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Viewing cable 08ADDISABABA153, USG HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TEAM: SECURITY AND ACCESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ADDISABABA153 2008-01-18 11:05 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #0153/01 0181105
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181105Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9231
INFO RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 2088
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 8880
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3338
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3062
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4140
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2996
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 6353
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7205
RUEHC/DEPT OF INTERIOR WASHDC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/CCJ5/CCJS//
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 000153 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, DAS AF JSWAN, AF/E, AF/PDPA, OES, 
A/S PRM SAUERBREY, AND PRM/AFR 
AFR/AA KALMQUIST, WWARREN, JBORNS, KNELSON, CTHOMPSON 
DCHA/AA MHESS, GGOTTLIEB 
DCHA/OFDA KLUU, ACONVERY, CCHAN, PMORRIS, KCHANNELL 
DCHA/FFP JDWORKEN, PMOHAN, SANTHONY, PBERTOLIN 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD 
USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN, RTILSWORTH, AND LPANASUK 
NAIROBI FOR OFDA/ECARO JMYER, GPLATT, RFFPO NCOX, USAID/EA 
ROME FOR AMBASSADOR, OHA, HSPANOS 
BRUSSELS FOR USEU PBROWN 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH, RMA 
USUN FOR TMALY 
NSC FOR PMARCHAN 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM SENV EAGR PGOV ET
REF:  A) ADDIS 3611  B) ADDIS 0027 
SUBJECT: USG HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TEAM: SECURITY AND ACCESS 
UPDATE #3 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  Between January 2 and 9, U.S. Government (USG) Humanitarian 
Assistance Team (HAT) in Ethiopia staff, traveled to Degehabur and 
Fik zones in Somali Region as part of a second field visit to assess 
current humanitarian conditions.  USG HAT staff report that a letter 
of approval from the Somali Regional President significantly 
improved and facilitated USG HAT travel in the region.  However, 
some areas remained inaccessible due to security concerns, including 
Dihun, Segeg, and Gerbo districts of eastern Fik Zone.  USG HAT 
staff identified a critical lack of U.N. Department of Safety and 
Security (UNDSS) presence and capacity in Somali Region that is 
significantly undermining security monitoring, reporting, and 
information sharing.  Both U.N. agencies and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) operating within the conflict-affected areas of 
Somali Region characterized current UNDSS presence and performance 
as inadequate.  UNDSS representatives also acknowledge the need to 
augment staffing to effectively support the humanitarian community 
in Somali Region.  In addition, the absence of a U.N. Humanitarian 
Air Service (UNHAS) operation in Somali Region is negatively 
affecting programming and contingency response capacity. End 
summary. 
 
------------------- 
Access and Security 
------------------- 
 
2.  Between January 2 and 9, USG HAT staff, traveled to Degehabur 
and Fik zones in Somali Region as part of a second humanitarian 
field assessment.  In a January 2 meeting, the Somali Regional 
President provided written authorization for USG HAT travel in 
Somali Region, including the five conflict-affected zones of Fik, 
Degehabur, Warder, Gode, and Korahe.  USG HAT staff report that the 
authorization letter significantly improved and facilitated USG HAT 
travel in the region, Qding reduced delays at military 
checkpoints and increased cooperation from military and civil 
authorities.  However, some areas remained inaccessible due to 
security concerns, including Dihun, Segeg, and Gerbo districts of 
eastern Fik Zone.  Medecines Sans Frontieres (MSF)/Switzerland 
reported that areas south of Hamedo town and Kasanagas village, 
Hamedo District, were unsafe due to Ogaden National Liberation Front 
(ONLF) presence and an increased risk of clashes with the Ethiopian 
National Defense Forces (ENDF).  In addition, the Degehabur Zonal 
Commissioner denied approval for USG HAT travel to Degehamedo 
District, Degehabur Zone, due to security concerns and military 
escort requirements. 
 
3.  USG HAT staff received reports of recent fighting and observed 
the presence of landmines in some areas of Degehabur and Fik zones. 
In Bulale village, Degehabur District, 42 kilometers (km) southeast 
of Degehabur town, local residents reported recent fighting between 
the ONLF and ENDF approximately 10 km from Bulale.  Approximately 
one km outside of Bulale, USG HAT staff observed a well marked 
landmine.  In addition, USG HAT observed two, well marked landmines 
during travel between Hamero town and Kasangas village, Hamero 
District, Fik Zone.  USG HAT staff report that as a result of the 
clear demarcation and local driver knowledge of landmine placement 
 
outside of Bulale and Kasangas villages, the landmines did not pose 
a risk to USG HAT travel in the area. 
 
4.  USG HAT staff emphasize the need to respect local ENDF 
checkpoint procedures in the region.  During USG HAT travel to Fik 
town, the lead car in the three-car convoy inadvertently failed to 
stop at an ENDF checkpoint approximately 1 km outside of Fik town, 
prompting a tense exchange between ENDF soldiers and USG HAT staff. 
The second car in the convoy stopped at the checkpoint and radioed 
the first car to return.  Following a brief discussion and cursory 
check of the vehicle, the ENDF soldiers permitted the convoy to 
continue.  However, the incident underscores the importance of 
adhering to checkpoint procedures, which the USG HAT safety and 
security officer emphasized with all convoy drivers and USG HAT 
members. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
UNDSS: Under-staffed and Under-resourced 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5.  USG HAT staff note a critical lack of UNDSS presence and 
capacity in Somali Region, which is prohibiting the provision of 
adequate security support to humanitarian staff and operations in 
the region.  Both U.N. agencies and NGOs operating within the 
conflict-affected areas of Somali Region characterize current UNDSS 
presence and performance as inadequate.  MSF/Switzerland and SC/UK 
staff in Fik Zone report frustration regarding the lack of UNDSS 
security reporting and information sharing.  The U.N. World Food 
Program (WFP) reported that UNDSS's current weakness is undermining 
its own efforts to expand access and presence in the region, due to 
WFP's reliance on UNDSS for information and security clearance.  USG 
HAT staff note that the absence of a robust and reliable security 
presence in Somali Region has significant negative implications, 
including undermining humanitarian staff safety and operations. 
 
6.  In a January 11 meeting with USG HAT staff, UNDSS and WFP 
security representatives also acknowledged the need to augment 
staffing to meet minimum safety and security standards and 
effectively support the humanitarian community in Somali Region. 
Current staffing levels, with three international and four local 
staff covering the entire country, are inadequate to address 
security monitoring and reporting needs for the region.  Both UNDSS 
and WFP security representatives identified the need for 
international staff from their organizations to be based in Jijiga 
town, Jijiga Zone, and Kebridahar town, Korahe Zone.  Currently, 
neither WFP nor UNDSS maintains a permanent international staff 
presence in Somali region.  UNDSS and WFP report that efforts to 
augment staffing levels have been hindered by budget limitations to 
date. 
 
7.  In addition, USG HAT staff report that the absence of an UNHAS 
operation in Somali Region is negatively affecting programming and 
contingency response capacity, including emergency evacuation 
planning. 
 
------------------------------- 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
------------------------------- 
 
8.  USG HAT staff will continue to closely coordinate with the U.S. 
Embassy resident security officer, UNDSS, WFP, and NGOs to share 
security information and inform future USG HAT travel in Somali 
region.  In addition, USG HAT staff recommend U.S. Government and 
USAID Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance 
(USAID/DCHA) advocacy with the U.N. to augment UNDSS presence and 
capacity in Somali Region.  High-level advocacy to facilitate UNHAS 
operations in the region is also recommended. 
 
YAMAMOTO