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Viewing cable 07VIENNA2948, AUSTRIAN TRADE DELEGATE VIEWS ON IRANIAN POLITICAL AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07VIENNA2948 2007-12-14 14:47 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Vienna
VZCZCXRO3212
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHVI #2948/01 3481447
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141447Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9161
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 002948 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS, SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ETRD EINV PREL IR AU
SUBJECT: AUSTRIAN TRADE DELEGATE VIEWS ON IRANIAN POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC SITUATION 
 
REF: VIENNA 1604 
 
VIENNA 00002948  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) A former Austrian trade delegate to Iran recently told 
Emboff that financial sanctions are effective in the banking sector, 
but less successful in deterring Austrian companies from trading 
with Iranian counterparts.  In the view of the trade official, U.S. 
sanctions were counterproductive, because they ultimately undermined 
the position of pro-U.S. factions in Iranian society.  Austrian 
exports to Iran are declining, not because of sanctions, according 
to our interlocutor, but because of a general deterioration of 
Iran's economy.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) During a recent informal meeting with Emboff, a former 
representative of the Austrian Economic Chamber (Wirtschaftskammer 
Oesterreich-WKO)in Tehran discussed his impressions of the current 
Iranian economic and political situation.  The trade rep had just 
returned from a three year tour in Tehran where he promoted Austrian 
trade and investment in Iran. 
 
 
Iranians Predisposed to U.S., But Not To Sanctions 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3.  (SBU) In the opinion of the trade rep, U.S. policy towards Iran 
was "counter-productive and wrong."  Although many Iranians were 
positively inclined towards the U.S., USG policy had damaged the 
Iranian economy, making it difficult for most Iranians not to 
support the regime.  According to our contact, many Iranians 
believed that increased commercial relations between Iran and the 
West could improve the political climate.  The trade delegate's 
Iranian interlocutors often expressed concern that the U.S. was 
unfairly siding with an "inhumane" regime in Saudi Arabia against 
Iran.  Most Iranian Shiites, according to the trade rep, considered 
themselves more open and democratic than their Sunni counterparts. 
There is a democratic movement in Iran, which hopes the 2009 
elections will usher in regime change and an era of reforms. 
 
 
Financial Sanctions Effective 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Commenting on financial sanctions targeting Iranian banks, 
the trade rep maintained that almost no bank is willing to finance 
or guarantee investments in Iran.  Also effective, to a certain 
extent, were U.S. warnings that it might implement the Iran 
Sanctions Act (ISA) against companies that invest in Iran's energy 
sector.  However, our interlocutor criticized the ISA as "a breach 
of international law," allowing extra-territorial application of 
U.S. laws. 
 
 
Austrian Business Prefers "Business As Usual" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) According to our contact, the WKO and other European 
business lobbying groups will continue to support legitimate 
European trade and investments in Iran, as long as UN, European, and 
national laws are upheld.  It was difficult to do business in the 
"cumbersome" government-controlled oil and gas sector. 
Nevertheless, our interlocutor maintained that there were attractive 
opportunities for investments and trade in other sectors, 
particularly in those that have been recently privatized. 
 
6.  (SBU) Austrian exports to Iran continue to decline, not so much 
because of international sanctions, according to the trade rep, but 
because of a general deterioration in Iran's economic situation. 
Austrian exports to Iran decreased by 15.6% to Euro 339 million in 
2006, and decreased by another 9.6% in the first three quarters of 
2007. 
 
7.  (SBU) Our contact expressed hope that relations between the U.S. 
and Iran could improve, particularly following elections in both 
countries.  He predicted that the 2009 presidential elections in 
Iran could usher in more political and economic reforms.  Our 
contact maintained that many opinion leaders in Iran are 
increasingly discontent with the government's economic performance, 
as well as Ahmadinejad's "lunacy." 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Austria has historically enjoyed excellent commercial 
relations with Iran, even in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 
revolution.  While the comments are the trade rep's private views, 
they echo the views expressed to us from various government and 
 
VIENNA 00002948  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
business leaders:  economic sanctions are not the most appropriate 
means to effect regime change in Iran.  On the contrary, many 
Austrian policy makers argue that intensified trade and economic 
cooperation would facilitate political reforms. 
 
KILNER#