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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA2, Goma situation report for January 1, 2008

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA2 2008-01-02 14:08 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO3269
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0002/01 0021408
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021408Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7323
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT:    Goma situation report for January 1, 2008 
 
Note:  The following report was provided by Embassy Kinshasa's 
political officer in Goma.  End note. 
 
Observations on the "Petit-Nord" 
-------------------------------- 
 
1.  (SBU) One Indian battalion of about 300 men is responsible for 
Masisi and Walikale Territories in the "Petit Nord" area of North 
Kivu.  This area is about 31,000 square kilometers of terrain 
(roughly three times larger than Kosovo, with a comparable 
population density), most of which is mountainous with few roads 
trafficable to anything but the most capable off-road vehicles.  In 
comparison, the initial Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR) deployed 
with 50,000 troops and now, over eight years later, maintains a 
force level of 16,000 troops.  In comparison with KFOR, this 
battalion is 1/150th the current size of KFOR when adjusted for 
number of peacekeepers per square kilometer.  Given the vast and 
challenging terrain, at least a division-sized element (roughly nine 
times the size of the current element) would be more suited to 
securing the terrain and mastery of the situation. 
 
2.  (SBU) Present Partisan Positions in Masisi territory: 
 
-- 14th Integrated Brigade (IB) has withdrawn to Kalonge, 
   South Kivu. 
-- 15th IB is reportedly headquartered at Nyanzale. 
-- 7th Brigade has responsibility for the area south of 
   Sake along the road to Kitumbili, but its control is 
   weak near Sake and rebels (probably Mai-Mai) have 
   launched raids against civilian vehicles traveling along 
   the road in recent days. 
-- 81st Brigade (minus one battalion) is at Mugunga (5kms. 
   east of Goma) and in Goma. 
-- 82nd Brigade, controls the Goma-Sake road, as well as 
   the city of Sake.  This brigade has been commanded since 
   the year 2000 by Col Jonas Padiri, and is one of the few 
   FARDC units that has performed well in battle.  The 82nd 
   Brigade has not been through the formal "brassage" 
   process, but boasts that it has a high proportion of 
   troops from all over the country.  Colonel Padiri, a 
   former Kadogo (Tutsi child-soldier) crossed into Congo 
   with his Commander, Laurent Kabila, on August 2, 1996. 
-- Cobra Brigade (Mai-Mai) currently occupy commanding 
   terrain south of Sake, controlling the road to Minova, 
   South Kivu.  This unit continues to conduct small-scale, 
   poorly planned attacks against CNDP troops vicinity 
   Gingwe, Kirotshe, and Rubaya in an effort to garner 
   favor with the 8th Military Region Commander prior to 
   the upcoming National Peace Conference. 
-- A new group exists that is being called the "deserters 
   faction" situated roughly 20kms. west of Masisi.  The 
   group is composed of disaffected elements of various 
   groups, including Hutu and Tutsi and its primary 
   objective is defense of their own homes and families. 
   In this sense it is similar in origin to the Mai-Mai, 
   but otherwise unrelated. 
-- Nkunda has regained all former positions, but may be 
   overextended, though his forces are no longer short of 
   ammunition due to recently captured stocks from the 
   FARDC.  Once source estimates that the CNDP can now 
   sustain for fourteen days of continuous fighting without 
   external resupply. 
-- Nkunda has five brigades and an unknown number of 
   battalions, each with a strength of about 300-400 
   personnel, for a total estimated strength of 3,000-4,000 
   troops.  He also has a cadre of trainers who are 
   currently conducting battalion-level training. 
 
Sake today 
---------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Sake is a strategic piece of real estate.  It is the 
gateway to Masisi and Walikale to the West, Kitchanga to the south, 
Minova to the south, and Goma to the east.  The town itself lies on 
a plain but is surrounded to the north, west, and south by steep, 
volcanic mountains that provide commanding views of the eastern 
avenue of approach.  Today, the city is bustling with activity, a 
change from two weeks ago when the city's inhabitants deserted it 
for nearby IDP camps in light of heavy fighting between the National 
Commission for the People's Defense (Nkunda's pro-Tutsi movement, 
known by its French acronym CNDP) and the FARDC.  Farmers, 
villagers, and cell-tower maintenance personnel travel freely up and 
down the fertile, black volcanic soil of the mountain held by 
Nkunda's troops.  In town, market vendors and civilians go about 
their daily business and individual soldiers are visible throughout 
the city with their weapons slung in a relaxed manner. 
 
KINSHASA 00000002  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
4.  (SBU) Just several hundred meters north of the city center, 
beyond two MONUC outposts, is a CNDP checkpoint manned by four 
Nkundists.  There is no demarcation, barbed wire, or even a rock in 
the road to indicate that one has arrived at the gateway to rebel 
held territory; just a tacit understanding between both sides that 
this point marks the beginning of Nkunda-held territory. 
Additionally, the CNDP also holds the most commanding terrain in the 
area, the so-called Celtel ridgeline (named for the higher of the 
two commercial cell-towers on the hilltop; the other antenna is 
owned by Vodacom).  Operationally speaking, Nkunda is the clear 
winner here.  He owns the most important high ground and has 
unopposed control of the northern approach in/out of the town.  It 
would be very easy for him to consolidate his gains and advance into 
the city center, but instead he has chosen to hold his ground and 
order a ceasefire; likely in part due to the MONUC presence, and in 
part due to the upcoming peace conference. 
 
5.  (SBU) The following is a list demands by Nkunda as relayed to 
Goma officer by a third party: 
 
-- All Tutsi refugees in Rwanda must be returned to DRC and 
   settled in their places of origin. 
-- The FDLR must be disarmed and repatriated since the 
   Tutsi population in the DRC is threatened by their 
   presence. 
-- All CNDP military soldiers must be integrated into the 
   FARDC without prejudice. 
 
6.  (SBU) Following is a summary of Nkunda's strategy as relayed to 
Goma officer by a third party: 
 
-- Wait and see how the peace talks will unfold.  Nkunda is 
   using the current de facto cease fire to pull portions 
   of his troops off the front lines in order to conduct 
   battalion-level training, one to two battalions at a 
   time.  He expects that regardless of the outward results 
   of the peace process he will be attacked in 3-4 months. 
-- Some sources report that Nkunda is actively recruiting 
   in order to boost his strength. 
-- Some tribal chiefs have requested to enter into talks 
   directly with Nkunda rather than participate in the 
   upcoming peace conference. 
 
Unanswered questions and dilemmas for the DRC 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Sources also summarized to Goma officer many of the 
dilemmas the GDRC faces as it prepares for the offensives it has 
committed to under the Nairobi communique: 
 
-- Since Nkunda has not yet been marginalized, will the 
   FARDC be ready to launch attacks against the LRA at the 
   end of January, followed by a March offensive against 
   the FDLR? 
-- Will the government be able to tame the loose Mai-Mai 
   groups that have gained strength in both numbers and 
   weapons in light of the recent FARDC rout? 
-- Who does the GDRC owe, and how much, for the 11 armored 
   vehicles and artillery that came in support of the 
   recent offensive?  Finally, Will the FARDC's marriage of 
   convenience with the FDLR and Mai-Mai prevent the 
   government from taking action against them? 
 
Final notes 
----------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Located 20 kms. west of Goma, Sake has no electricity even 
though a major high tension line (mast about 50 meters high with 
four wires) runs past Sake coming from the Ruzizi hydroelectric dam 
in South Kivu on its way to Goma.  A major utility construction 
project is underway to give Sake electricity.  The new line 
surprisingly parallels the incoming Ruzizi line most of the way from 
Goma to Sake.  The line consists of 15 meter-high, lattice-frame 
masts on a concrete base, about 150 meters apart, running the length 
of Goma to Sake (about 20 kms.).  The completed masts support three 
wires resting on glass insulators. 
 
9.  (SBU) There is a new Islamic school, the "Institut Bihara" 
located 5 kms. west of Goma city center.  The school is located on a 
plot of land that is approximately 5 acres and has new buildings 
housing 20 classrooms with space for several hundred students. 
 
Garvelink