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Viewing cable 08ADDISABABA27, USG HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TEAM: SECURITY AND ACCESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ADDISABABA27 2008-01-08 08:07 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #0027/01 0080807
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 080807Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9012
INFO RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 2040
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 8837
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3292
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3022
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4090
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2956
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 6313
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7146
RUEHC/DEPT OF INTERIOR WASHDC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/CCJ5/CCJS//
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 000027 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, DAS AF JSWAN, AF/E, AF/PDPA, OES, 
A/S PRM SAUERBREY, AND PRM/AFR 
AFR/AA KALMQUIST, WWARREN, JBORNS, KNELSON, CTHOMPSON 
DCHA/AA MHESS, GGOTTLIEB 
DCHA/OFDA KLUU, ACONVERY, CCHAN, PMORRIS, KCHANNELL 
DCHA/FFP JDWORKEN, PMOHAN, SANTHONY, PBERTOLIN 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD 
USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN, RTILSWORTH, AND LPANASUK 
NAIROBI FOR OFDA/ECARO JMYER, GPLATT, RFFPO NCOX, USAID/EA 
ROME FOR AMBASSADOR, OHA, HSPANOS 
BRUSSELS FOR USEU PBROWN 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH, RMA 
USUN FOR TMALY 
NSC FOR PMARCHAN 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM SENV EAGR PGOV ET
REF:  A) ADDIS ABABA 3611 
SUBJECT: USG HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TEAM: SECURITY AND ACCESS 
UPDATE #2 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  Summary:   Between December 27 and 30, the U.S. Government (USG) 
Humanitarian Assistance Team (HAT) in Ethiopia program officer, 
health and nutrition specialist, and safety and security officer 
traveled to Jijiga and Degehabur zones in Somali Region as part of 
an initial field visit to assess humanitarian conditions and examine 
security and access restrictions to inform future travel in the 
region.  Despite improved access in parts of Somali Region in recent 
weeks, USG HAT staff report that a lack of clarity regarding 
clearance procedures and an apparent disconnect between regional, 
zonal, and district authorities and Ethiopian National Defense 
Forces (ENDF) continues to hinder movement.  End summary. 
 
------ 
ACCESS 
------ 
 
2.  As of December 30, USG HAT reported that travel in Degehabur 
District remains restricted to the main roads.  U.N. agencies, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the USG HAT have not been 
able to access rural areas.  Despite approval from regional 
authorities for unrestricted access in Degehabur Zone, the USG HAT 
observed that in practice secondary approval at the zonal and 
district level is required.  In addition, USG HAT staff note an 
apparent disconnect between civilian and military authorities that 
effectively delays and hinders access. 
 
3.  In a December 27 meeting, the Somali Regional President provided 
verbal approval for unrestricted USG HAT access in Somali Region. 
Despite this approval, the USG HAT reported that secondary approval 
at the zonal level was also required.  The Degehabur zonal 
administrator initially denied the USG HAT approval to travel to 
Deghamedo District, sighting security concerns.  Subsequently, the 
zonal administrator stated that the USG HAT could travel to 
Degehamedo, but that he that could not provide security assurances. 
In this context, the U.N. Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) 
would not have provided security clearance for U.N. Children Fund's 
(UNICEF) staff traveling with the USG HAT, and the USG HAT 
ultimately did not attempt to travel to Degehamedo.  In addition, in 
response to the USG HAT's request to travel to Gunagado village, the 
zonal administrator indicated that in the absence of village local 
officials, travel would not be possible. 
 
4.  In two separate meetings, the Degehabur zonal administrator 
informed the USG HAT that his approval was sufficient for access in 
Degehabur Zone and that military clearance was not required. 
However, Medecins Sans Frontieres/Greece (MSF/Greece) reported that 
it remains restricted to Degehabur town because it has not received 
military approval to access rural areas, despite verbal approval 
from the zonal and district administrators.  In addition, the U.N. 
World Food Program (WFP) head of office in Degehabur reported that 
although WFP has access to all district capitals on the main road, 
with the exception of Degehamedo, as of December 28, WFP staff had 
not been able to meet with the military commander to discuss the 
issue of off-road travel.  In addition, UNDSS curfew requirements 
for U.N. travel are contributing to reduced access.  MSF/Greece and 
 
WFP reported that despite repeated efforts to meet with local 
military commanders, the military has been unavailable.  When the 
USG HAT raised these concerns with the zonal administrator, the 
administrator reiterated his authority for providing clearance, but 
stated that he would facilitate a meeting between WFP and the local 
military commander. 
 
5.  Despite approval from the Somali Regional President, ENDF forces 
repeatedly stopped and questioned the USG HAT. At Kebribeyah 
checkpoint, approximately 20 kilometers (km) southeast of Jijiga 
town, the ENDF detained the USG HAT before escorting the team to the 
ENDF commander to explain the purpose of the team's travel. 
Approximately 2 km further on at the south end of Kebribeyah, the 
ENDF forces again stopped and questioned the team.  Similarly in 
Higelay village, ENDF forces stopped and aggressively questioned the 
USG HAT.  Although, the ENDF permitted the team to continue after 
each checkpoint, the USG HAT noted that clearance from regional 
authorities did not appear to have been communicated to the field. 
USG HAT reported the pervasive presence of ENDF forces throughout 
areas accessed. 
 
-------------------- 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
-------------------- 
 
6.  In Jijiga town, UNDSS representatives reported increased 
tensions as a result of recent civilian shootings and the presence 
of police checkpoints at night.  According to UNDSS, recent security 
incidents reflect increased tensions between Ethiopian highlanders 
and local populations.  UNICEF and WFP stronQ recommended the use 
of local drivers while traveling in Somali Region. 
 
7.  In Degahabur, WFP reported a security incident involving a young 
boy suspected of communicating with the Ogaden National Liberation 
Front (ONLF) who was killed by the ENDF on December 29.  However, 
USG HAT note that there have been no other security reports since 
mid-November.  WFP opened a field office in mid-November in 
Degehabur town.  USG HAT staff report that the WFP compound meets 
security standards and represents a secure potential base for USG 
HAT staff for future travel in the region. 
 
8.  USG HAT staff noted a reluctance of local populations and U.N. 
staff to discuss sensitive issues.  Local U.N. and health facility 
staff voiced concerns of potential civilian and military 
repercussions for communicating sensitive information. 
 
----------------------- 
CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS 
----------------------- 
 
8.  In close coordination with the U.S. Embassy Regional Security 
Officer, the USG HAT will continue to operate in Somali Region to 
facilitate the assessment of humanitarian conditions in the region 
and advocate for greater access for humanitarian agencies.  The 
December 27 to 30 field visit has contributed to gaining the 
confidence of regional and local authorities and established a 
foundation for future travel.  However, USG HAT note that a lack of 
clarity regarding access procedures persists, which continues to 
hinder access to conflict-affected areas in Somali Region.  End 
 
comment. 
 
 
YAMAMOTO