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Viewing cable 08COLOMBO22, EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING JANUARY 7, 2008

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08COLOMBO22 2008-01-07 13:13 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0022/01 0071313
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071313Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7440
UNCLAS COLOMBO 000022 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/SCA, DS/DSS/ITA, CA, S/ES-O-CMS AND 
SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING JANUARY 7, 2008 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 00015 
 
     B. COLOMBO 00006 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: AmEmbassy Colombo convened an Emergency 
Action Committee (EAC) meeting on January 7, 2008.  The EAC 
discussed Post's security profile and security for American 
citizens in general in light of the Government of Sri Lanka's 
(GSL) abrogation (ref A) of the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement 
(CFA). After reviewing all available information, the EAC 
determined that security measures currently in place were 
appropriate to the threat level. The EAC concurred that it is 
not necessary to amend the current Travel Warning as the 
information and advice outlined in the document is valid for 
the present security environment. End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On January 7, 2008, AmEmbassy Colombo convened 
meeting of the core EAC.  Present for the meeting were the 
DCM, RSO, PAO, MGT, ECON, POL, DATT, ODC, RAO, CONS, and 
USAID. The agenda items for the meeting were: 
 
A. Mission security in light of the GSL's annulment of the CFA 
 
B. Security for the general American expatriate community 
 
3. (SBU) The RSO noted that contacts within the Sri Lanka 
Police Service (SLPS), including the desk officer for LTTE 
matters and the director of Western Province (in which 
Colombo is located) Intelligence conjectured that the LTTE 
would try to cause maximum damage to political and economic 
targets. These officers noted that LTTE's aim would be to 
show that the GSL was at fault for abrogating the CFA, and 
therefore the focus of possible LTTE actions would continue 
to be GSL political or economic targets. Neither source 
provided specific or actionable threat information beyond 
their speculations. Other SLPS contacts noted that the LTTE 
had, in the recent past, made maximum efforts to launch 
attacks in Colombo, but the extraordinarily stringent 
security measures had prevented several incidents. The RSO 
commented that there still exists no information to indicate 
that the U.S. Mission, Americans, or American interests are 
targets of LTTE actions and that the main threat remains 
being in the wrong place at the wrong time. RAO and DATT 
concurred with the RSO's comments, adding that inquiries of 
their sources had yielded basically the same information the 
RSO obtained from the SLPS. 
 
4. (SBU) The RSO averred that it is not necessary to increase 
security measures at Mission facilities beyond the measures 
currently in place, since the U.S. historically has not been 
a target of LTTE attacks and given the lack of information 
indicating otherwise. The RSO reiterated advice for Mission 
employees to change their routes to and from work, and 
especially change their times of arrival and departure, so as 
to avoid the congestion of rush hour traffic in front of the 
Chancery and American Center, both of which are in proximity 
to the residence of the President of Sri Lanka and the 
Collpetty Police Station. The EAC concurred with the RSO's 
comments that the security measures currently employed at 
Mission facilities are commensurate with the threat. The EAC 
further recommended that the RSO remain engaged with the 
Overseas School of Colombo (which most American children 
attend) regarding security issues. 
 
5. (SBU) Concerning the general American community, the EAC 
agreed that a revision of Post's current Travel Warning 
(issued October 19, 2007) or Warden Message (issued January 
3, 2008) is not indicated because the information in both 
documents is valid for the current security environment. The 
Travel Warning advises American citizens of the possibility 
of being in the wrong place at the wrong time; that the LTTE 
has conducted politically-motivated assassinations throughout 
Sri Lanka, including several in Colombo; to be aware of their 
personal surroundings; and, to avoid large crowds, public 
gatherings and particularly stay away from political rallies 
and military bases in Sri Lanka. The Warden Message repeats 
advice from the Warning, includes information regarding a 
January 2, 2008 bombing (ref B) of a military transport bus 
in Colombo, and recommends that American citizens defer 
non-essential visits to crowded public places and 
high-profile public venues. 
 
6. (SBU) The EAC agreed that while at this time the 
abrogation of the CFA does not change Post's security 
profile, the situation is fluid and subject to change, and 
should be monitored closely. The DATT and PAO noted some 
important dates to remember - January 16 (date of formal 
abrogation) and February 4 (60th anniversary of Sri Lanka's 
independence). EAC members with responsibility for liaison 
with GSL security elements will continue to engage their 
contacts. The EAC will convene whenever necessary to review 
the security environment. 
 
7. (SBU) In summary, the EAC determined that current security 
measures at Mission facilities and homes are commensurate 
with Colombo's "High" indigenous terrorist threat (as 
determined by DS/ITA), even taking into account the 
abrogation of the CFA. The EAC further determined that the 
Travel Warning and Warden Messages adequately describe the 
threats and provide good advice to American citizens to 
lessen their chances of becoming victims of terrorist 
attacks. Therefore, the EAC recommended no additional steps 
for the security of the official American community or the 
expatriate American community. 
 
8. (U) Post will continue to monitor the security environment 
and will report further developments, if any, per septel. 
POC for this message is RSO Michael V. Perkins, who may be 
contacted at 94.11.249.8885, 94.11.249.8888 (MSG Post 1 after 
regular business hours), or via the classified and 
unclassified email systems. 
 
SIPDIS 
BLAKE