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Viewing cable 08HANOI33, SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE VISIT TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HANOI33 2008-01-10 06:16 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO8374
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0033/01 0100616
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100616Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6981
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH 4138
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 HANOI 000033 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR D FROM AMBASSADOR MICHALAK 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP VM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE VISIT TO 
VIETNAM 
 
 
HANOI 00000033  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
Summary and Introduction 
------------------------ 
 
1. (SBU) Deputy Secretary Negroponte: Mission Vietnam looks forward 
to welcoming you to Hanoi.  Your visit is well timed to focus 
Vietnamese leaders on the year ahead, which with focused effort 
should bring a further deepening in the bilateral relationship. 
While the relationship is broadening and maturing in a satisfying 
manner, which bodes well for the future, top-level exchanges like 
yours are important.  Challenges of course remain.  Vietnam's 
critical strategic preoccupation remains China, and this can still 
complicate our attempts to engage on some issues.  The 
transformation of the economic, social and technological landscape 
continues to create "space" for Vietnam's people, including a 
greater ability to be heard, even on some sensitive issues. 
However, top leaders continue to try to persuade the people of 
Vietnam - with a significant degree of success -- that stability is 
the necessary foundation for all advances underway, and the majority 
appears willing to accept current restrictions of political activity 
on the understanding that the regime will continue to gradually 
liberalize. 
 
2. (SBU) Vietnam's economic successes have translated into greater 
international clout, especially in the region, and Vietnam's recent 
election to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council has 
raised its international profile.  Leaders here are not fully sure 
how to handle all the attention, but understand that the United 
States has - and is - playing a direct role in creating the 
conditions for their nation's success.  Leaders here are thankful, 
in particular, for the key technical assistance we've given over the 
past seven years in reforming the system of economic governance. 
They want more.  We are increasingly able to expand our efforts into 
the broader areas of good governance and education. 
 
3. (SBU) Looking beyond their border, Vietnam's leaders realize that 
the United States is an important force in maintaining a stable 
geopolitical environment in which even "small" countries like 
Vietnam are assured their independence and freedom of action. 
Domestic considerations play a role as well.  As Vietnam continues 
its rapid economic and social transition, many Vietnamese view the 
strength of its relations with the United States as a key indicator 
of how much progress has been made in leaving the dark days of the 
1970's and 1980's behind.  For these reasons, Vietnam's leaders are 
committed to continued progress in bilateral relations and will 
likely speak positively and optimistically about the future of 
U.S.-Vietnam ties.  Differences over human rights remain, however, 
and lingering fears that the United States supports the overthrow of 
the current regime continue to complicate the relationship. 
 
4. (SBU) One of the drivers for the substantial enhancements in our 
relationship to date has been top-level visits like yours.  Since 
2005, there has been one formal visit between involving either the 
Vietnamese Head of State or Head of Government with President Bush 
each year.  These have definitely proven their worth in spurring 
positive changes in Vietnam, and in pinning down those in Vietnam 
who might otherwise work to sidetrack or limit those advances.  The 
White House has invited Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to Washington 
in 2008.  We are working to settle upon dates. 
 
The Economy, WTO and Investment 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Vietnam's dynamic economy grew by 8.5% in 2007 and has 
averaged over 7.5% for the past decade.  Per capita annual income 
jumped from about $220 in 1993 to over $800 in 2007.  Since 1986, 
the Vietnamese government has continued to implement an economic 
reform program known as "Doi Moi" (renovation).  As a result, 
effective market-oriented policies have improved the quality of life 
for many Vietnamese and have succeeded in slashing the poverty rate 
from 58% in 1993 to well under 25% today.  Increased trade and 
foreign direct investment have been key drivers in Vietnam's 
economic growth.  Vietnam formally acceded to the WTO as its 150th 
member on January 11, 2007.  While its chief exports are crude oil, 
apparel, footwear and aquatic products, Vietnam is also increasing 
its exports of furniture, machinery, cameras, computers, printers, 
consumer electronics, coffee, rice and other diverse products.  The 
United States is currently Vietnam's third largest overall trade 
partner (behind China and Japan), but remains its largest export 
market.  The government still needs to meet the challenges of 
expanding infrastructure, increasing energy production, stamping out 
corruption, transforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into more 
competitive entities, improving worker and professional skills, 
implementing WTO commitments, and maintaining the course of reform. 
 
Humanitarian and Technical Assistance 
------------------------------------- 
 
HANOI 00000033  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Since 1995, U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) programs have provided aid in legal reform, governance, 
economic growth, HIV/AIDS, environmental protection and disaster 
prevention.  For FY 2007, total U.S. assistance from all agencies 
was about USD 86.6 million, the bulk of which has gone towards 
providing health-related assistance, notably in the area of HIV/AIDS 
treatment and prevention and the fight against avian influenza. 
Vietnam is one of fifteen countries in the President's Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).  The United States provided USD 65 
million in FY 2007 to expand integrated HIV/AIDS prevention, care 
and treatment programs.  Since 2000, DOD has supported a wide 
variety of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDCA) 
projects in Vietnam.  Additionally, USPACOM has facilitated multiple 
donations of excess medical property to various medical facilities 
throughout Vietnam. 
 
7. (SBU) Unfortunately, U.S. assistance in areas other than HIV/AIDS 
remains very modest at roughly $5 million for a country of over 80 
million people.  While small, several U.S. programs are nonetheless 
having a profound impact here.  The "STAR" (Support for Trade 
Acceleration) program has played a major role in helping Vietnam to 
reshape its trade and commercial laws and regulations.  While 
initially established to help Vietnam comply with its obligations 
under the 2001 Bilateral Trade Agreement, STAR also played a 
critical role in Vietnam's preparations for WTO membership and its 
broader entry into the global economic system.  Another small 
program, the Vietnam Competitiveness Index (NBCI), is having a real 
impact on promoting good economic governance domestically by 
providing a quantitative measure of the impact of governance and 
rule of law on economic development.  Provinces' rankings on the 
annual VNCI report are closely watched and leaders of provinces that 
score well have a particularly good chance of being promoted to more 
senior positions in Hanoi. 
 
8. (SBU) Through a combination of Fulbright grants and the Vietnam 
Education Foundation (VEF), an innovative program created through 
legislation to facilitate the training of Vietnamese scientists, the 
United States sponsors over 100 students yearly for graduate study 
in the United States.  The VEF was established with the unpaid 
proceeds of loans extended to the old South Vietnamese government. 
Another important activity is the Fulbright Education Training 
Program, through which 70 mid-level Vietnamese professionals receive 
in-country training in economics and public policy each year in a 
program run by Harvard University. 
 
9. (U) I will host an Education Conference in Hanoi January 24-25 to 
help coordinate and spur forward American efforts in education in 
Vietnam, broadly defined.  The Conference, designed to be a forum 
for American universities, companies, NGOs and USG-funded 
educational programs, will provide a forum for participants to 
generate ideas and action plans about how best to meet three 
principal goals: a significant increase in the flow of Vietnamese 
students to the United States, more and deeper linkages between 
American and Vietnamese universities, and higher quality of human 
resources in the pool from which American companies in Vietnam 
hire. 
 
Opportunities for Greater Engagement 
------------------------------------ 
 
10. (SBU) Vietnam's UNSC membership creates a window of opportunity 
to encourage Vietnam to speak out in a constructive way on global 
security issues, and to help Hanoi distance today's Vietnam from the 
NAM and Communist-Bloc focus driving its old-style foreign policy. 
We have been proactive here and in Washington in educating GVN 
leaders and officials on Burma, North Korea and Iran, where in the 
past it has been unwilling to engage constructively with us due to 
"traditional friendship" and non-interference.  We are also 
proactively assisting the GVN to get up to speed on issues beyond 
the traditional scope of GVN concern, such as Kosovo and Darfur, 
conditioning GVN officials to look toward us for advice - and 
constructive support to enhance Vietnam's image as a player -- over 
the year. 
 
11. (SBU) As it raises its profile on the world stage, Hanoi is 
ready to accelerate its efforts in preparing its military for 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations, but has proven 
reluctant to jump into a close bilateral relationship with us on 
training, despite our efforts to convince the GVN to participate in 
PKO training through the Global Peace Operations Initiative.  Part 
of Hanoi's problem is that it will be setting precedents in 
accepting our aid in the security arena that require difficult 
internal negotiations and decisions. 
 
Challenges on Human Rights 
 
HANOI 00000033  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
12.(SBU) While we share common views with the GVN in many areas, 
differences over human rights remain, and lingering fears that the 
United States supports the overthrow of the current regime continue 
to complicate the relationship.  The existence of groups in the 
United States and elsewhere that continue to explicitly advocate 
regime change helps generate negative charges by conservatives here 
which stoke a lingering paranoia that we are indeed still "the 
enemy." Reassuring the GVN that the USG does not support separatist 
groups can assist in building a better human rights dialogue based 
on mutual trust. 
 
13. (SBU) Serious deficiencies related to human rights in Vietnam 
include lack of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom 
of the press.  One of our key objectives is to end the use of 
catch-all "national security" provisions such as Article 88 of the 
GVN criminal code, which prohibits "conducting propaganda against 
the State."  The U.S. Mission tracks approximately 50 individual 
cases of prisoners of conscience and activists under various forms 
of house arrest or surveillance/harassment.  We continue to call for 
the release of all prisoners of conscience and freedom of peaceful 
expression of political views, but where we see individuals 
expressing their political opinions, many of our government 
interlocutors see "lawbreakers" trying to destabilize the regime. 
 
14. (SBU) Perceptible progress is, however, being made. Key 
Vietnamese leaders are committed to enhancing governance 
establishing the rule of law, and combating corruption, all critical 
in building guarantees of individual freedoms.   Vietnam's leading 
newspapers are much more aggressive in terms of the types of news 
they publish and their willingness to push back against censors. 
Only a few years ago, any protest resulted in swift and severe 
police action.  Over this past year, various peaceful protests 
occurred, with one stretching out for a month before it was finally 
ended.  With regard to religious freedom, Vietnam has made 
surprising progress, in large part due to the intensive engagement 
of Ambassador Hanford over recent years.  More needs to be done, but 
the country no longer qualifies as a particularly severe violator of 
religious freedom under our legal definition and we removed the 
nation from the list of countries of particular concern in late 
2006. 
 
Vietnamese Concerns About China 
------------------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) While Vietnam's engagement with the United States will 
continue to broaden, China constitutes Vietnam's most important 
strategic preoccupation.  This is not to say, however, that Vietnam 
is "choosing" China over the United States; the situation is much 
more complex than that.  For starters, Vietnam's leadership is 
sophisticated enough to realize that relations with China and the 
United States do not represent a zero sum game; it is possible to 
have good relations with both.  Each relationship also creates 
challenges.  While China constitutes a vital and necessary 
commercial partner and former ally, it is also perceived as a 
significant and frustrating constraint to Vietnam's freedom on 
action.  Chinese bullying of foreign companies in an attempt to 
compel them to cease oil and gas exploration efforts in the South 
China Sea serves to remind Vietnamese officials that while the 
Vietnamese may not approve of all U.S. policies, the same is 
certainly true of Chinese actions. 
 
16. (SBU) On security matters, China looms large and there is an 
understandable caution with regard to China's potential reaction to 
enhancements in cooperation with the United States.  U.S.-Vietnam 
cooperation in the security field is also constrained by an 
institutional conservatism born of concern over "peaceful evolution" 
as a real threat to the regime, as well as by an ingrained caution 
on the part of Vietnam's military in the face of relative power 
calculations vis-a-vis China. 
 
Gradual Progress in Defense Cooperation 
--------------------------------------- 
 
17. (SBU) Defense relations have nonetheless advanced at a measured 
pace, and have actually come quite far if viewed over the past 
decade.  We are in year three of a new IMET program, and we now have 
professional military exchanges with the People's Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN) in a limited but growing range of areas including military 
law, military nursing, public affairs, search and rescue, 
meteorological/ oceanographic (METOC) prediction, and disaster 
preparedness.  Since 2003, U.S. Navy ships have made five port 
visits to Vietnam, including most recently a November 14-18 visit by 
two mine countermeasures ships, the USS Guardian and the USS 
Patriot, at Haiphong port.  Reaching our full potential for closer 
 
HANOI 00000033  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
cooperation in defense activities, including multilateral 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance efforts and attendance at U.S. 
military schools is attainable, but will require time, persistence 
and patience, and a lot of hard work. 
 
Counterterrorism Cooperation: Case-by-Case Basis 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
18. (SBU) Vietnam says the right things about the threat of global 
terrorism and has participated with us in modest cooperative 
activities.  During President Bush's visit last year, the President 
and his Vietnamese counterpart pledged to increase cooperation to 
halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related 
technology and materials in accordance with international and 
national laws and each country's capacities.  The United States 
provides counterterrorism assistance to Vietnam by funding 
Vietnamese participation in counterterrorism-related training at the 
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, and through 
military-to-military exchanges with an emphasis on counterterrorism 
themes.  Vietnam has signed eight out of thirteen UN terrorism 
conventions.  Approval of the remaining five is winding its way 
through the cumbersome GVN bureaucracy, the delay explained in part 
by GVN concern with its capacity to carry out obligations under the 
conventions.  Two of the remaining conventions are reportedly in the 
final stages of GVN approval, while the status of the other three 
remains unclear. 
 
19. (SBU) Vietnam remains hesitant to embrace certain U.S. 
initiatives, such as PSI and GPOI, which could help us help Vietnam 
enhance its capability to fight terrorism.  In part, this reluctance 
is based on a lack of recent precedent for military engagement 
beyond Vietnam's borders, and the bureaucratic requirements to gain 
approval for such initiatives also constitute a barrier in itself. 
You are well positioned to explain the importance of progress. 
 
Fullest Possible Accounting 
--------------------------- 
 
20. (SBU) Predating the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and 
normal defense contacts, U.S. military and DoD elements continue 
their efforts toward the fullest possible accounting of Americans 
missing from the Vietnam Conflict.  Since 1988, the Joint POW/MIA 
Accounting Command (JPAC), a USPACOM subordinate element, has 
evolved to include forward Detachments in Vietnam, Laos, and 
Thailand/Cambodia.  With its Vietnam Detachment (Det 2), it has 
completed 90 Joint Field Activities (JFA), which incorporated 
extensive research, interviews, analysis, and excavations in order 
to accomplish its mission.  From its inception, Det 2 has forged 
good relations with its GVN counterparts.  Ultimately, JPAC's 
efforts in Southeast Asia have resulted in accounting for 880 
Americans previously listed as MIA; 1766 remain missing throughout 
Southeast Asia. 
 
21. (SBU) An area of heightened bilateral cooperation is the 
undertaking of investigation and recovery efforts at sea.  During 
the Vietnam Conflict, more than 400 American aviators were lost in 
the waters off the coast of Vietnam.  While the majority of those 
Americans were declared dead and their remains deemed not 
recoverable, JPAC continues to conduct underwater investigation and 
survey activity when information obtained and validated has the 
potential to lead to a recovery.  This is a resource-intensive 
endeavor.  In December, 2006 the GVN gave its approval for the use 
of U.S. naval vessels to operate within their territorial waters in 
order to enhance JPAC's underwater investigations towards the 
identification of potential recovery sites. 
 
Consequences of War 
-------------------- 
 
22. (SBU) In your meetings, you may hear references to "consequences 
of war" or "legacies of war" issues.  This is the catch-all term 
that the GVN applies to a myriad of problems, including Agent 
Orange(AO)/Dioxin contamination, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and land 
mines from the war era, and the recovery of missing Vietnamese 
military personnel. 
 
23.(SBU) While scientists and GVN officials continue to debate the 
human impact of the 80 million liters of AO sprayed over 2.6 million 
hectares and 3,000 hamlets in Vietnam, recent GVN-approved studies 
reveal that Dioxin contamination is not widespread, but rather is 
concentrated in roughly 20 "hotspots."  Former U.S. bases, from 
which Operation Ranch Hand missions were staged and AO was stored, 
have soil dioxin concentrations exceeding concentration levels 
recommended by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
World Health Organization, while other areas thought to be targets 
of heavy aerial spraying do not currently have soil concentrations 
 
HANOI 00000033  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
considered hazardous to health. 
 
24. (SBU) Much has been accomplished recently in turning a new leaf 
on the AO/Dioxin issue with regards to government-to-government 
relations and changing the tone of the dialogue both in meetings and 
in the press.  Beginning in 2006, the State Department and EPA 
provided USD 400,000 in technical assistance to the GVN's Office 33 
and MOD's Chemical Command for remediation planning and immediate 
interventions at the Danang airport.  Congress recently appropriated 
an additional USD 3 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for 
"dioxin mitigation and health activities," thereby helping Vietnam 
to remediate areas with demonstrably high levels of dioxin and 
assist those with disabilities.  This follows four years of USG 
support to build the capacity of the Vietnam Academy of Science for 
analysis of contaminated soils and sediment.  The USG is continuing 
to work together with the GVN, UNDP, Ford Foundation and other NGOs 
to discuss the next steps in the environmental remediation of three 
priority hotspots in Danang, Hoa Binh and Phu Cat airfields. 
 
25. (SBU) Since 1989, USAID, through support from the Patrick J. 
Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF) and other sources, has provided over 
USD 43 million to support NGOs and private voluntary organizations 
to develop comprehensive programs for people with disabilities.  In 
addition, since 1993 the USG has been actively involved in assisting 
the people of Vietnam in overcoming the social and economic impacts 
of remaining UXO from the war.  Vietnam was formally accepted as the 
37th participant in the U.S. Humanitarian De-mining Program in June 
2000, and the USG is now the largest donor of humanitarian 
assistance for mine action programs in Vietnam.  The USG has 
invested over USD 37 million in a broad spectrum of programs not 
only to locate, remove and destroy unexploded ordnance and 
landmines, but also to address the UXO effects on health and 
livelihood of Vietnamese living in affected areas. 
 
26. (SBU) Today, various NGOs conduct UXO and land mine clearance, 
risk education and victim rehabilitation. The USG has also donated a 
significant quantity of equipment to the PAVN to assist efforts in 
UXO and landmine clearance and return land to productive use.  In 
2006, the State Department provided USD 3.5 million to support UXO 
action and demining activities in Vietnam, almost a third of which 
went directly to PAVN in the form of donated demining equipment. In 
2007, an additional USD 2.5 million will be provided to underwrite 
mine action related activities in Vietnam.  In initial budgets, USG 
funds for demining have been cut substantially. 
 
Adoption Issues 
--------------- 
 
27. (SBU) Baby buying has emerged as a serious and troubling issue 
in Vietnam.  We are working toward a new MOA with the GVN that will 
allow for adoptions to continue in limited categories.  Ideally this 
MOA would allow for expansion of these categories as Vietnam makes 
progress on legal reform, Hague accession and increased transparency 
in the adoption process.  We will push for Vietnam to pass new 
comprehensive adoption legislation and accede to the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption during 2008 and offer to provide 
Vietnam with technical assistance to meet this goal. 
 
Management Issues: New Embassy Compound, APP Danang 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
28. (SBU) When we established diplomatic relations in 1995, we 
rented an "interim" building to set up initial operations.  Thirteen 
years later, we're still there.  When you visit the Hanoi Embassy, 
you will note that our facilities are overcrowded, inefficient, 
insecure, and just plain ugly.  The long term solution involves the 
construction of a New Embassy Compound (NEC), a "priority" deferred 
for over ten years.  U.S. interests in Vietnam dictate that we 
create an appropriate platform in Hanoi for our diplomatic 
activities in this increasingly important nation.  OBO made a 
proposal to the GVN to purchase land for the NEC in a newly 
developed area in Hanoi; in retrospect, the offer has proved not to 
be in accordance with market conditions.  In order to move the 
process forward, however, we need a counter-offer from the GVN that 
would provide the basis for further negotiations for the NEC land 
purchase. 
 
29. (SBU) State Department budget limitations may delay the 
scheduled opening of APP Danang at least into FY2009.  Although we 
have not had formal negotiations with GVN officials regarding the 
opening of the APP, informal soundings indicate that they are quite 
receptive to the idea.  We hope a way can be found to begin 
negotiations "in principle" with the GVN on new consulates.  This 
will allow us to get necessary agreements in place before our side 
decides to begin allocating funds. 
 
What You Can Expect 
 
HANOI 00000033  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
------------------- 
 
30. (SBU) While the GVN recognizes the strategic importance of the 
United States in the region and the world, leaders here are not shy 
about raising the specter of "peaceful evolution," or to criticize 
U.S. actions it perceives as outside the multilateral system.  They 
routinely chafe over U.S. criticism of Vietnam's record of human 
rights and religious freedom.  Nonetheless, Vietnam's leaders are 
also pragmatic and recognize that Vietnam's own continued economic 
well-being, growth and security are, in large measure, inexorably 
tied to its relationship with the United States. 
 
31. (SBU) You can expect your interlocutors not only to be 
articulate and well informed, but also to speak in terms generally 
supportive of growth in the bilateral relationship.  As noted above, 
lingering suspicions still exist among conservatives in leadership 
about the development of closer ties with the United States, but the 
overall tenor is one of support and interest at a measured pace that 
will not upset the GVN's calibrated attempts to maintain balance 
among its other regional partners.  Your upcoming trip to Hanoi will 
add momentum to our efforts to help translate those good feelings 
into measurable accomplishments in our bilateral relationship. 
 
32. (U) Media interest in your visit is high, both among Vietnamese 
and international outlets.  We are making arrangements for a press 
conference and, in addition to questions on the purpose of your 
visit and the results or your meetings, would anticipate questions 
on China, human rights and the arrest of American citizens and other 
suspected of membership in an anti-government organization. 
 
33. (SBU) Again, we look forward to your visit and stand ready to do 
everything we can to make your return to Vietnam as productive as 
possible. 
 
MICHALAK