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Viewing cable 08MEXICO138, MEXICAN OFFICIALS DISCUSS COOPERATION ON ENERGY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MEXICO138 2008-01-18 17:55 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Mexico
VZCZCXRO6443
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0138/01 0181755
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181755Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0174
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITY
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 0176
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000138 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/MEX, WHA/EPSC, AND S/CT 
DHS FOR A/S STEPHAN 
DOE FOR IA LOCKWOOD AND WARD 
DOE FOR A/S KOLEVAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EPET MX
SUBJECT: MEXICAN OFFICIALS DISCUSS COOPERATION ON ENERGY 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
 
 
Introduction and Summary 
------------------------ 
 
1.  (SBU) Representatives from the Department of Energy 
(DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Embassy 
Mexico met with Mexican Secretariat of Energy officials, as 
well as Senior Executives from Pemex, the Mexican oil and gas 
monopoly, and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) on 
December 13 to discuss the July and September 2007 attacks on 
Mexican pipelines, as well as possible areas of cooperation 
between the U.S. and Mexico on Critical Energy Infrastructure 
Protection.  Raul Livas, Pemex's Chief Operating Officer, 
speaking for Mexico said coordination between Pemex officials 
and the Army and local law enforcement must improve, Mexico 
needed to reevaluate the security threat posed by its 
critical infrastructure facilities and plan exercises better. 
 Energy Secretariat officials requested that DOE and DHS 
officials share the question set they used to evaluate 
facilities.  U.S. officials reiterated their invitation to 
Mexican Energy Secretary Kessel to visit Sandia Labs to see 
first-hand technological advances in U.S. Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, and promise to consider the 
Mexican requests.  Both sides agreed to follow up the 
discussion by conference call.  End Introduction and Summary. 
 
 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Mexican officials outlined several of their 
concerns.  They told U.S officials they needed to coordinate 
intelligence sharing between disparate organizations and 
operating groups including Pemex, CFE, local police, the 
federal police, and the Mexican Army (SEDENA) more 
effectively.  Mexican officials suggested they wanted work to 
develop the protocols required to share information on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection between these groups.  As 
a part of this concern, Pemex Chief Operating Officer Raul 
Livas told the U.S. delegation that Pemex needed to find a 
better way to work with local law enforcement, as well as 
revamping contingency plans.  Livas added that Pemex needed 
help handling sensitive information about its facilities, 
specifically, how and when to share that information with 
local law enforcement.  The forces protecting facilities are 
segmented.  There is a need to give "operating information" 
to those protecting the facilities.  Second, SENER and Pemex 
officials agreed that Mexico needs a nationwide evaluation of 
facilities looking specifically at security concerns rather 
than looking at security through the safety optic as had been 
done previously.  Finally, all sides wanted to plan exercises 
more effectively to better highlight the coordination between 
Pemex and CFE. 
 
3.  (SBU) Responding to the Mexican delegation's concerns, 
the U.S. delegation noted that U.S. officials would welcome 
additional meetings on the topic of infrastructure 
protection.  They reiterated the U.S.'s earlier invitation to 
Mexican Energy Secretary Georgina Kessel to visit Sandia 
National Laboratory in New Mexico to learn more about U.S. 
technical advancements in infrastructure protection.  The 
U.S. side also noted that it would like to discuss 
reconciliation of security and safety, and would be available 
to share experience with Mexican officials on enlisting the 
cooperation of private sector organizations and other actors. 
 Finally, U.S. officials also suggested discussing the 
transformation of the energy industry and the effect of that 
transformation on critical infrastructure protection in North 
America. 
 
4.  (SBU) While the Mexican delegation was not in a position 
to agree, it suggested that U.S.-Mexican discussions on 
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection could also include 
examining the DOE's Critical Infrastructure model from a 
systemic point of view.  Such an examination would help 
Mexican officials better understand U.S. methodology.  The 
Mexican side also requested that the DOE/DHS group share the 
list of questions that U.S. assessment teams use, as well as 
brief them on U.S. methods in evaluating a facility.  U.S. 
officials pledged to review these requests and respond. 
 
5.  (SBU)   At the conclusion of the meeting, both sides 
agreed that next steps would include follow-up conference 
call to discuss direct contacts in various sub-sectors of 
 
MEXICO 00000138  002 OF 003 
 
 
critical infrastructure protection, as well as an exchange of 
ideas on how best to move forward. 
 
Background Discussion 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Following a brief presentation by Eric Puype, Chief 
of the Vulnerability Assessment Branch in the Protective 
Security Coordination Division Office of Infrastructure 
Protection of DHS on an earlier U.S. assessment of a Pemex 
and CFE facility,   Raul Livas said that increased discussion 
of critical infrastructure came as Mexico reacted to the 
pipeline attacks of July and September 2007.  Livas called 
those attacks a "wake-up" call, as they showed that 
terrorists could and would target Mexican infrastructure. 
After 9/11 the Mexican government had developed a list of 
critical infrastructure, classifying facilities according to 
the importance of the functioning of the Pemex "system," 
though not their overall effect on the economy.  He added 
that most termed critical infrastructure in Mexico was 
guarded by the military (SEDENA).  The July and September 
2007 attacks -- against unmanned facilities -- changed the 
apparent nature of the threats that the government faced. 
Almost all of Mexico's critical infrastructure was 
government-owned and controlled through the Executive Branch; 
nevertheless, private facilities must also be involved in any 
new security protocols. 
 
7.  (SBU) Livas added that Mexico had to reassess its 
internal policies, and direct resources to protecting 
unmanned facilities.  Emergency response had originally been 
planned as a safety, rather than as a security measure, with 
a bias in contingency planning towards safety, with security 
measures incorporated into the safety plan as an 
afterthought.  The situation was complicated by the fact that 
the word "seguridad" in Spanish means both security and 
safety.  The result was, according to Livas, that not enough 
attention was paid to security in contingency planning.    In 
general Livas felt that Pemex was "very vulnerable" to 
attacks.  He was conducting an overall look at redundancy at 
Pemex system-wide including at inventory levels as well as 
alternate routes. 
 
8.  (SBU) Livas described the July and September attacks as 
"worse on clients" than on Pemex itself.  Attackers were able 
to stop economic activity.  Pemex had not previously looked 
at the effect on overall economic activity and communities, 
but only at the risk suffered by Pemex, Pemex officials would 
now have to do that analysis.  The analysis would have to 
look at the overall consequences and the probability of 
different types of attacks. 
 
9.  (SBU) Responding for the U.S. delegation Puype noted that 
the DHS/DOE methodology considered recoverability.  Private 
facilities had to be part of the security protocols. 
Security must be the responsibility of everyone.  U.S. 
officials must cooperate at all levels, Army, Local Law 
Enforcement, etc.  He said the entire U.S. is moving into 
improved intelligence and security policy. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (SBU) While Pemex and SENER officials seemed truly 
interested in DHS/DOE methodology and expertise, and we 
believe want to follow up, SENER remains woefully 
understaffed to take on its traditional function of 
overseeing Mexico's oil and gas and electricity monopolies 
and this added task of overseeing critical infrastructure 
protection.  Working against any significant further 
cooperation on energy infrastructure protection is the 
attention demanded by upcoming debates on energy reforms, 
Pemex and SENER's likely inability to interact with the Army, 
which is ultimately responsible for protecting energy 
facilities, and the difficulty of closer cooperation with the 
U.S. on a sensitive national security issue.  Nevertheless, 
the active participation and involvement of one of Pemex's 
most senior officials does underscore the seriousness with 
which the attacks were taken.  Ongoing efforts by DOE to 
coordinate interagency response on critical energy 
infrastructure (recent exercises and work in Trinidad and 
Tobago) may help to pull together a more concerted response 
in Mexico. 
 
MEXICO 00000138  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
GARZA