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Viewing cable 08BRATISLAVA29, AMBASSADOR OBSITNIK'S COURTESY CALL ON FORMER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRATISLAVA29 2008-01-23 16:50 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bratislava
VZCZCXRO9734
OO RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHYG
DE RUEHSL #0029/01 0231650
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231650Z JAN 08 ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1470
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: LO PO PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR OBSITNIK'S COURTESY CALL ON FORMER 
PRIME MINISTER DZURINDA 
 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000029  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
 
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR 
_____________________________________________ _________ 
PLEASE ZFR ALL SECTIONS AND ASSOCIATED MCNS OF 
BRATISLAVA 000029 DTG 231650Z JAN 08 IMI ALL 
SECTIONS AND ASSOCIATED MCNS. MESSAGE WILL BE 
REVIEWED AND SENT WITH A NEW MRN. THANKS. 
_____________________________________________ _________ 
 
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR 
 
 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000029  002 OF 002 
 
 
charges were "absolute rubbish," adding that he would welcome 
any inquiries into the deal.  He said that Fico has raised 
the issue in retaliation for his move to launch a 
no-confidence vote against the Prime Minister in December. 
(Comment: Fico recently characterized the privatization the 
"largest theft in Slovak history" and said the government 
plans to make the SPP inquiry a top priority. End comment.) 
For his part, Dzurinda told the Ambassador he intends to 
mount another no-confidence vote in the next session of 
Parliament.  I "am preparing my party and my country for a 
tough fight in two years," Dzurinda added.  Noting the 
polemical nature of some of the recent exchanges between the 
government and the opposition -- and the media's portrayal of 
the rivalry between Dzurinda and Fico -- Ambassador asked 
about personalizing what are serious and substantive policy 
disputes. Dzurinda acknowledged that personalizing the 
dispute had not been very effective and noted that while he 
would play a leading role, he would not be the only face of 
the opposition in the months ahead. (Comment: There is 
significant disgruntlement among SDKU members that Dzurinda 
is not allowing effective politicians within the party due 
influence over party tactics and strategy. End comment.) 
 
Fico's Foreign Policy: "Not Normal" 
================================== 
 
5.(C) Dzurinda was sharply critical of PM Fico's statements 
with respect to U.S. engagement in Iraq, on Missile Defense 
and regarding Cuba.  "Is this normal?" he asked repeatedly. 
Regarding U.S. missile defense plans, which he characterized 
as a "benefit" for Slovakia, Dzurinda shared his surprise at 
the position taken by the new Polish government. Dzurinda 
praised Tusk as a "very good man," but added that he lacked 
experience.  Dzurinda said he planned to see Tusk during his 
January 18 visit to Bratislava and would urge him to take a 
more positive -- less transactional -- approach to his 
discussions with the U.S.  Dzurinda opined that DefMin 
Sikorsky was the main force behind the current approach, 
calling him "too clever," but also suggested that Tusk felt 
the need to show (perhaps a bit naively) that he could manage 
the "Russia issue."  In the end, Dzurinda said, he was fairly 
confident the Poles would come around. He would remind Tusk, 
he said, of the importance of partnership with the U.S. 
(Note: in an separate encounter on January 17, former FM and 
current SDKU MP Eduard Kukan suggested to DCM that Dzurinda 
seems to have begun to accept the outcome on Kosovo, 
including that the GOS will likely join its EU partners in 
recognizing an independent Kosovo within the next several 
months.  Kukan implied that Dzurinda would take a more 
measured approach to the issue than he had last year.) 
 
 
ΒΆ6. (C) Comment and conclusion.  Although Dzurinda's ratings 
are down, he remains as feisty as ever. There is no question 
that Dzurinda sincerely believes that the U.S. should be 
Slovakia's pre-eminent partner.  At the same time, drawing 
parallels between Fico and Meciar, and trumpeting the role of 
the U.S. Ambassador, he suggested that Ambassador Obsitnik 
use his bully pulpit to speak out against the government (and 
implicitly for him).  He has become more realistic about the 
current political context. Reflecting again on the challenges 
the opposition faces, Dzurinda grabbed a pen and paper and 
sketched out the coalition that could have been, had he won 
in 2006:  SDKU, the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK), the 
Christian Democrats (KDH) and Meciar's HZDS.  Dzurinda 
asserted that this was a viable group (we are not so sure) 
that would have been much better for the country than the 
current coalition, but added that such an arrangement was no 
longer possible given Fico's popularity.  After more than 18 
months out of office, it appears that Dzurinda may have 
finally let go his hopes for a near-term return to government 
via some sort grand coalition.  If that it is the case, he 
might begin to be a more effective opposition leader.  On the 
other hand, he is unwilling or unable to hear the message -- 
sent loudly by the polls and echoed by at least some of his 
advisors -- that, at least for now, tactics such as 
no-confidence votes lower his credibility and that of the 
opposition -- not the Prime Minister's. 
OBSITNIK