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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA21, Goma Report January 9, 2008 -- fourth day of

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA21 2008-01-10 14:52 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO8901
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0021/01 0101452
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101452Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7345
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT:    Goma Report January 9, 2008 -- fourth day of 
            Kivus Conference; Kamerhe, CNDP perspectives 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  Vital Kamerhe, speaking to international 
observers, said that the Kivus Conference, which picked up in pace 
January 9, would operate at two levels, with the real work taking 
place in side discussions with the armed groups (especially CNDP). 
It was essential that the Conference focus on producing a timetable, 
by which the ceasefire would lead to brassage.  In a separate 
meeting, the CNDP delegation set forth many conditions (security for 
Tutsis, dealing with FDLR, amnesty, return of refugees, security 
sector reform, eliminating Mai Mai); the international observers 
urged CNDP to concentrate on goals achievable in the immediate term, 
i.e., at the Conference.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) The Kivus Conference held its first, abbreviated 
substantive plenary on the afternoon of January 9, mainly with 
uncontroversial speeches by ministers.  Over 500 members had been 
accredited at opening of day, thanks to a hugely simplified process. 
 A full plenary commences January 10.  The Conference is now 
scheduled to conclude on January 17. 
 
International observers meet with Kamerhe 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) International observers, led by EU Special Envoy Roeland 
van de Geer, African Union Special Envoy Pierre Yere, Belgian 
Special Envoy Jozef Smets and MONUC's political chief Christian 
Manahl, had an early meeting January 9 with the Conference's Number 
Two Vital Kamerhe, President of the National Assembly, president of 
the Conference's Committee of Elders ("Comite des Sages"), and 
Conference spokesman.   Kamerhe said that the Conference was 
"doable" -- i.e., a real success was achievable.  The Congolese were 
"capable of surprising you" -- they could, he said, make a huge 
advance in short order, or dally for a year.  The Kivus Conference 
was significantly more manageable than Sun City had been, in his 
view. 
 
4.  (SBU) Kamerhe said that the real work of the Conference would 
involve the armed groups, particularly CNDP.  He saw therein a 
primary role for his own Wise Men's Committee.  The plenaries would 
be for setting the mood and consecrating decisions made in smaller 
circles.  The key would be to produce a concrete plan and timetable, 
something that the wider Conference and general populace -- hungry 
for any sign of progress toward ending war -- could latch on to and 
not despair, afterwards, that the Conference had been a waste of 
time.  Kamerhe commented that he had for a long time hoped for the 
ascendancy of a political over a military mindset, and the 
Conference represented that golden opportunity. 
 
5.  (SBU) Smets pressed Kamerhe for the Government to extend the 
ceasefire to several months.  Kamerhe said that that would be a good 
thing, but it would have to be linked with a concrete timetable for 
sending troops into brassage.  He emphasized the importance of DRC's 
resuming diplomatic relations with Rwanda as soon as possible ("to 
delay resupply of Nkunda").  He said that it was hard for him to see 
Nkunda's being reconstituted as a general in the FARDC.  There had 
been much call in the pre-Conference for including FDLR in the 
Conference but the decision had been made to keep contacts with FDLR 
indirect, he said. 
 
Also meet with CNDP delegation 
------------------------------ 
 
6.  (SBU) The international observers had a long meeting with the 
CNDP delegation of 12, transported by MONUC to the Karibou Hotel. 
AU Special Envoy Yere, noting that this was AU's first encounter 
with CNDP, excoriated CNDP as a rogue armed group undermining a 
democratic state, and described CNDP's position as politically and 
morally unacceptable.  Van de Geer, Smets, and Manahl were more 
diplomatic but pushed the CNDP delegation on human rights 
violations, rape, and child soldiers, and urged it to support the 
Conference by formulating steps that would be immediately 
achievable. 
 
7.  (SBU) Four members of the CNDP delegation gave a smooth 
presentation, mainly centered on demands only achievable in the mid 
to long term, viz.:  security for a Tutsi community which they 
claimed suffered discrimination and threat; removal of the FDLR; 
return of all Congolese refugees; amnesty for all CNDP members; 
suppression of the Mai Mai ("Congo's janjawid"); and thorough 
reconstitution of the armed forces.  They admitted that CNDP had a 
"problem" with child soldiers, and claimed that CNDP soldiers were 
the "least" offender (after FDLR, Mai Mai, and FARDC) on sexual 
violence in North Kivu and other human-rights violations.  They 
emphasized that the key issues of the Conference would have to be 
addressed outside plenary and expressed skepticism that President 
 
KINSHASA 00000021  002 OF 002 
 
 
Kabila would abide by any recommendations of the Conference. 
 
And with Refugee Representatives, Interior Minister 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8.  (SBU) The international observers later met representatives of 
the four Congolese refugee communities in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, 
and Tanzania.  The first three of these were Tutsis.  The 
representative from Burundi spoke French; the representative from 
Rwanda spoke French but noted that the youth in the camp were only 
learning Kinyarwanda; the representative from Uganda spoke English; 
the representative from Tanzania spoke Swahili.  In contrast to the 
claim, earlier in the day, by CNDP of there being over 500,000 
Congolese refugees in the four countries, these refugee 
representatives gave the figure of just over 200,000 (Rwanda 47,000; 
Uganda 31,000; Burundi 28,000; Tanzania 96,000 -- the only one of 
the four to be decreasing at present).  They all said that the 
refugees overwhelmingly wanted to be able to return to Congo and 
would like to do so quickly so as to be able to participate in local 
elections.  However, they said that most of the refugees feared for 
their security on return and in many cases had no sense that they 
had land to which they could return, on which to live and farm. 
They said that the Congolese government had been laggard in 
establishing tripartite committees (refugees, DRC, host government) 
to deal with issues of return, particularly to include land tenure, 
security, and economic prospects.  Smets and van de Geer urged these 
refugee representatives to seize the occasion of the Conference to 
give a clear public presentation on their legitimacy and needs. 
 
9.  (SBU) At the international observers' regular evening meeting, 
held with the Minister of State of the Interior in the place of 
Conference president Malu Malu, and with presidency foreign affairs 
advisor Chissambo, van de Geer and Smets urged them to assure that 
the refugee representatives would have ample opportunity to speak in 
plenary and that the DRC government would give priority to the 
tripartite committees.  The Minister of State said he would fulfill 
both requests.  He made the claim (false) that prior to 1994 there 
had been no problems in Congo (Zaire) between Tutsis and Hutus or 
vis-a-vis Tutsis generally.  He also stated that the key problem on 
refugees was the "party manipulating the refugees" (i.e., Rwanda). 
 
Garvelink