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Viewing cable 07TOKYO5624, CLUSTER MUNITIONS DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO JAPANESE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO5624 2007-12-20 07:53 2011-06-16 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #5624/01 3540753
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 200753Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0472
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2480
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 0128
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0276
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0544
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 1166
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6809
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0648
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0132
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1014
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/USFJ
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 005624 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR PM/WRA KATHERINE BAKER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM MOPS JA
SUBJECT: CLUSTER MUNITIONS DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO JAPANESE 
 
REF: STATE 167308 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4(b) a 
nd (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Japan believes the optimal solution to the 
cluster munitions issue is a legally binding agreement 
arrived at through the CCW process.  However, because such an 
outcome is not certain, Japan will continue to participate in 
the Oslo Process in order to be able to influence any final 
outcome it may reach.  Japan concurs with our position 
regarding the utility of cluster munitions, but is also 
heavily influenced by press and public opinion which is 
generally strongly supportive of disarmament efforts.  MOFA 
officials would like to coordinate closely with counterparts 
from both the United States and Europe to assure we are all 
speaking with one coherent voice, and is interested in 
meeting bilaterally with U.S. officials either before or 
during the upcoming January 14-18 CCW meetings in Geneva. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Per reftel, Embassy Tokyo Political Officer met 
December 19 with MOFA officials Michiko Makino of the 
Conventional Arms Division of the Disarmament, 
Non-Proliferation, and Science Department, and Takuma Kajita 
of the Treaties Division of the International Legal Affairs 
Bureau to discuss U.S. views on cluster munitions.  The 
discussion emphasized that the U.S. shares humanitarian 
concerns about the use of cluster munitions and that we fully 
support negotiations on this issue within the framework of 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) process. 
 Both papers contained in reftel were discussed and left. 
 
------------------------------ 
JAPAN SHARES OUR VIEWS, BUT... 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) Japan shares our views on the utility of cluster 
munitions, said Kajita, and agrees completely that the most 
desirable outcome is to resolve any concerns about their use 
within the CCW process.  However, because the CCW process 
works by consensus and it is unclear whether the Russians are 
fully on board, it is uncertain whether an agreement will be 
possible.  Accordingly, Japan believes it necessary to 
participate in the Oslo Process in order to be able to 
influence any final outcome or agreement in that forum. 
Kajima pointed out that several NATO members are also 
participating in the Oslo Process. 
 
4. (C) Ideally, Japan would like to see a legally binding 
agreement worked out in the CCW process, rather than simply a 
set of guidelines. Kajita noted that since the CCW process 
includes major producers of cluster munitions, any agreement 
reached will be more effective than anything the Oslo Process 
will achieve, even if any restrictions on use are not as 
comprehensive. 
 
5. (C) Kajita said it is critical to understand what the ""red 
lines"" are for both Japan and the United States on this 
issue.  Obviously, a total ban is a red line, but it seems 
inevitable that some restrictions are forthcoming, and it 
would best to understand right now what is acceptable to each 
party.  Japan believes it important for countries sharing 
like views to coordinate our approach on this so we can speak 
with a single coherent voice, and welcomes the opportunity to 
meet bilaterally with us prior to or on the sidelines of 
meetings coming up in Geneva January 14-18. 
 
------------------------------- 
... PUBLIC OPINION PLAYS A ROLE 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (C)  Despite the fact Japan's view on the utility of 
cluster munitions is similar to ours, Kajita and Makino 
pointed out that on this issue, public and press opinion in 
Japan will play a key role.  Although there are many 
activists in the United States who are campaigning against 
cluster munitions, Kajita asserted they are not as organized 
or effective as those in Japan, where disarmament is always a 
hot-button political issue.  He claimed that, for example, at 
the November Oslo meeting, eighty percent of the journalists 
who attended were from Japan, and that the only television 
news camera there was from Japan's NHK network.  In addition, 
the day prior to the meeting, parliamentarians held a 
conference on cluster munitions.  Japanese attendees included 
Liberal Democratic Party Diet member and former Minister for 
Gender Equality Kuniko Inoguchi, who also served as 
Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in 2003-2004, and 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) representative and former 
""shadow Foreign Minister"" Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi.  And as 
recently as December 18, the question of a ban on cluster 
munitions had been raised in Upper House debates.  Because 
the Upper House is now controlled by the opposition DPJ, the 
potential for cluster munitions to become a major subject for 
debate is a real possibility, warned Kajita. 
 
7. (C)  Political Officer replied that we are aware of the 
political sensitivities in Japan concerning cluster 
munitions, but that we hope MOFA and MOD officials, along 
with like-minded Diet members, will use the materials in our 
two papers to help explain to the public the true facts about 
the utility of these munitions and the possible ramifications 
of enacting bans that also include criminal penalties. 
 
8. (C) A copy of the two non-papers were also provided to 
Ministry of Defense officials. 
SCHIEFFER