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Viewing cable 07KINSHASA1377, HIGHLIGHTS OF JOINT MONITORING GROUP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KINSHASA1377 2007-12-18 10:34 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO4769
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1377/01 3521034
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181034Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7252
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001377 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM MOPS PREL PREF KPKO CG RW
SUBJECT:  HIGHLIGHTS OF JOINT MONITORING GROUP 
          (JMG) DECEMBER 14 MEETING IN GOMA 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  The Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) established by 
the Congo-Rwanda Nairobi communique got off to a rocky start at its 
first meeting December 15, but succeeded in reaffirming support for 
the process and establishing follow-up mechanisms.  A UN emphasis on 
North Kivu and repeated off-agenda detours by Congolese delegates 
prevented a focused discussion of the full agenda, but judicious 
interventions by UN, U.S. and EU envoys helped resolve questions on 
the scope of the communique and obligations of both parties.  Most 
significant:  follow-up to Nairobi should focus on eliminating the 
threat to the region posed by all armed groups, and decisions on how 
and when to address groups based in Congolese territory.  The JMG 
agreed to meet again in January in New York prior to the scheduled 
January 16-19 Contact Group meeting, and established an expert-level 
task force to consider more detailed questions each week in Goma. 
End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) The first meeting of the Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) for 
the Congo-Rwanda Nairobi communique was held on December 15 in Goma. 
 The meeting was marred by several off-agenda detours, but 
established common understandings on key points and reaffirmed both 
parties' commitment to the process.  UN Assistant Secretary General 
Haile Menkerios chaired the meeting, with SRSG William Swing also 
participating.  Foreign Minister Mbusa Nyamwisi and Special Envoy 
Richard Sezibera headed the Congolese and Rwandan delegations 
respectively.  Envoys from the U.S., EU, South Africa, AU and SADC, 
as well as the secretariat of the International Conference on the 
Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR), participated as JMG members, with other 
P3+2 representatives (France, UK, Belgium) invited as observers. 
U.S. representatives were Ambassador Garvelink and Tim Shortley, AF 
Assistant Secretary Frazer's senior advisor for conflict resolution. 
 
 
3.  The UN's decision to lead off the meeting with extensive MONUC 
and UN/OCHA presentations designed to spotlight its support of 
Congolese military operations in North Kivu against the forces of 
renegade FARDC General Laurent Nkunda and its support for some 
800,000 North Kivu IDP's skewed the meeting from its stated focus on 
implementation of the Nairobi communique.  However, interventions by 
Menkerios, Swing, AF Senior Adviser Tim Shortley and EU Special 
Envoy Roeland van de Geer succeeded in achieving consensus that the 
follow-up to Nairobi should focus on eliminating the threat to the 
region posed by all armed groups, and that decisions on how and when 
to address groups based in Congolese territory are the exclusive 
right of the Congolese government.  The group also agreed that the 
revived bilateral Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM) should address 
reports by both parties of breaches in the agreements. 
 
4.  (SBU) Addressing actions taken by the Congolese government to 
implement the communique, Mbusa noted in a prepared statement that 
it had submitted its FDLR plan by the December 1 target date, and 
was working out a media campaign to gain public support.  He 
stressed, however, that Nkunda's recent actions had pushed back 
eventual implementation of the FDLR plan.  He said planning was 
going forward on a regional conference on peace and development to 
be held later in December.  Mbusa acknowledged that presidential 
adviser Seraphin Ngwej was properly the Congolese representative to 
the JMG, but cited his own and Defense Minister Chikez Diemu's 
presence as an indication of the importance of the issue.  He spoke 
little during the rest of the meeting, with Chikez and Ngwej, 
neither of whom appeared to have prepared to address specific agenda 
items, repeatedly hijacking the discussion on petty matters. 
 
5.  (SBU) Sezibera prefaced his summary of Rwandan follow-up actions 
by emphasizing that "bilateral relations are getting better," and 
praising the recent visit of 50 Congolese students to Rwanda and the 
"positive role" of North Kivu Governor Julien Paluku, also in 
attendance.  He said the Rwandan government had stepped up efforts 
to monitor and control its border and taken internal measures as 
well to prevent Rwandan-based support to armed groups based in 
Congo.  He confirmed it was preparing a list of "genocidaires" for 
submission before January 1 and had for some time had structures in 
place, financed by the World Bank, to receive and to facilitate 
re-integration of ex-FAR/Interahamwe fighters and their families 
into Rwandan society.  He also cited many public statements by 
Foreign Minister Murighande in support of the Nairobi process. 
(Comment:  By contrast, similar public statements by senior 
Congolese officials have been conspicuously lacking.  End comment.) 
 
 
6.  (SBU) Several points of contention emerged during the meeting. 
Attempts by Chikez and Ngwej to maneuver the group into a public 
statement citing Nkunda as the sole reason for the province's 
humanitarian crisis were met by a characterization by Sezibera that 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe "is the object of the communique of Nairobi." 
 
KINSHASA 00001377  002 OF 002 
 
 
The issue was eventually - and deftly - resolved by Mbusa who turned 
his own delegation's argument against itself by citing Sezibera's 
(erroneous) contention of an exclusive focus for the agreement.  He 
said this focus - and by implication a similar one on Nkunda -- 
would harm the credibility of the process, arguing that Nairobi did 
in fact aim to eliminate the threat from all armed groups. 
 
7.  (SBU) No delegates disagreed that timing of actions against 
armed groups present on Congolese territory is up to the Congolese 
government, nor argued against its recent military offensive against 
Nkunda's forces.  However, Menkerios stressed that it should take 
steps to ensure no other groups move into areas that may be vacated 
by Nkunda's forces.  Sezibera noted that moving against Nkunda first 
would not have been Rwanda's decision, but agreed that it was 
Congo's right to do so.  He said the ex-FAR/Interahamwe had been a 
problem for 10 years, and will continue to be a problem if it is not 
dealt with.  Chikez disagreed that the group was in fact a threat. 
"No one has been killed by the FDLR in the last four years," he had 
claimed earlier in the meeting. 
 
8.  (SBU) Ngwej, in repeated interventions, complained that the 
Congolese government was unable to go forward with its FDLR plan by 
January 1 without the list of "genocidaires" promised in the 
communique by the Rwandan government.  Sezibera noted difficulties 
in identifying true "genocidaires" from a list of some 700,000 
suspects, and cautioned that, for legal reasons, its list could not 
be regarded as definitive, since evidence may later emerge 
implicating others not initially listed.  Menkerios eventually 
closed discussion by noting that the Congolese obligation to begin 
the program January 1 should not be affected by the list, although 
it could affect completion. 
 
9.  (SBU) The Congolese delegation accused Rwanda of infiltrations 
into Congo by the Rwandan Republican Guard or by Rwandan nationals. 
Mbusa noted in his opening statement that Congolese security 
services had picked up several Rwandans in the Bunagana theatre of 
operations, discovered Rwandans among pro-Nkunda troops reporting 
for brassage, and arrested two members, with ID, of Rwandan 
President Paul Kagame's Republic Guard in Bukavu.  Sezibera 
expressed surprise at hearing this information for the first time 
during this meeting.  He also noted that the Congolese government 
had taken no action on detailed lists the Rwandan government had 
provided of ex-FAR/Interahamwe members who had gone through brassage 
and joined the Congolese military.  Menkerios said the JVM was the 
proper forum for addressing these complaints, and urged both parties 
to make their cases there. 
 
10.  (SBU) To conclude the meeting, the JMG confirmed it would meet 
monthly under a rotating chairmanship, with the next to take place 
in New York prior to the January 16-19 Contact Group meeting in 
Brussels.  It agreed to form an expert-level task force which will 
meet weekly in Goma; the first meeting should take place later this 
week.  Due to time constraints it was unable to discuss additional 
resources needed to implement the communique, but invited Congo and 
Rwanda to present lists in writing of their non-humanitarian 
requirements for review by donors. 
 
11.  (SBU) Comment:  Although a rocky start for the JMG, the meeting 
succeeded in establishing buy-in by both parties to the process and 
specific follow-up mechanisms.  Third-party participants clearly 
want to remain involved, and pitches for their support by both 
Congolese and Rwandan delegates indicate both parties' awareness 
that they can not resolve the issues on their own.  End comment.