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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM8, DIFFICULTIES PROVIDING EMBASSY SUPPORT FOR CODEL PAYNE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM8 2008-01-02 16:46 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3342
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0008/01 0021646
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021646Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9652
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/PDAS LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD AND AF/SPG 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP ASEC AMGT PGOV PREL KSCA OTRA EAID CDC SU KE
ER, SO, CD 
SUBJECT: DIFFICULTIES PROVIDING EMBASSY SUPPORT FOR CODEL PAYNE 
 
REF:  KHARTOUM 0001 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Even without the need for increased security in 
the wake of the January 1 attack on an Embassy Khartoum vehicle, 
resulting in the deaths of an FSN driver and an American USAID 
officer, post is facing enormous challenges in providing support for 
the visit of CoDel Payne.  This is the result of extremely limited 
access to information from the CoDel with respect to its itinerary, 
and considerable pressure that some aspects of the visit not be 
shared with Sudanese authorities normally responsible for 
authorizing and coordinating such visits. Given these factors, Post 
strongly urges that the CODEL be requested to defer travel to Sudan 
until a later date.  In the event that the visit is not postponed, 
post will do its best with limited resources to support the visit. 
 
Aftermath of Shooting: 
---------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Embassy Khartoum is currently dealing with the security and 
human resources implications of the January 1 fatal shootings of two 
USG employees.  The entire Mission is in a state of disbelief and 
grieving the loss of esteemed colleagues.  Post is currently 
`operating through the end of the week with reduced staff performing 
only essential work. (See Reftel for details)   Due to year end 
holidays, a single RSO is coordinating the security needs of the 
Mission, and following up with Sudanese police authorities on the 
shooting deaths. 
 
Lack of information: 
-------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Post still has nothing in writing accurately reflecting 
CoDel Payne's proposed visit.  The country clearance request cable 
(State 170458) is almost completely wrong with regard to the Sudan 
portion of their trip - arrival/departure dates and times, point of 
entry/departure, etc.  An accurate country clearance is critical for 
post to fully respond to the proposed visit. 
 
Confusion over Guests: 
---------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Only very belatedly were we informed that Rep. Payne is 
traveling with guests.  We first were informed Dec. 31 that the 
Congressman was traveling with "a guest," so the entire Delegation 
would stay in a hotel in Juba, as they understood that non-official 
personnel were prohibited from staying on the AID compound.  We then 
informed the CoDel that the guest would be allowed to stay on 
compound for the Congressman's security and in order to best utilize 
ConGen Juba's very limited resources (i.e.,   vehicles, etc.). 
(Note:  Official USG visitors are currently not authorized to stay 
overnight off the compound for security reasons).  It was only then 
that we were informed that there were in fact two guests - Ms. Mia 
Farrow (the actress) and her son, Ronan Farrow (aged about 20).  The 
size of delegations is a significant factor, as lodging on the 
compound is extremely limited, and the required support staff from 
Khartoum for the visit must also be factored in to the equation 
(i.e., RSO and control officer).  It is worth noting that the 
delegation has requested that the visit of the Farrow family not be 
announced.  We were instructed that their visit is private, and they 
want to keep the official and private portions of the visit 
separate.  Unless accommodations are found on the compound for 
everyone, the delegation has stated that they will all stay in a 
hotel.  This would severely stress our ability to provide security 
for the CoDel. 
 
Problems in communicating with CoDel: 
------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) From the time Embassy was informed of the visit, we have 
had extremely limited contact with the CoDel point of contact. 
Until December 31, the contact person (Mr. Ted Dagne) had never 
answered his cell telephone.  Our repeated and urgent answering 
machine requests that he contact us ASAP usually were unheeded. 
This situation greatly complicated our task of making preparations. 
The need for contact was particularly acute since we had no accurate 
information in writing concerning the visit. 
 
 
Limited Personnel in Juba: 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Given the holiday season, Embassy staffing is extremely 
reduced in Juba.  US ConGen Juba's new CG will arrive December 4, 
just two days before the scheduled arrival of the CoDel.  Currently, 
there is only one RSO in country, who must devote his efforts to the 
January 1 shooting incident and the investigation support teams on 
their way to Khartoum  The Juba RSO is on leave. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000008  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Visa complications: 
------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) All visitors to Sudan must obtain a valid visa prior to 
entry. As of January 1, the MFA has not received notification of 
visa applications having been submitted by the delegation.  It 
appears that the delegation now intends to apply for visas in Asmara 
or Nairobi.  In order to assist with visa issuance, it is critical 
that the delegation inform post as to where it prefers to collect 
visas, if approved by the MFA.  Under no circumstances should the 
delegation travel to Sudan without visas. 
 
Vague Itinerary: 
---------------- 
 
9. (SBU) We have had extremely limited information about the CoDel's 
itinerary.  Embassy staff did not learn until December 31 that their 
itinerary was not limited to Juba.  In fact, the CoDel also intends 
to visit Nuba and Boma.   In its diplomatic note announcing the 
visit, post informed the MFA that the delegation intended to visit 
Juba only.  The delegation has requested that their proposed travel 
outside of Juba not be announced.  Mr. Dagne, in support of this 
request, stated that, given the terms of the CPA, they are not 
required to inform the GoNU, and that any insistence on informing 
them amounted to a "violation of sovereignty" of the GoSS. 
 
10. (SBU) Post informed Mr. Dagne that it is customary for an 
Embassy officer to accompany CODELS when they travel in country. 
Mr. Dagne confirmed that Embassy personnel were welcomed to travel 
with the delegation.  The details of the itinerary have still yet to 
be identified. 
 
11. (SBU) If the visit cannot be deferred, it is critical that the 
delegation provide forthwith the following to Embassy Khartoum:  1) 
Precise itinerary with arrival and departure information; 2) Precise 
information with respect to the members of the delegation; 3) 
Confirmation that visas have been obtained or information concerning 
when and where applications were submitted; 4) Information with 
respect to travel outside of Juba; and 5) An accurate country 
clearance requesting identifying all members of the delegation. 
Post will fully support the CODEL visit with it limited resources 
and will endeavor to ensure that the visit is a success.  Failure to 
provide the above information immediately may jeopardize the CODEL's 
chances of obtaining visas, which are absolutely required for any 
visit. 
 
POWERS