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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA99, OUTSIDE DEFENSE MINISTRY, BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA99 2008-01-17 12:22 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO5034
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0099/01 0171222
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171222Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0874
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7620
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5708
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1495
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018 
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL PTER BR
SUBJECT: OUTSIDE DEFENSE MINISTRY, BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS 
EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT DCA 
 
REF: STATE 3557 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOEL, REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
 1. (C) Summary.  I separate meetings, the Ambassador 
discussed the roposed Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) 
withMinistry of External Relations (MRE) Under Secretay for 
Political Affairs Everton Vargas and Long-erm Planning 
Minister Roberto Managabeira Unger.  Although Minister of 
Defense Jobim and other levels at the MOD continue to 
strongly support the proposal both Vargas and Unger expressed 
concern with the proposal and indicated it would be a 
sensitive and potentially controversial initiative to move 
through the GOB.  Post does not intend to press for response, 
but will continue to monitor GOB reaction as discussions 
continue.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) During a broad-ranging meeting with Vargas on January 
11 (septel), the Ambassador provided a copy of a draft 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), per reftel.  Despite a 
long series of discussions between USG officials and the 
Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MOD), as well as informal 
discussions with MRE at the working level on the issue, 
Vargas was clearly surprised.  He said the Ambassador must 
understand that, from the MRE's point of view, "we are 
starting at square zero" on a DCA.  The Ambassador reminded 
Vargas that he had discussed this issue with Brazilian 
Ambassador to the United States Antonio Patriota, and that it 
was he who had suggested that the Ambassador should approach 
the MOD directly.  Vargas responded that there would have to 
be a decision by Secretary General (Vice Minister) Samuel 
Guimaraes and FM Amorim to enter into discussions with the 
MOD, and that it was "a very delicate" issue. 
 
3. (C) Informed that a diplomatic note would be coming to him 
shortly with the official proposal for a DCA, Vargas 
suggested that it would be better to allow him to work the 
issue informally.  (Note: The diplomatic note was delivered 
on January 14.  End note.)  He repeated that it was a very 
delicate and sensitive issue, and that he was concerned that 
a formal proposal of the DCA via diplomatic note would either 
receive a quick rejection, or no answer.  Vargas said his 
concern was that he did not want Washington to misinterpret 
such a reaction as indicative of Brazilian interest in 
continuing to develop the strong bilateral relationship and 
progress we are making in other areas. 
 
4. (C) In a January 14 meeting with the Ambassador (who was 
accompanied by PolCouns, DATT, and MLO Chief) that touched on 
defense cooperation and other possible areas of bilateral 
cooperation (septel), Unger also voiced concern about a DCA, 
following up comments he had made to DOD officials who 
provided him a briefing in Cambridge on December 11 at his 
request regarding defense cooperation issues.  (Note: Unger 
is heading up an inter-agency effort to revamp Brazil's 
national defense strategy.  End note.)  Unger said that he 
understood the value of the DCA as a "legal facilitator," but 
felt such a document would "create tremendous commotion for a 
lot of legal boiler plate."  He felt it would be perceived as 
an effort to move Brazil closer to the United States, and 
therefore would require an expenditure of an enormous amount 
of political capital.  He worried that it would create 
enormous controversy within the GOB and, if it were signed, 
would generate controversy outside the government.  Saying he 
could not discuss the details, he insisted that the issue "is 
more complicated than it seems" and suggested the USG should 
understand that there is a "higher level of complexity" in 
the GOB on this issue.  Furthermore, he felt that, if the GOB 
were to sign the agreement quickly, it would not necessarily 
be a good sign, but might well signal that more ambitious 
possibilities for cooperation had effectively been taken off 
the table.  Either way, the expenditure of political capital 
to achieve the agreement, might well make it more difficult 
to advance substantive cooperation in areas of greater 
importance, both in defense and non-defense areas. 
 
5. (C) Comment: The initial negative reaction from Vargas to 
the proposed DCA was not unexpected.  Minister Jobim and 
other MOD contacts continue to strongly support the 
initiative, but Vargas' specific mention of Guimaraes, the 
most hostile among senior GOB officials to closer ties with 
the United States, combined with Unger's caution, suggests 
that the matter will be the subject of significant high-level 
debate within the GOB.  There are many in the MRE and among 
senior policy makers who remain wary of closer relations with 
the United States, and especially the U.S. military.  MOD 
officials will need sufficient time to make their case that a 
 
BRASILIA 00000099  002 OF 002 
 
 
DCA is a standard, operational agreement between friendly 
countries that is in Brazil's interest to sign.  As a result, 
post does not intend to press for an immediate response, but 
will take soundings at various levels of the GOB over the 
next few weeks and seek to gauge how views are developing, 
while reiterating our view that a DCA would provide an 
important framework for pursuing further cooperation. 
 
SOBEL