diet. 
 
The 1955 framework has been effective in highlighting priority 
bills' contentious points, while avoiding the abuse of numerical 
superiority. But it has failed to prompt the ruling and opposition 
camps to join efforts to enact good laws by finding common 
denominators. 
 
People had been hopeful that the divided Diet would bring change to 
the political scene, with National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies Professor Jun Iio calling it a great chance to fundamentally 
review the established practice and precedents. Specifically, they 
expected that the ruling camp's adoption of the opposition bloc's 
viewpoint would result in fiscal and security policies reflecting 
popular will. 
 
Nevertheless, the refueling support legislation, a top priority for 
the government and ruling parties, followed a path typical of the 
1955 system. In November, DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa sealed off 
inter-party talks, saying, "We will not use any means that looks 
like rigging a bid between political parties." The ruling coalition, 
too, decided to readopt the legislation in the Lower House soon 
after the talks with the DPJ on forming a grand coalition fell 
through. As a result, despite 86 hours of Diet deliberations, the 
two sides endeavored only to play up their respective standpoints to 
the public and failed to search for common ground. 
 
Buds of revision talks and change 
 
There were some signs of change toward a 2007-model management of 
the Diet, while being tied to the 1955 political system. 
 
Some government-initiated bills were enacted after incorporating the 
ruling block's viewpoint into them. For instance, the opposition 
bloc had fiercely objected to a Broadcast Law revision including 
 
TOKYO 00000127  014 OF 014 
 
 
administrative measures against television broadcasters, presented 
under the former Abe cabinet. Before the Diet was divided, the 
ruling parties planned steamroller it, but during the latest Diet 
session, the ruling camp sounded out the DPJ on substantially 
revising the legislation and successfully enacted it in cooperation 
with the largest opposition party in the end. 
 
The DPJ had also called for the retroactive application of the 
lawmaker-initiated revision of the Law to Support the Rebuilding of 
Lives of Disaster Victims as well as for direct support. The ruling 
parties opposed the DPJ's requests in line with the government's 
wishes, but it managed to enact it during the latest Diet session 
owing to concessions by the largest opposition party. 
 
It was particularly epochal that the ruling parties and the DPJ 
established a panel in a committee to discuss the legislation. 
Another inter-party council was set up to discuss subsidies to those 
who contracted hepatitis C after being administered with 
contaminated blood products. Those panels might result in a system 
of establishing subcommittees or regularly using upper- and 
lower-house councils. 
 
The previous Diet, however, was undoubtedly marked by face-offs 
between the ruling and opposition blocs with Lower House dissolution 
in mind. Cooperation between the two camps on the aforementioned 
legislations owed much to personal ties between lawmakers of the two 
sides who were responsible for the subjects. Many challenges must be 
overcome before realizing a 2007-model Diet of facing off over 
controversial bills and making visible concessions on legislations 
containing common denominators. 
 
For separating the political situation from deliberations on bills, 
aiming at an agreement through talks between the two camps and 
identifying unattainable challenges beforehand is one idea. 
 
Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in a press conference yesterday said: "I 
had to use the trial-and-error method in the Diet session that 
closed today. I would like to see the opposition parties harbor a 
sense of crisis as well." The ruling and opposition camps share a 
sense of crisis now. This is a good opportunity for the buds that 
emerged in the latest Diet session to burst into bloom. 
 
26 bills enacted 
 
The 128-day extraordinary Diet session closed yesterday after two 
extensions and enacting a total of 26 bills. Of them, the government 
endorsed 14, fewer than the 18 enacted in the 85-day extraordinary 
Diet session in the fall of 2006. This comes from the government's 
cautious stance with the divided Diet in mind. 
 
At the same time, the ruling and opposition blocs jointly submitted 
many lawmaker-initiated relief bills. A bill revising the Law to 
Support the Rebuilding of Lives of Disaster Victims and legislation 
offering blanket relief to people with hepatitis C caused by tainted 
blood products were enacted one after another. 
 
The bill to establish a Japanese National Security Council (JNSC), 
submitted by the former Abe cabinet, was the only 
government-sponsored bill that was scrapped. 
 
DONOVAN