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Viewing cable 08SANJOSE71, RE-BUILDING BRIDGES IN COSTA RICA: A THREE-WAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SANJOSE71 2008-01-30 15:10 2011-03-21 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy San Jose
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSJ #0071/01 0301510
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301510Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9392
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUMIAGH/COMJTF-B SIMS SOTO CANO HO
RHMFIUU/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC, WHA/EPSC, PM AND EEB, 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CS EAID MASS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: RE-BUILDING BRIDGES IN COSTA RICA: A THREE-WAY 
PARTNERSHIP 
 
REF: A. SAN JOSE 003 
 
     B. SAN JOSE 1891 (NOTAL) 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  In an unusual three-way partnership, the 
GOCR, the Costa Rican private sector and the U.S. military 
have embarked on a campaign to replace key bridges damaged or 
washed out by flooding in the heavy 2007 rainy season. Most 
of the work will be undertaken by the National Emergency 
Commission (CNE) and a new business group called "Businessmen 
for Solidarity" (Empresarios Solidarios), which will combine 
forces to replace as many as 30 short-span and culvert 
bridges.  The U.S. role, begun by a SOUTHCOM technical survey 
in December, will be to help the GOCR erect as many as six 
Bailey-type bridges. President Arias requested USG assistance 
for the initiative.  Following the successful medical 
exercise last month (Ref A), this is another example of a new 
Costa Rican willingness to welcome U.S. military humanitarian 
assistance.  END SUMMARY. 
 
================== 
A BAD RAINY SEASON 
================== 
 
2. (U) The 2007 rainy season (May-December) was particularly 
heavy in Costa Rica, prompting the GOCR to declare a national 
disaster in October.  Communities in all seven provinces were 
affected by flooding, which isolated communities, damaged 
homes and infrastructure, and displaced thousands (Ref B). In 
light of the disaster, the Embassy made available $50,000 in 
OFDA disaster assistance for emergency supplies and fuel.  In 
mid-November, the CNE reported that some 18,000 people had 
been affected overall, with 18 killed and nearly 2,900 left 
homeless.  The CNE initially estimated that 124 major 
stretches of road and 29 bridges had been washed away or 
severely damaged.  Total damages at that time were estimated 
at 35 billion colones ($70 million).  As revised information 
became available, the CNE later raised the tally to 135-160 
bridges and culverts washed out or damaged nationwide. 
Infrastructure damage was so extensive, in fact, that one of 
the first tangible results of Costa Rica,s newly-established 
diplomatic relations with China was $20 million in disaster 
relief funding from Beijing, delivered in mid-December, which 
will go towards housing reconstruction (septel). 
 
============================== 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR MOVES FIRST 
============================== 
 
3. (SBU) To address the infrastructure reconstruction needs 
and to highlight the Costa Rican private sector,s sense of 
corporate responsibility, a group of firms joined forces to 
help with the post-flooding reconstruction.  Calling 
themselves Empresarios Solidarios (Businessmen for 
Solidarity), the loose consortium was drawn from financial, 
engineering, construction, and media firms under the informal 
leadership of Grupo Nacion, which owns the nation,s leading 
newspaper.  The group,s ambitious initial plan, as briefed 
to the Ambassador and Emboffs on October 29, was to raise USD 
1 million to rebuild eight bridges leading to isolated 
communities around the nation.  The group deliberately 
targeted not only areas in need, but also zones which had 
voted against CAFTA during the October 2007 national 
referendum.  The group also sought to distance itself from 
the GOCR, partially because the businessmen believed they 
could work faster than the government, and partly because 
they wanted to ensure the private sector received due credit. 
 The preliminary USG role, according to the Empresarios, 
would be to help locate, deliver or supply Bailey or ACROW 
bridging material. 
 
====================== 
THE GOCR ASKS FOR HELP 
====================== 
 
4. (SBU) Through November and December, Emboffs were invited 
to join the weekly planning meetings of the Empresarios 
group.  The ODR Chief and his staff, as well as Pol/C and 
Poloffs, participated.  Our first objective was GOCR support 
for the bridges plan, which would help facilitate any formal 
request for assistance.  In a letter from President Arias to 
the Ambassador on November 5 (copy sent to WHA/CEN and 
SOUTHCOM), we received both.  Arias,s letter expressed 
satisfaction with and gratitude for the Empresarios, 
initiative, and asked for any assistance the USG could 
provide.  Following a late-November call from the Ambassador 
to SOUTHCOM (Adm. Stavrides), SOUTHCOM and Post ODR staff 
 
began considering specific ways the USG could help. 
 
 
================= 
REFINING THE PLAN 
================= 
 
5. (SBU) Our second objective was to persuade the Empresarios 
to coordinate with the CNE to ensure that any private sector 
bridge reconstruction meshed with national needs.  Despite 
the group,s initial reluctance to work with the GOCR, they 
quickly realized that CNE expertise and cooperation would be 
essential.  As the weekly meetings continued (with CNE 
involvement), the Empresarios, plan was refined.  The group 
would target communities in need, financing and building 
bridges which had been washed out by the rain (and not 
structures the Ministry of Transport planned to improve or 
replace at some point.)  The group hoped the bridges would be 
just the first step in a long-term private sector commitment 
to infrastructure improvement. 
 
6. (U) By the end of November, the CNE and the Empresarios 
had agreed to work first on a list of 15 priority short-span 
(less than 15 meters in length) bridges.  All would be 
constructed using local materials (concrete) and local labor. 
 The total cost was projected to be over USD 1 million, 
exhausting what the business group had collected to that 
point.  The group planned to approach additional companies 
(including some U.S. multinationals) for additional 
contributions.  The Empresarios (wisely) postponed their 
original plans to spend money on a few, more impressive (but 
far more costly) longer-span structures. 
 
================= 
SOUTHCOM RESPONDS 
================= 
 
7.  (SBU) Our third objective was to focus and refine the USG 
role.  Initially, the Empresarios group had inflated 
expectations about what the U.S. could provide, and how 
quickly.  By early December, we had re-shaped the potential 
USG role to a realistic four components: a) survey the 
longer-span bridge sites the CNE had already identified, b) 
provide technical assistance to the CNE to erect replacement 
Bailey- or ACROW-type bridges, c) actually erect a Bailey- or 
ACROW-type bridge, using a deployed U.S. military unit, and 
d) if necessary in the future, help locate, find the best 
price and help arrange transportation for additional Bailey 
or ACROW bridging materials, to be funded by the Empresarios 
group.   At an Embassy-hosted meeting on December 10, the CNE 
and Empresarios agreed to this approach. 
 
8. (U) December 17-21, a two-member engineering team from 
SOUTHCOM (an Army engineer and a Navy Seabee) joined CNE 
engineers and PolOff on a survey of six longer-span bridging 
sites which may be candidates for USG technical assistance. 
The six sites spanned the length and breadth of Costa Rica, 
from the central Pacific to the central Caribbean, and from 
the central south to near the Nicaraguan border, covering 
parts of Puntarenas, Heredia and Guanacaste provinces and the 
canton of Perez Zeledon. The engineers also inspected stored 
bridging materials, to ensure that what was assigned to each 
site would indeed function there. 
 
9.  (U) As a result of the team,s four-day, 800-mile 
circuit, the U.S. engineers were able to identify and 
recommend alternative sites for two of the 
six bridges, as well as additional engineering work to be 
performed at all sites, such as new abutments, box culverts 
and improved access.  The U.S. team also recommended raising 
some bridges to 
above flood level, to avoid future problems.  Finally, one 
bridge 
was identified as being in need of maintenance and 
improvements, but not of complete replacement.  The CNE 
director and his engineering staff agreed with and welcomed 
the recommendations. 
 
========== 
NEXT STEPS 
========== 
 
10.  (U) The Empresarios Group is to resume regular meetings 
this month, with an eye to launching its initiative (and the 
first one or two short-bridge construction projects) at the 
end of January.  For the longer-span bridges, the SOUTHCOM 
survey team will identify U.S. units (e.g., from Ft. Leonard 
 
Woord, the Army Corps of Engineers, the 416th Engineering 
Company or a USN SeaBee unit) that could deploy a small team 
to provide subject matter expertise to help the CNE erect new 
ACROW- or Bailey-type bridges, using materials the CNE 
already has on hand.  The CNE must first complete its 
planning, which includes preparing the bridging site(s).  The 
first U.S.-assisted bridge site could be the 32 meter gap 
across the Pacuar River, in Perez Zeledon canton (N 09 22, 
29.7" x W 084 01, 21.9"), at the end of March, if the GOCR 
completes the site preparations in time. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
11.  (SBU) What began as an effort to highlight corporate 
responsibility following the hard-fought CAFTA referendum has 
become another opportunity to display USG "soft power" on 
Costa Rica.  The businessmen deserve credit for launching 
this unusual initiative and for obtaining the letter from 
President Arias.  The CNE deserves kudos for being receptive 
to the private sector assistance. Our goal is 
capacity-building, not doing everything for the Ticos, and 
the GOCR (and the Empresarios) seem to agree. Even if the 
ambitious private sector plan slows, the U.S. military has an 
important, high-impact (and low-cost) role to play in 
providing technical assistance.  Our thanks to SOUTHCOM and 
the units involved for responding so quickly to this 
opportunity. 
BRENNAN