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Viewing cable 08NAHA8, SOME INTEREST IN, BUT NO LOCAL DEMAND FOR, EXPANDED RETURN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NAHA8 2008-01-10 02:53 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Naha
VZCZCXRO8290
PP RUEHFK RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHNH #0008/01 0100253
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 100253Z JAN 08
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0874
INFO RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
RHMFIUU/CG FIRST MAW
RUHBANB/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER JA
RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RHMFIUU/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFIUU/COMMARFORPAC
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESDJ/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0283
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA PRIORITY 0169
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0934
RHMFIUU/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CP BUTLER JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0359
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0871
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHMIFUU/USCINCPAC REP GUAM
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAHA 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SECSTATE, SECDEF FOR JAPAN DESK; USFJ FOR J4, J5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR JA
SUBJECT: SOME INTEREST IN, BUT NO LOCAL DEMAND FOR, EXPANDED RETURN 
OF FOSTER 
 
(SBU)  Summary:  As we work toward implementing the Okinawa 
portion of the alliance transformation and realignment (ATARA) 
report, the Japanese government has been pressing the United 
States to return far more of south-central Okinawa's Camp Foster 
than had been previously agreed.  Japanese negotiators (and the 
ministers whose talking points they write) insistently claim 
that returning the majority of Camp Foster is essential to 
Okinawans' perception that ATARA provides a visible benefit to 
them.  ConGen Naha is skeptical of the claim, as our contacts 
have not been calling for greater land returns at Camp Foster. 
The associations representing Camp Fosters' landlords tell us 
that, while a minority of land owners would like the land 
returned, they would want it back only under certain conditions, 
which the central government has heretofore refused.  The 
majority of land owners prefer the steady flow of rent from the 
central government, and expect to renew their leases in 2012. 
End summary. 
 
(SBU)  As we work to implement the alliance transformation and 
realignment (ATARA) report, Japan has been pressing the United 
States to return far more of Camp Foster than had been 
previously agreed.  Negotiators from the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) have persistently claimed in working group meetings that 
returning the majority of Camp Foster is essential to Okinawans' 
perception that ATARA provides them a visible benefit.  We 
understand that policy-level leaders at the MOD, including the 
minister, have pushed this same claim with senior personnel at 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  The United 
States' position has been that, while additional returns of Camp 
Foster might be possible, it is premature to discuss it before 
plans for ATARA's agreed consolidation are complete. 
 
(SBU) ConGen Naha was puzzled by the Japanese central 
government's claim that most of Camp Foster must be returned to 
satisfy the Okinawan polity.  We were not hearing complaints 
about ATARA's lack of land returns at Camp Foster, or anywhere 
else.  We decided to survey the people with the largest stake in 
land returns.  Camp Foster overlaps the municipal boundaries of 
Okinawa City, Ginowan City, Chatan Town, and Kitanakagusuku 
Village.  We spoke with the leadership of the Okinawa 
Prefectural Federation of Military Land Owners Associations, and 
the municipal military land owners' associations for each of the 
host municipalities. 
 
(U)  To provide a bit of context, Camp Foster is a multi-use 
facility, hosting the headquarters U.S. Marine Corps Bases, 
Japan, U.S. Forces Japan's Okinawa Area Field Office, Awase Golf 
Course, family residences and Marine barracks, a commissary, 
post exchange, movie theater, and many other facilities.  It is 
located between Kadena Air Force Base and Marine Corps Air 
Station (MCAS) Futenma.  The total area of Camp Foster is 
approximately 1,587 acres (642.5 hectares).  Camp Foster does 
not include training facilities for operational forces, and has 
very little nuisance impact on its host communities.  As of 
2003, the central government was paying about Y8.542 billion 
(US$79.09 million) rent per year to 4,414 Camp Foster land 
owners, and paying the salaries of 2,364 Japanese employees at 
Camp Foster. 
 
(SBU)  We spoke with the presidents of the Federation of Okinawa 
Prefecture Military Land Owners' Associations, Chatan Town 
Military Land Owners' Association (hosting 40.1% of Camp 
Foster), Kitanakagusuku Village Military Land Owners' 
Association (hosting 32.8% of Camp Foster, including Awase Golf 
Course), Ginowan City Military Land Owners' Association (hosting 
24.4%), and Okinawa City Military Land Owners' Association 
(hosting 2.7%).  These associations represent the private owners 
 
NAHA 00000008  002 OF 003 
 
 
of land on which Camp Foster is located, and who accept rent 
from the national government.  They do not represent protest 
landowners.  Note: "One tsubo" (3.3 m2) land owners purchase 
tiny plots of base land in order to refuse to take rent.  There 
are approximately 30,000 rent-taking land owners and 3,000 
protest landowners in Okinawa.  End note. 
 
Current Majority Position: Keep the Rent Coming 
 
(SBU)  The associations' leaders unanimously agreed that, for 
now, the majority of Camp Foster's landlords want to continue 
receiving rents from the Japanese government, and do not want 
their land returned to them.  The original land owners are 
elderly, and some receive a large enough income stream from 
their rent to live on.  They have no interest in stopping that 
stream. 
 
(SBU) Chosho KYUNA, president of the Okinawa Prefectural 
Federation of Military Land Owners' Associations, estimated that 
90% of its associations' members would want to renew their 
leases with the central government in 2012, when the leases 
would expire.  He and other officers of the Federation were 
concerned, however, about 3,000-odd one-tsubo protest land 
owners.  Their numbers were increasing as the original land 
owners passed on.  The Federation expected they would do what 
they could to interfere with the majority's interest in carrying 
on receiving rents. 
 
(SBU)  Choko MAKABE, president of the Chatan Town association, 
agreed that his members would participate in the lease 
extensions in 2012, but would demand higher rates, especially 
for land along route 58.  His members felt "cheated" by the last 
round of extensions, as their land had not appreciated as much 
as land across the street from them that had been returned and 
redeveloped.  Note:  Land from the former Camp Hamby and a 
returned portion of Camp Lester have become the commercial and 
governmental core of Chatan Town, and more development is 
planned.  Years passed between return and use, and considerable 
public and private investment went into developing the area. 
Military landlords assumed no such risk.  End note. 
 
(SBU)  The Federation's Kyuna guessed that, over time, more 
landlords would want their land back.  The protest land owners 
were getting a little of the land as it changed hands, but most 
the original land owners left their land to multiple heirs, who 
were "normal" landowners.  The second-generation landowners, 
with smaller plots, received less rent.  Thus, they were more 
interested in eventually having the land returned for their own 
use.  The municipal associations echoed the distinction between 
elderly and next generation landlords.  They all noted, however, 
that there were more than generational differences at play, 
especially the likely ease and potential profitability of 
redevelopment. 
 
 
Mind the Gap 
 
(SBU)  All associations' leaders complained bitterly about the 
central government discontinuing rent payments for most land 
three years after it was returned by the United States to Japan. 
 Preliminary surveys and negotiations took far longer than three 
years, so there was a gap between income from rent and 
profitable after-use.  They also noted that infrastructure 
consumed some portion of all returns, and a larger percentage of 
small returns, significantly reducing the benefit of getting 
back the land. 
 
 
NAHA 00000008  003 OF 003 
 
 
(SBU)  Chatan's Makabe noted that initial land surveys would be 
required, as nobody actually knew their property boundaries. 
The Ginowan association president Shinichi MATAYOSHI noted that 
environmental and cultural surveys took years, and detailed 
planning had to wait for the results.  Masanobu NAKAMA, the vice 
president of the prefectural federation and a Kin Town Council 
member, noted that some returned land necessarily went to access 
roads, power, water and sewer lines, and even for parks, schools 
and other public facilities.  The land owners who retained their 
land had to appease the land owners who would "lose" their land 
to public use, in order to get their cooperation in 
redevelopment.  Small area returns were particularly 
contentious, because over half of the land might go to 
infrastructure, with too little land to compensate the losers. 
Nakama estimated that surveying, planning, and negotiating could 
eat up fifteen years or more before anybody broke ground. 
 
(SBU) Ginowan's Matayoshi said that most of the 600 land owners 
opposed the return of the Futenma Housing Area, under the second 
phase of the SACO final report.  Since the return would be only 
136 acres (55 hectares) of hilly land, compensation would last 
only three years beyond return.    Matayoshi said the 
association was asking the Okinawa Development Bureau (ODB) to 
either expand the returned area so that it extended to route 58, 
or buy the land outright from the private land owners. 
 
(SBU) Jousuke ISA, president of the Kitanakagusuku Village 
association said his members also opposed the SACO report's 
return of 14.8 acres (6 hectares) of Kishaba Housing.  The 
village wanted to use over half of the area for roads.  The 
landowners association had requested ODB to make the land "joint 
use," so that they could continue receiving rents after the area 
returned to civilian (but largely public) use.  Isa's membership 
is, however, looking forward to building a shopping center once 
Awase Golf Course is returned pursuant to the SACO final report. 
 
(SBU) Conclusion/Comments:  The central government's insistence 
on the return of substantially more of Camp Foster than we had 
understood in the ATARA discussions is not based on political 
necessity in Okinawa.  The majority of Camp Foster's landlords 
hope to extend their leases to the central government in 2012, 
and intend to bargain for higher rates, especially along the 
busy route 58 corridor.  Elderly land owners are in the majority 
and want their steady income stream to continue.  Second and 
third-generation land owners may welcome land returns, but even 
their interest is conditional on their risk/benefit 
calculations.  While it would be an overstatement to say that 
nobody in Okinawa wants to see more of Camp Foster returned, it 
is a priority for very few.   We can assure U.S. negotiators and 
policy makers that expanding the return of Camp Foster is not 
key to ATARA's success from an Okinawan perspective.  We do not 
speculate on what might be driving the issue in Tokyo. 
Okinawa's priorities vis a vis land returns are MCAS Futenma, 
Camp Lester, Naha Military Port and Camp Kinser.  End comment. 
 
(U)  All conversions are at the rate of Y108/US$1.  Senior 
Political Specialist Hideo Henzan and Commercial Specialist 
Akinori Hayashi contributed significantly to this report. 
MAHER