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Viewing cable 07ZAGREB1094, CROATIAN ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGN SPENDING FIGURES AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ZAGREB1094 2007-12-21 13:35 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Zagreb
VZCZCXRO7899
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHVB #1094/01 3551335
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211335Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8438
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 001094 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/PPD AND EUR/RPM 
OSD FOR WINTERNITZ, NSC FOR BRAUN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV HR
SUBJECT: CROATIAN ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGN SPENDING FIGURES AND 
MESSY VOTER REGISTRIES 
 
 
CAMPAIGN SPENDING:  $70,000 PER SABOR SEAT 
------------------------------------ 
 
 1.  Following the November 25 parliamentary elections in 
Croatia, Transparency International Croatia (TIH) and GONG, 
an election monitoring organization, have published their 
report on campaign spending.  During the official campaign 
season 3 - 23 November, Croatian political parties spent more 
than 50 million kuna ($10 million).  The ruling Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) led campaign spending with over 25 
million kuna, or more than all other parties combined.  The 
main opposition party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), was 
a distant second, spending just over 8 million kuna.  While 
the SDP's campaign won fewer seats than the HDZ, it was much 
more cost effective.  The SDP spent approximately 145,000 
kuna (or $29,000) per each of its 56 seats in the Sabor, 
while the HDZ spent over 400,000 kuna (or $80,000) for each 
of the 61 seats it won inside Croatia.  Both parties did far 
better however, than the right-wing Croatian Party of Rights 
(HSP), which spent 3m kuna ($600,000) to win a single seat. 
For the elections as a whole, the average seat in Parliament 
cost around 350,000 kuna ($70,000). 
 
2. There is no specific law in Croatia to regulate campaign 
financing for parliamentary elections.  The existing statute 
only governs the overall financing of political parties, 
independent lists and candidates.  Enacted in December 2006, 
the law defines political parties as nonprofit organizations 
which are partially subsidized from the state budget.  All 
parties with at least one representative in the Sabor are 
eligible for state funds, and the money is divided 
proportionally among the parties.  Parties are eligible for a 
10 percent bonus for each representative of an 
"under-represented gender" (i.e. - female).  The State Audit 
Office at the Ministry of Finance requires end-of-year 
financial statements from the parties, who must publish the 
same on their public websites. 
 
3. The TIH/GONG figures are only estimates based on the most 
visible portion of the campaign.  The numbers, compiled by a 
private firm, are based on a selective look at advertising 
during the campaign: political party radio and TV ads, 
advertisements on the most popular Croatian Internet portals, 
in daily and monthly print media, and on commercial 
billboards.  GONG and TIH speculated that their findings 
captured only about half of actual spending by the parties, 
putting the final level of campaign spending at closer to 100 
million kuna ($20m).  Both major parties have provided their 
own figures for campaign spending.  HDZ says its total 
campaign spending was 24 million kuna -- less than GONG/TIH's 
partial figure, and well below GONG/TIH's total estimate of 
approximately 50 million kuna.  SDP's estimated figures are 
more in line with GONG/TIH's numbers, at approximately 16 
million kuna for the total campaign. 
 
THE DEAD ARE REGISTERED, BUT THEY DON'T VOTE MUCH 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. GONG also released a separate report on the status of 
Croatian voter lists during the 2007 parliamentary elections. 
 GONG estimates as many as 20 percent of Croatians registered 
to vote in District 11, the so-called "Diaspora", are in fact 
deceased.  Their estimates are based on a review of the dates 
of birth of voters and their contact with Croatian 
institutions over the last 15 years.  While GONG believes 
these "dead voters" had no influence on the results of the 
parliamentary elections as they found no evidence of large 
scale voting by the dead, the presence of these names on the 
registers would increase the turnout requirements for any 
future referenda.  (NOTE: A referendum is unlikely for 
Croatia's NATO accession, but would be required, barring a 
change to Croatian's Constitution, for EU accession. END 
NOTE.)  The discrepancy in voter lists was not isolated to 
lists in Bosnia-Hercegovina, but also extended to the U.S. 
and other diaspora vote registries, in part because it is 
harder for the State Election Commission to track foreign 
deaths and update voter lists.  Since the elections, 
Croatia's State Election Commission has confirmed one 
instance of a dead person voting in Bosnia-Hercegovina and is 
pursuing the case with the Croatian State Prosecutor's Office. 
 
5. COMMENT:  Croatia has taken significant steps in 
increasing the transparency of its electoral process and 
improving the management of voter registration lists.  As the 
reports by GONG and TIH show, room for improvement still 
exists, but the overall evaluation of the 2007 parliamentary 
elections by groups like OSCE/ODIHR and GONG has been very 
 
ZAGREB 00001094  002 OF 002 
 
 
positive.  It is notable that Croatia's system of providing 
state funds to political parties based on their 
representation in parliament means the rich will get richer. 
SDP's gains in the 2007 elections will translate to better 
funding of future campaigns.  HSP's loss of seats will 
increase the party's reliance on private funding.  Shifts in 
public support toward the establishment of two or three 
primary political parties will only increase the imbalance in 
funding between those parties and smaller parties focused on 
specific regions or interests.  This imbalance will only 
increase the need for additional transparency in the coming 
years.  END SUMMARY. 
BRADTKE