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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA93, BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR SUBMARINE AMBITIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA93 2008-01-15 18:56 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
O 151856Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0861
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIOITY 
AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 
AMMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0415
AMEMBASSY ARIS PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L  BRASILIA 000093 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel.  Reason 1.5 (b) (d) 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, M, T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2018 
TAGS: MASSMNUC NPT PARM PREL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR SUBMARINE AMBITIONS 
 
1. (U) This is n action request - see para 9. 
 
2. (C)  SUMMARY. Brazil's leadership, including President 
Lula and Defense Minister Jobim, have expressed support for 
production of a Brazilian nuclear submarine in recent months. 
While serious questions exist as to the proposed vessel's 
military utility and affrodability, it enjoys strong support 
both for reasons of perceived national prestige and for its 
pssible benefits to Brazil's nuclear power industry. 
Although the submarine program may well collapse under its 
cost burden and technological challenges, Brazil appears 
determined to proceed with consideration of this project, as 
Jobim has already gone on record saying that he expects to 
proceed with support from Russia and France.  U.S. opposition 
at this point would likely only increase support within 
Brazil for the nuclear submarine program.  Brazil is a member 
of the NPT and, provided it maintains a strong compliance 
record, its naval propulsion program is not necessarily a 
proliferaton risk.  Moreover, Mission believes that U.S. 
spport for Brazil's naval modernization, including submarine 
technology where appropriate -- subject to regular export 
control measures -- would help forge stronger connection to 
the Brazilian defense industry and military.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (C)  Brazil's nuclear submarine program, begun in the 
late 1970s, has been reinvigorated by high-level support. 
President Lula, an opponent of nuclear power and the military 
in his union leader days, announced on July 10, 2007 that he 
would seek funding to build a nuclear submarine.  Defense 
Minister Jobim stated in November that he was looking for a 
plan to proceed with construction.  These proposals are part 
of a broader Brazilian effort, driven by increasing awareness 
of the shortcomings of the Brazilian military, to modernize 
Brazil's military forces and defense srategy.  Jobim and 
Long-Term Planning Minister Rberto Mangabeira Unger are 
heading up a special ommission to rethink Brazil's national 
defense srategy (to be reported septel), which will 
presumbly set the framework for future development and 
purchases of military hardware.  The commission is due to 
complete its work in September.  Such defense restructuring 
could present opportunities fo expanding U.S.-Brazilian 
cooperation, and because of the high level support, an 
indication that the U.S. would be prepared to work with 
Brazil's submarine program as appropriate could open the door 
to improved ties with the Hemisphere's second largest 
military and defense industry.  However, while cooperation 
with Brazil's defense modernization is in U.S. interests, it 
should not be limited to one area  The nuclear submarine's 
high costs and limited military utility may again put the 
program on the rocks, making it unwise to limit cooperation 
to this area. 
 
WHY A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU)  Brazil has long harbored ambitions for building 
nuclear submarines.  A large part of its motivation comes 
from a perception that, in order to be taken seriously as a 
world power, such vessels will be necessary.  In July 
President Lula was quoted as saying "I think we would be more 
highly valued as a nation (with a nuclear submarine)."  All 
of the UN Security Council's permanent members operate 
nuclear subs, and fellow UNSC aspirant India has leased a 
Russian sub and is building its own version.  More than just 
keeping up with the Guptas, Brazil also sees the submarine 
program as a boost to its domestic nuclear power industry. 
Lula has made improved nuclear power generation a priority, 
and could gain support for its funding by linking it to a 
project of national prestige.  The submarine project could 
also allow Brazil to take advantage of the NPT provision that 
exempts naval propulsion from IAEA safeguards, a potentially 
important point when Brazil has disputed IAEA access to 
specific areas of its nuclear facilities. 
 
5.  (SBU)    There are, however, several serious obstacles to 
Brazil's nuclear submarine program.  The most significant is 
cost.  Brazilian press estimates are that building a nuclear 
sub will cost over half a billion dollars (production costs 
of U.S. subs are around USD 4 billion).  Even if this figure 
were correct, it would be a significant percentage of 
Brazil's USD 13 billion defense budget.  Brazil has other 
urgent defense priorities, including modernization and 
replacement of virtually all its aircraft and many of its 
armored vehicles, not to mention its conventional naval 
units.  Brazil also faces important technological barriers to 
producing fuel for a naval reactor, which would require a 
higher level of enrichment than fuel for a civilian power 
reactor.  Prior submarine research has also encountered 
difficulty developing of technology for a pressure hull. 
 
6.  (SBU)  There is no military reason why Brazil should 
deploy a nuclear sub.  Traditional missions for such vessels, 
long range power projection and long time on station 
capability, are not part of Brazilian naval doctrine. 
Defense Minister Jobim made headlines in November by 
announcing that Brazil's nuclear sub would be used to protect 
recent offshore oil discoveries.  Even if a threat to the oil 
fields existed, it could be met more effectively, and 
economically, by conventional vessels.  In reality, a nuclear 
submarine would not improve Brazil's security apart from a 
dubious boost to national machismo. 
 
7.  (C)  In his November statement, Jobim said he expected to 
purchase submarine technology from France, which would have 
fewer restrictions.  While Brazil will ultimately approach 
both France and Russia, Jobim and Unger have also made clear 
that they would like access to U.S. technology, which in many 
areas is clearly superior.  Offers to discuss access to U.S. 
technology on a program personally important to Jobim can 
open the door to other more practical issues.  In a January 
14 meeting with Ambassador Sobel, Unger mentioned the fuel 
cycle, hull development, software and weaponry as areas for 
possible U.S. contributions. 
 
ELEMENTS OF A U.S. POSITION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  Brazil is currently considering a much-needed 
defense modernization, a key element of which will be 
augmenting Brazil's navy.  Building a nuclear submarine could 
undermine Brazil's overall effort by diverting resources to a 
program that would not improve military effectiveness.  That 
said, U.S. opposition would almost certainly serve to 
strengthen Brazilian resolve to press on.  With Lula and 
Jobim providing strong public support, it is likely that 
efforts to build a Brazilian nuclear submarine will continue. 
 We can avoid provoking a negative reaction from the GOB on 
this issue and potential defense cooperation in other areas 
by maintaining our general openness to cooperating with 
military modernization, including submarine technology, and 
not taking a specific position at this time on Brazil's 
nuclear submarine program.  Nonetheless, we need to be sure 
that our discussion encompasses not just submarines, but 
other fields for potentially beneficial cooperation.  Brazil 
should also maintain its good record on proliferation issues, 
including resolving its issues with the IAEA.  Singing an 
additional protocol with IAEA would provide a higher level of 
access to Brazilian nuclear facilities and facilitate 
assistance to Brazil's nuclear industry.  We also need to 
make clear that any exports of U.S. technology would be 
subject to U.S. Arms Export Control Act restrictions, 
including necessary end use and retransfer assurances.  In 
our discussions with the GOB, we can highlight that Brazil 
will be treated equally with U.S. allies and offer to address 
Brazilian concerns on this issue during our upcoming 
political-military consultations. . 
 
Comment and Action Request: 
 
9.  (C) Brazil's white whale may ultimately become stranded 
on the reefs of technical challenges and cost overruns, but 
continued openness to cooperation at a time when Brazil will 
be making important decisions about its future security 
strategy and forces can have longer term benefits to the 
U.S.-Brazil relationship.  The nuclear submarine program, 
with its high-level backing, can provide a catalyst for a 
greater U.S. role in other modernization projects.  Jobim 
will almost certainly raise this issue with SecDef Gates on 
his visit to Washington in March.  As we prepare for this 
visit, mission requests Washington concurrence with this 
approach and guidance on next steps for potential defense 
cooperation.