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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA55, Goma Report for January 20 - CNDP Makes

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA55 2008-01-21 09:13 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO7180
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0055/01 0210913
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210913Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7391
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000055 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM MOPS PREL CG
SUBJECT:    Goma Report for January 20 - CNDP Makes 
            Demands as Kivus Conference Prolongs 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  On what was meant to be the next-to-last day of 
the Kivus Conference (now apparently extended to January 22), the 
CNDP expressed dissatisfaction on multiple points.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) On what was meant to be a final day of preparations before 
closure on January 21, the Kivus Conference was on hold while the 
conference leaders and president's advisers were disputing 
concessions to be made to the CNDP.  As of late afternoon January 
20, successful conclusion of the conference -- meaning, to a 
significant degree, signature by the CNDP -- remains unsure, and the 
conference's closure has been apparently extended to January 22. 
 
3.  (SBU) In a meeting with international observers January 20, the 
CNDP delegation reviewed its many points of dissatisfaction.  The 
delegation, speaking mainly through Bertrand Bisimina, said that it 
had received different versions of the final conference declaration 
to be signed by all parties, a version from the president's Chief of 
Staff Raymond Tshibanda and one from the conference leaders.  The 
former left out key points dealing with amnesty and a presidential 
decree formalizing and legalizing the conference declaration, points 
which were contained in the version offered by the conference 
leaders. 
 
4.  (SBU) Bisimina reviewed the many issues which the CNDP felt 
remained unaddressed, particularly in the former version.  He 
emphasized that it was inadequate for President Kabila to assert 
that he should be trusted to hold his word, without solid guarantees 
built into the conference's final document.  He stressed: 
 
-- The ceasefire and other major recommendations of the conference 
needed to be converted into formal government decisions through a 
decree from the president, with signature by the president. 
 
-- The conference needed to establish political as well as military 
follow-up commissions to resolve political problems such as return 
of refugees and reconciliation, while the military commission would 
deal with problems of demobilization, securing territory, and 
brassage. 
 
-- Refugee return would need to be elaborated with a specific 
timetable. 
 
-- Brassage would be put in force only after the issue of FDLR was 
resolved pursuant to the Nairobi communiqu. 
 
-- Amnesty must be established by decree.  CNDP needed solid 
assurance that none of its members would be arrested. 
 
-- Exile for certain members (i.e., Nkunda) was unconstitutional and 
out of the question. 
 
-- The text would have to be signed and guaranteed by the 
international community. 
 
5.  (SBU) In response, EU Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer 
addressed the main points.  On FDLR, he stressed that the Nairobi 
process was under way.  FDLR was the one of the fundamental causes 
of conflict in the Kivus, and all sides had stressed this point 
during the conference.   A "sensitization" program was beginning and 
there was reason to hope that the remaining FDLR could be much 
reduced in size voluntarily.  He said that a refugee-return 
timetable was a laudable objective but not appropriate in the 
conference's declaration, which should rather call for return of 
refugees as soon as possible in conformance with normal 
international standards.  Belgian Special Envoy Jozef Smets noted 
that the president had told the international community that he 
would be soon convoke the leaders of the FDLR to tell them they had 
reached "the end of the road" in DRC.  He urged the CNDP, however 
much they feared that the government with MONUC would not be able 
completely to stem the threat from FDLR, to seize the moment of this 
conference to bring peace to the region and gain in stature. 
 
6.  (SBU) Van de Geer said that amnesty for rebellion was to be 
sharply distinguished from amnesty for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.  A political solution in Goma required the former, but it 
would be very unwise for CNDP to ask for the latter, which was 
beyond the capability of an individual state to comply with. 
Bertrand said that CNDP had heard that the government had forwarded 
the arrest warrant for Nkunda to Interpol.  Human Rights Watch 
representative, attending the meeting, clarified that, to her 
knowledge, while the government had the right to forward the warrant 
to Interpol it had not done so.  She noted that the existing amnesty 
law (amnesty for insurrection) covered the period up to 2003, and 
the president to could follow a simple procedure (avoiding the 
 
KINSHASA 00000055  002 OF 002 
 
 
national assembly) for extending that period to the present.  As for 
the arrest warrant, she said, it had been valid for only three 
months and had expired, and the auditor general could officially 
notify Nkunda that it had expired. 
 
7.  (SBU) Van de Geer said that on signature by the government, 
there was no problem, as he believed a decision had been made for 
signature by a high official such as the Minister of State for 
Interior.  He advised CNDP strongly against demanding that the 
president himself sign.  As for exile, van de Geer noted that the 
issue was not in any of the texts being discussed, and the focus had 
moved to a cooling off period rather than exile.  He noted that the 
real work of bringing peace to the Kivus was only beginning, would 
unfold with many starts and stops in the commissions set up by the 
conference, and issues such as Nkunda's remaining or leaving the 
country for a period could be worked out over time. 
 
8.  (SBU) Several other members of the CNDP delegation then offered 
their views.  They were mollified on the amnesty issue, but they 
remained very distrustful of the government and disquieted by the 
prospect of moving forward on the Goma peace process without 
adequate assurances about Nairobi and the FDLR.  They cautioned that 
it would be better for Nkunda to remain in the country, as he had 
the adoration of his troops and was by far the best person to keep 
them under control. 
 
9.  (SBU) This meeting was followed immediately by CNDP's meeting 
with conference leaders. 
 
Brock