Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08ANKARA173, TURKEY: KARAMANLIS VISIT PAVES WAY FOR IMPROVED

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ANKARA173.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ANKARA173 2008-01-30 14:59 2011-06-07 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
Appears in these articles:
http://www.tanea.gr
VZCZCXRO5052
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0173/01 0301459
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301459Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5076
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018 
TAGS: PREL TU GR
SUBJECT: TURKEY: KARAMANLIS VISIT PAVES WAY FOR IMPROVED 
BILATERAL RELATIONS 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 102 
     B. ISTANBUL 43 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis' January 
23-25 trip to Turkey symbolizes the improved state of 
Turkish-Greek relations.  During his meeting with PM Erdogan, 
the two Prime Ministers focused on how to overcome the three 
most contentious bilateral issues -- Cyprus, the Aegean, and 
minority rights.  Although no final agreements were reached, 
Erdogan and Karamanlis agreed on several new channels of 
dialogue to accelerate the process.  Publicly, both leaders 
praised the new era of good will.  Karamanlis reiterated 
Greek support for Turkey's EU bid and Erdogan made positive, 
yet vague, statements regarding the Ecumenical Patriarch. 
The Turkish media praised Karamanlis for his bravery in 
making the domestically unpopular trip.  The success of the 
visit gives PM Erdogan space to take on several of the more 
controversial aspects of the bilateral relationship in the 
coming months.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) While Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis' January 23-25 
trip to Turkey did not result in any formal deliverables or 
public commitments, the visit itself marks an historic step 
forward for the bilateral relationship.  During a 
two-and-one-half hour meeting, January 23, Prime Ministers 
Karamanlis and Erdogan discussed Cyprus, the Aegean, and 
reciprocal minority rights.  MFA Deputy U/S for the Americas 
and NE Mediterranean Haydar Berk told us the two leaders 
agreed that 2008 is a "window of opportunity" to seek 
progress on all three issues.  To do so, the GOG and GOT will 
accelerate exploratory talks at the U/S level on the Aegean, 
increase ministerial engagement on minority rights, and 
enhance maritime and civil aviation cooperation (ref a). 
 
3. (C) On Cyprus, Berk noted, the two sides still hold 
differing opinions, but agreed on general principles 
including the need to relaunch the UN process following the 
Cyprus elections.  MFA Deputy Director General for Greece 
Kerin Uras reported Erdogan asked Karamanlis to increase 
pressure on the Greek Cypriots to "constructively engage." 
Karamanlis expressed hesitancy to do so, as previous attempts 
to influence Nicosia had proven counterproductive. 
 
4. (C) Overall, Berk characterized Karamanlis' visit as 
successful, noting that both sides tried to focus on "the 
full side of the glass." An informal agreement between the 
Turkish and Greek General Staffs to avoid maritime or 
airspace incidents one day prior until one day after the 
talks allowed the leaders to maintain a positive tone. Berk 
added that the soon-to-be-voted-on Foundations Law will lay 
the groundwork for resolving many of the Greek minority 
property disputes, including Halki. 
 
5. (C) At a joint press conference, both leaders spoke of 
increasing good will and cooperation. Erdogan stated that 
political, military, economic, and cultural relations will 
improve in the coming months.  Turkey and Greece will tackle 
"non-problematic" issues first and then progress to more 
contentious ones.  Karamanlis' comments reflected Erdogan's 
positive tone and the potential for greatly improved 
relations.  He repeated his position on Turkey's EU 
membership -- full compliance, full membership. In response 
to press questions, Karamanlis said that, from the Greek 
perspective, the only problem in the Aegean is the issue of 
the continental shelf.  He also urged the GOT to allow the 
opening of the Halki seminary and to recognize the ecumenical 
status of the Patriarch.  Erdogan responded that the GOT was 
"evaluating" the Halki seminary, and that the ecumenical 
issue is an internal matter of the Orthodox Church. 
 
6. (C) Before leaving for Istanbul on January 24, Karamanlis 
also met with President Gul and opposition leader Deniz 
Baykal.  Baykal told the press that during his meeting with 
Karamanlis, he expressed support for the Annan Plan and noted 
it would be difficult for a secular state such as Turkey to 
open the door to religious education being provided through 
entities such as Halki seminary.  During a speech to students 
at Ankara's Bilkent University, Karamanlis said "The time has 
come to solve the Cyprus issue.  Nicosia is the last obstacle 
for Turkey with the EU."  In Istanbul, Karamanlis and his 
delegation of 160 Greek businessmen met with representatives 
of the Turkish-Greek businessmen's associations, Economic 
Policy Research Forum of Turkey (TEPAV), and Turkish Union of 
Chambers of Commodities and Commerce (TOBB) to discuss how to 
improve bilateral trade. 
 
7. (SBU) The Turkish press warmly received the Greek Prime 
Minister's visit and focused on its symbolism.  One 
journalist optimistically wrote, "the friendship and 
cooperation has begun."  Most major media outlets praised 
Karamanlis for his courage in traveling to Turkey and 
highlighted the gentlemen's agreement to avoid maritime or 
aviation incidents that might have sullied the visit. 
Karamanlis' January 24 meeting with Greek Orthodox Patriarch 
Bartholomew in Istanbul was largely ignored by the press (ref 
b). 
 
8. (C) Comment:  Although a few naysayers highlighted 
Karamanlis' public mention of minority issues and the Aegean 
dispute, the vast majority of Turks welcomed the new era in 
bilateral relations.  Erdogan escaped criticism; many 
portrayed him as the consummate statesman.  The success of 
the visit, the absence of incident, and the promise of Greek 
support for Turkey's EU bid should strengthen Erdogan's hand 
domestically, and perhaps allow him to take on in coming 
months some of the more controversial issues that have vexed 
Turkish-Greek relations for years.  End Comment. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
MCELDOWNEY