Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07NAIROBI4745, KENYA ELECTIONS: CREDIBLE VOTE LIKELY, BUT WE'RE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07NAIROBI4745.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NAIROBI4745 2007-12-14 04:01 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #4745/01 3480401
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140401Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3865
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 9732
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 5617
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 4951
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2443
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1724
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2494
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2418
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS NAIROBI 004745 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL KE
SUBJECT: KENYA ELECTIONS: CREDIBLE VOTE LIKELY, BUT WE'RE 
MONITORING TRIP WIRES 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 4647 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     B. NAIROBI 3675 
 
1. (SBU)  SUMMARY: Less than three weeks from the election, 
we remain confident that the exercise will be generally free 
and fair.  This confidence is based on six pillars: an 
independent and non-partisan electoral commission, free and 
vibrant civil society organizations and media, responsible 
behavior by police, vigilance on the part of political 
rivals, a robust domestic and international observation 
effort, and Kenya's free political climate.  Political 
violence, appeals to ethnic hatred, misuse of government 
resources, subversion of ECK procedures, and partisan 
behavior of provincial officials are our chief areas of 
concern about Kenya's electoral process.  For each, we have 
specific trip wires that would lead to intervention, either 
publicly or privately, as circumstances warrant.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Indicators Point to Fair, Transparent & Credible Election 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
2. (SBU)  We continue to closely monitor all aspects of 
Kenya's election process, looking for opportunities to bring 
USG influence to bear on behalf of our goal: a fair, 
transparent and peaceful election.  Less than three weeks 
from the election, we remain confident that the election will 
be generally free and fair.  This confidence is based on six 
pillars: an independent and non-partisan electoral 
commission, free and vibrant civil society organizations and 
media, responsible behavior by police, vigilance on the part 
of political rivals, a robust domestic and international 
observation effort, and Kenya's free political climate. 
 
3. (SBU) The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK):  The ECK 
remains firmly under the control of its Chairman, Samuel 
Kivuitu.  This is a good thing.  There were fears in some 
quarters that newly appointed commissioners, many of whom are 
presumed to be pro-Kibaki partisans,  would overwhelm the 
non-partisan Chairman and diminish his authority.  This has 
not happened.  Kivuitu has skillfully managed the commission 
and kept public opinion on his side.  Kivuitu managed a 
number of administrative reforms and compromises that augur 
well for election day success.  For example, realizing that 
the voter register contains numerous erroneous entries, 
Kivuitu pushed through a ruling, with political party 
agreement, that double registered voters would retain their 
franchise as long as they sign a binding agreement to vote 
only once.  Those registered more than twice would be purged 
from the rolls.  Kivuitu also managed to pass a similar 
ruling concerning distribution to polling officials of the 
commission's voter register, again with consent of the 
political parties.  He consistently prioritizes broad 
participation and transparency over strict controls that 
unfairly exclude voters, given the problematic state of the 
voter rolls. 
 
4. (SBU) Kivuitu has also won respect by striking out 
publicly against senior politicians and government officials 
who make unfounded accusations against his commission. The 
Electoral Commission of Kenya's strong record in 
administering elections in a non-partisan manner is our 
principal reason for predicting a credible process. 
 
5. (SBU) Civil Society & Media: Kenya's vibrant, free and 
outspoken civil society groups and media also inspire 
confidence in the process.  Every few days a major civil 
society group holds a well attended press conference to 
highlight an aspect of the process and finger institutions 
and individuals who they hold responsible for malfeasance. 
The media is covering the process minutely, even reporting on 
the arrival of freshly printed ballot papers and their 
conditions of storage.  Political advertising is robust and 
unfettered.  Debate on the editorial pages rages.  The 
electronic media has been equally engaged, although some 
outlets are developing a reputation for biased coverage. 
Still, in today's Kenya there is such a diversity of voices 
available to voters that no candidate can credibly claim to 
be shut out. 
 
6. (SBU) The Kenya Police Service:  The police force has so 
far surprised its many critics by behaving in a professional 
and politically neutral manner.  Police have detained 
political miscreants from both sides, including two Kenyan 
Administrative Police officials caught distributing 
anti-Raila hate literature. Police have also questioned an 
Assistant Minister regarding his involvement in the transport 
of weapons found in his official vehicle.  Many lament the 
long-standing law enforcement tradition in Kenya of pursuing 
foot soldiers while sparing their well known and politically 
connected generals.  For the most part, this has not changed, 
although we know some practitioners of political violence 
have been directly warned to desist.  Under civil society and 
international community pressures (including the U.S. 
Mission), the police commissioner publicly agreed to provide 
security to women candidates, who suffer more than their male 
colleagues from violent intimidation.  We have heard from 
numerous women candidates that implementation of the 
commissioner's promise has been inconsistent so far.  We are 
advocating a more thorough and systematic treatment of this 
serious problem. 
 
7. (SBU) Mutual Vigilance:  The fact that this election is so 
competitive is in itself a cause for confidence.  The two top 
parties are watching one another's every move, and declaiming 
from the rooftops any perceived malpractices of their 
opponents.  Opposition leader Odinga is especially prone to 
launching pre-emptive strikes against his opponents and 
(unfairly in our view) against the ECK.  All sides have 
senior bureaucrats in their camp ready to leak news of any 
electoral skullduggery to the concerned parties. 
 
8. (SBU) Domestic & International Observation:  ECK has 
welcomed and encouraged election observer missions, both 
domestic and international.  Religious organizations and a 
wide array of civil society groups, some of which have 
considerable experience in election observation, are striving 
to field at least one observer in each of the 27,000 polling 
stations.  Twenty-five resident diplomatic missions, the 
European Union, the Commonwealth, and the African Union will 
also field observation missions.  The US Mission will field 
over 150 observers and facilitate an official observer 
delegation headed by former Assistant Secretary Constance 
Newman. 
 
9. (SBU) Civil Freedom:  Finally, Kenya's five-year old 
climate of civil freedom contributes to our confidence in the 
process.  As one elderly rural voter in a remote region told 
PolCouns, "Under Moi and Kenyatta we did whatever the 
District Commissioner and his men told us to do.  No one 
wanted to pay the price of refusing them.  These days when 
the District Officer and his chiefs tell us to support the 
government, we tell them to their face that we are free to 
vote for whoever we want." 
 
Trip Wires: Looking Out for Danger Signs 
---------------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Political violence, appeals to ethnic hatred, 
misuse of government resources, subversion of ECK procedures, 
and partisan behavior of provincial officials are our chief 
areas of concern about Kenya's electoral process.  For each, 
we have specific trip wires that would lead to intervention, 
either publicly or privately as circumstances warrant. 
 
11. (SBU) Political Violence:  Political violence is being 
practiced by some parliamentary candidates from all three 
major political parties.  We are not witnessing the 
widescale, centrally organized political-ethnic violence that 
characterized Kenya's first two multiparty elections in 1992 
and 1997.  When violence threatens to escalate from isolated 
incidents to wholesale destruction, which is currently the 
case in the Molo region of Rift Valley Province, public 
outcry and protests from civil society, religious 
organizations and political leadership is fierce.  We have 
added our voice to condemn both isolated incidents (the 
attack on a woman candidate in Eastern Province, see ref B) 
and more widescale violence.  Our trip wire for changing our 
positive view of the election process is widespread political 
violence targeting specific communities so as to change 
turnout (as occurred in '92 and '97).  So far, this level of 
 
violence has only occurred in parts of one constituency, and 
so does not have ramifications for the national vote.  The 
Mount Elgon clashes (Western Province) are chronic and not 
directly related to the election.  We will continue to 
implement specific programs to curb violence, about which we 
are reporting septel. 
 
12. (SBU) Appeals to Ethnic Hatred:  We have seen extremely 
offensive, hateful political statements and literature aimed 
at encouraging ethnic hatred emanating from the two largest 
parties (Kibaki's PNU and Odinga's ODM).  The great majority 
of such material is coming from the Kibaki camp, despite the 
President's frequent admonitions for his supporters to avoid 
such tactics.  The media and civil society have vociferously 
condemned hate propaganda.  The police have arrested 
distributors of this material, including those acting on 
behalf of the Kibaki campaign.  We have brought to the 
attention of leaders in both camps specific examples of hate 
speech we have heard and read.  Our trip wire for hate speech 
effecting the election is widescale use of vernacular radio 
to spread extremist messages (a la Radio Mille Collines in 
Rwanda). 
 
13. (SBU) Misuse of Government Resources: Kenya's Human 
Rights Commission and the ECK have both documented and 
condemned misuse of official resources for campaign purposes. 
 The press and civil society have done the same.  The police 
have acted against officials using government vehicles for 
campaign purposes.  Still, the practice continues, but with 
more restraint than was the case in past elections.  Our trip 
wire for misuse of government resources is massive, blatant 
and unrestrained use of government funding and assets on 
behalf of the president's campaign to the extent that it 
threatens to seriously tilt the playing field in his favor. 
 
14. (SBU) Subversion of ECK: Partisan ECK commissioners could 
use their authority to influence ECK polling clerks, 
presiding officers and returning officers to depress the vote 
in certain areas and pad it in others.  Conceivably, they 
could also attempt to substitute pre-marked ballots or use 
other rigging schemes.  There are a number of controls in 
place (such as vote counting at the polling station in full 
public view) that would likely defeat most such plans.  We 
strongly expect that Chairman Kivuitu would keep his word to 
resign in a publicly spectacular fashion if the commission 
was subverted in this fashion.  Our trip wire is ECK 
permissiveness of fraud extensive enough to effect the 
outcome. 
 
15. (SBU) Partisan Officials:  The provincial administration 
answers directly to the Minister of Internal Security and 
Provincial Administration, John Michuki.  His father was a 
provincial official under the British, as was he as a young 
man.  Michuki is definitely subscribes to the old school 
"top-down" view of governance.  We have sen indications that 
Michuki has instructed his officials to support the 
government.  In some areas this indeed appears to be 
happening, but to no great effect.  In other areas provincial 
officials appear to be mindful of the possibility that they 
may be serving under a new government in a few weeks time, 
and so are behaving in a reasonably neutral fashion.  Our 
trip wire is widespread, blatant and effective partisan 
behavior on part of the administration to the extent that the 
election outcome is or will be effected. 
 
 
RANNEBERGER