Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07MOSCOW5835,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW5835.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW5835 2007-12-17 12:57 2011-01-31 21:30 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO3474
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #5835/01 3511257
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171257Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5883
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005835 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT 
EUR/CARC, SCA (GALLAGHER, SUMAR) 
DOE FOR HARBERT, HEGBORG, EKIMOFF 
DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RS PINR

1.(C) Summary: Rosneft CEO Sergey Bogdanchikov told the Ambassador December 13th that he is optimistic about the company's future, noting in particular that its large Vankor field should come online in 2008. Bogdanchikov dismissed claims the company was overextended as a result of recent acquisitions and said Rosneft would be able to secure any needed credit. He expressed satisfaction with Rosneft's Sakhalin 1 partnership with ExxonMobil and said he supported a market price for the field's gas, despite pressures to the contrary from Gazprom. Bogdanchikov did not see any major structural changes in Russia's oil industry in 2008 and insisted Rosneft has no interest in the non-BP half of TNK-BP. On the Burgas-Alexandropoulis pipeline (BAP), Bogdanchikov said the day a final deal is signed to make the pipeline a reality "is the day we will have final agreement on CPC expansion." Finally, Bogdanchikov dismissed rumors that he will enter politics in Sakhalin, and indicated he is staying put.

End Summary.

------------------------------------------- OPTIMISTIC ON ROSNEFT'S FUTURE, BAP AND CPC -------------------------------------------

2.(SBU) In a December 13th meeting with the Ambassador, Bogdanchikov focused on Rosneft's performance, optimistically outlining the company's operations and future. Bogdanchikov claimed Rosneft's 10% organic growth (growth excluding acquisitions) in oil production in 2007 was among the best rates in the industry world-wide, and he expected 7-8% organic growth in 2008. The company is replacing over 100% of reserves and that its large Vankor field has proven bigger than expected. He said production from Vankor will begin in 2008, despite construction delays on the East Siberian Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline. Since Vankor will be connected to the Transneft system, it would not require ESPO until 2010, when Vankor production would exceed current Transneft capacities.

3.(SBU) Bogdanchikov said Rosneft isn't planning further major upstream acquisitions, but that it would consider "attractive" opportunities that arise. Rosneft plans to boost production from the current 100 million tons (2 mbd) to 160 million tons (3.2 mbd) by 2015. Bogdanchikov added that Rosneft plans to focus more on refining. It will sell less crude and process more in its own refineries. The company plans to invest $15 billion in refining by 2020, mostly on acquiring refineries and upgrading its own.

4.(SBU) Rosneft, as a shareholder in the BAP and as a shareholder and user of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), fully supports construction of the BAP as well as CPC expansion. According to Bogdanchikov, "the day a final deal is signed on the BAP is the day a deal will be signed on CPC expansion." He was optimistic that these deals would be concluded soon, as congestion in the Bosporous adds costs for all producing companies. He predicted that BAP construction and CPC expansion could both be completed in 18 months once the agreements are inked.

--------------------------------------------- --------

TRANSPORT TARIFFS, SUBSOIL AMENDMENTS, AND SAKHALIN 1

--------------------------------------------- --------

5.(SBU) Bogdanchikov said he believes the GOR will implement a common pipeline tariff for access to the Transneft system, which he called more "market oriented," because it would replace the current differentiated system. (Note: A common tariff is considered necessary to fund the ESPO, whose costs have escalated. A common tariff would, in effect, subsidize the ESPO at the expense of shippers moving oil west.)

6.(SBU) Bogdanchikov was hopeful that anticipated amendments to subsoil legislation would be passed in 2008, allowing new license auctions and extending the current five-year licenses for off-shore production. He also expected that new tax incentives, currently granted for some East Siberia greenfield developments, would be extended to cover offshore projects. He said new license blocks will be complicated to develop and that companies need to get started on them as soon as possible. MOSCOW 00005835 002 OF 002

7.(SBU) Bogdanchikov was positive about Rosneft's partnership with ExxonMobil in Sakhalin

ΒΆ1. Regarding gas sales out of Sakhalin 1, Bogdanchikov said Rosneft believes that the consortium should seek the best commercial terms, "regardless of to whom or in what market" the gas is sold. He suggested, however, that scheduled domestic gas price increases may help resolve the current stalemate with Gazprom, which insists Sakhalin 1 gas be sold to it domestically.

------------------------------------

DEBT RESTRUCTURING AND CONSOLIDATION

------------------------------------

8.(SBU) Regarding Rosneft's vast debt and rumored difficulties in obtaining credit, Bogdanchikov said the company already has an agreement with banks to extend the term of its current $20 billion bridge loan. He was "absolutely sure" there would be no problems restructuring its debt on favorable terms. He expressed confidence in U.S. credit markets, noting that "even the Fed is helping us" keep debt service costs down.

9.(SBU) Commenting on rumors of further consolidation in the oil sector, Bogdanchikov said there has been no decision on merging with Surgutneftegaz, and that Rosneft is not interested in buying the "Russian half" of TNK-BP. He claimed that TNK-BP's production efficiencies and assets were substantially inferior to Rosneft's and that such an investment wouldn't make sense -- "it would be better to drill new wells." On the rumored restructuring of the Ministry of Industry and Energy, Bogdanchikov said that given the inauguration in the spring, he didn't see time for such changes. Although "as an oil man" he would like to see a ministry devoted to energy, he has not seen any preparations for doing so.

10.(SBU) In response to the Ambassador's question about Bogdanchikov entering politics in Sakhalin Oblast, Bogdanchikov said such suggestions were "totally rumors." He claimed he has never been interested in pursuing political office and plans to stay on at Rosneft, but did not comment on recent resignations of three of his deputies.

11.(C) Bogdanchikov's depth, vision, and presentation were impressive, as usual. His forecast, however, is at odds with conventional wisdom here. Most analysts with whom we have spoken believe further consolidation in the Russian oil sector is inevitable and that, after 10 years at the helm, Bogdanchikov may be on his way out. BURNS