Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD172, USG MEDIA LEAKS HAVE PAKISTANI MILITARY "REVIEWING CONTINGENCIES"

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ISLAMABAD172.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ISLAMABAD172 2008-01-11 10:24 2011-06-03 04:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO9664
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0172/01 0111024
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111024Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4360
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 8039
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7038
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2635
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 8619
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 4547
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3204
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000172 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR KPAO PK
SUBJECT: USG MEDIA LEAKS HAVE PAKISTANI MILITARY "REVIEWING CONTINGENCIES" 
 
 
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)  
 
1. (C) Summary. Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Tariq Majid separately called in Ambassador January 8 and 9 to express their concern about repeated media reports stating senior USG officials were considering unilateral action within Pakistan. Both officials said the recent statements harmed the ongoing cooperation between Pakistan and the U.S. in the war on terror and fueled anti-American and anti-GOP conspiracy theories. General Majid further stated the Pakistani military was reviewing its own contingency plans in the event that the U.S. attempts to take unilateral action within Pakistan. End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan called in Ambassador January 8 to express his concern about repeated media reports that Pakistan's nuclear weapons might fall into extremist hands, including reports that the U.S. was developing contingency plans to seize Pakistan's nuclear weapons. He also raised alleged discussions by senior USG officials about unilateral U.S. military/intelligence action within Pakistan, which had been reported in the New York Times and Washington Post. Riaz Khan said the stories were having a negative impact even among pro-western Pakistani elite. The reports are encourage anti-Americanism among the illiterate man in the street, he added. Riaz Khan said it was hard not to see these leaks as “purposeful.” He went on to say he knew governments had to develop contingencies, but they did not have to talk about them in the press. He observed that these articles unify Pakistanis - from ultra-liberal to ultra-conservative - in a way that almost nothing else could. 
 
3. (C) Ambassador said we had a realistic picture of Pakistan's nuclear safeguards, and we knew that they were not going to fall into the hands of Islamic terrorists.  She added that we always take visiting congressmen and senators to see LTG Khalid Ahmed Kidwai (Ret), Director General of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, to get a better understanding of Pakistan's nuclear security. The USG can not control media reports, and as a practical matter, the administration cannot control ill-informed “leaks” from supposed or actual USG sources either.  Ambassador agreed that ill-informed speculation in the media was not useful in promoting bilateral relations with Pakistan or in putting pressure on Pakistan to do more in the war on terror. 
 
4. (C) General Tariq Majid, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called in the Ambassador on the same topic January 9. General Majid complained Pakistan has become a “punching bag” in the American media. He stated the Pakistani military views all the USG statements over the last year regarding possible U.S. unilateral action in Pakistan as linked. General Majid added, “It got to the point where we are looking at our own contingencies.” Ambassador replied that his statement was astonishing. 
 
5. (C) General Majid asked if the Ambassador was familiar with stories circulating that the U.S. was working to destabilize Pakistan. He continued, “The U.S. has the right to contemplate what actions it would take in certain situations, but we have the right to defend ourselves.” He went on to say the leaks from USG officials and similar statements from U.S. presidential candidates have put President Musharraf and the Pakistani military in a difficult position regarding cooperation with the U.S. 
 
6. (C) Ambassador assured General Majid the USG has confidence in Pakistan's nuclear safeguards and described the productive meeting that morning among Ambassador, Senator Lieberman, and General Kidwai to discuss the issue (reported septel). Ambassador agreed the recent media reports were counterproductive and assured the General of the USG's intent to strengthen our anti-terror and nuclear security cooperation. Ambassador suggested the GOP could help ease the backlash by ensuring that GOP-owned Pakistan Television (PTV) stops airing absurd conspiracy theories and drivel that feed anti-American and anti-GOP sentiments. 
 
7. (C) PTV is airing regular targeted programming that not only criticizes U.S. policies, but also questions the motives of some of our routine diplomatic activities. Many of the current highly inflammatory anti-American conspiracy theories and allegations have come out under the names of PTV staff. 
 
8. (C) Ambassador asked General Majid about his views on Baitullah Mehsud and expressed concern that he may become more brazen following a series of successful suicide bomb attacks apparently under his direction. General Majid agreed Mehsud “is one of the main sources of these attacks” adding, “he must be killed.” General Majid stated the Pakistani military has been contemplating this for some time, but is waiting for actionable intelligence so it can kill Mehsud with a quick strike followed by a push from the army to wipe out his then-leaderless forces. 
 
9. (C) Comment: Alleged meetings of high-level officials in the U.S. supporting “unilateral action” have been reported in banner headlines here, displacing coverage of the Bhutto assassination and the electricity shortage. These reports have fanned anti-American sentiments among the population. 
End comment. 
BODDE