Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM95, UN, AU ENVOYS PROVIDE UPDATE ON PEACE PROCESS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KHARTOUM95.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM95 2008-01-23 11:23 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8795
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0095/01 0231123
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231123Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9763
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: UN, AU ENVOYS PROVIDE UPDATE ON PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 074 
 
1. (SBU) Briefing the Khartoum diplomatic corps on January 
18, UN Special Envoy for Darfur Jan Eliasson and AU Special 
Envoy for Darfur Salim Ahmed Salim said that increased 
tensions between Sudan and Chad posed the greatest risk to 
the political process at present. They remarked that without 
an end to the Chad-Sudan proxy war there can never be real 
peace in Darfur.  "This is a major concern," said Eliasson, 
"and there must be a decrease in tensions to create an 
environment for talks."  He also posited a link between the 
decline in Sudanese-Chadian relations and the Justice and 
Equality Movement's (JEM) increasing military activity and 
unwillingness to engage in the peace process.  The Envoys 
called on the international community to use its influence to 
resolve the standoff.  The French Ambassador stated that "my 
authorities--at the highest level--are appealing to Sudan and 
to Chad to exercise restraint, come back to dialogue, and 
adhere to the Tripoli agreement." 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Regional Meeting, Arusha II in Six Weeks 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Eliasson and Salim suggested that the UN/AU will 
hold a meeting of regional governments (Chad, Libya, Eritrea 
and Sudan) in N'djamena within the next six weeks, followed 
by an "Arusha II" type meeting to prepare Darfur's fractured 
rebel movements for "substantive talks."  They asserted that 
the rebel movements had consolidated into five clear 
groupings: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) affiliated with 
Abdulwahid al Nur; SLA/Unity led by Suleiman Jamous, Sharif 
Harir, and Abdullah Yehia; JEM led by Khalil Ibrahim; the 
United Revolutionary Front (URF) based around the 
JEM/Collective Leadership; and the SLA affiliated with Ahmed 
Abdulshafie.  Salim said that the mediation "will not 
tolerate" new groups beyond the "existing five."  The two 
envoys praised and embraced the efforts of the SPLM in 
helping to unite some of the rebel factions (an initiative 
that both envoys sniped at and tried to sabotage over the 
past months).  They noted that Abdulsafie is still very 
skittish about negotiations. 
 
------------------------ 
Opening from Abdulwahid? 
------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) During the envoys four-day trip--which included 
stops in Darfur and Southern Sudan--SLA/Unity pledged to 
attend an "Arusha II" gathering and both SLA/Unity and the 
URF expressed "their absolute full support for the process," 
according to Eliasson.  In addition, the envoys were 
surprisingly optimistic about the potential for 
SLA/Abdulwahid to participate in the political track, 
characterizing a meeting with Abdulwahid commanders in Jebel 
Marra as "the most impressive opening" of their visit.  They 
attributed some of the progress in the dialogue with 
SLA/Abdulwahid to the decision to have UNAMID Force Commander 
Martin Luther Agwai travel with their delegation in Darfur to 
explain how the peacekeeping force plans to address 
Abdulwahid's concerns about security in the region.  (Note: 
In press reports from January 19-21, Abdulwahid denied any 
opening to the mediation, reiterating his demands that a UN 
peacekeeping force must be fully deployed before negotiations 
begin.  End note.) 
 
------------------------ 
Envoys' Action on UNAMID 
------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) Responding to a question from CDA Fernandez, 
Eliasson said that, in meeting with Sudanese officials, he 
had underscored the importance of an effective peacekeeping 
force to monitor an eventual cessation of hostilities.  He 
had "warned the Government" of the danger of hand-picking 
troop contributors by nationality, noting that the rebel 
movements were making similar demands. The Envoys felt that 
some of these issues could be resolved at a possible 
Ban-Bashir meeting at the margins of the upcoming AU Summit. 
While appealing to the international community to meet the 
UN's request for helicopters, the envoys explained that the 
peace process could not wait for full deployment of UNAMID. 
"We must push forward on both tracks, even if one or the 
other is slowed," said Eliasson. 
 
------------------------------- 
"Difficulties" on Civil Society 
------------------------------- 
 
KHARTOUM 00000095  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) The Envoys acknowledged that they were confronting 
"difficulties" in finding a formula for civil society and 
IDPs to be represented in the peace process but said they had 
instructed UNAMID civil affairs to begin outreach to these 
groups.  Cautioning that a focus on Arab tribes risked 
"exaggerating or exacerbating the ethnic divide," they 
nonetheless claimed that they had had "intensive contacts" 
with Arab leaders.  Salim said that it was the "serious 
responsibility" of the Sudanese Government and the rebel 
movements to include Arab voices in the process. They 
suggested that IDPs could be more easily incorporated once 
Abdulwahid is on board with the upcoming talks. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) This briefing by the two Special Envoys seemed a bit 
too rosy and surreal for us. There appears to be no defined 
division of labor among UNAMID civil affairs, the Joint 
Mediation Support Team (JMST) that supports Eliasson and 
Salim, or the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) 
to execute an effective strategy for civil society outreach 
in support of the peace process nor any indication that these 
three bodies have made progress on this issue in preparation 
for negotiations. There also seems to be too wide of a 
disconnect still between UNAMID implementation and the peace 
talks.  A clear strategy will be critical to moving the 
process forward, as will establishing dates for the next 
steps in the process--with plenty of advance notice--so that 
the international community may begin pressing the parties to 
attend.  End comment. 
FERNANDEZ