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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM2017, NORTH DARFUR INSECURITY ON THE RISE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM2017 2007-12-17 06:46 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3179
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2017 3510646
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170646Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9586
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 002017 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: NORTH DARFUR INSECURITY ON THE RISE 
 
1. (QBU) The week of December 10 saw a sharp rise in carjackings, 
banditry and insecurity in North Darfur, culminating on December 14 
with a violent car-jacking attack on the African Union Mission in 
the Sudan (AMIS), whose El Fasher Force Headquarters are located in 
close proximity to USG residences.  On December 14 at approximately 
2030, AMIS Outgoing Military Chief of Staff COL George Partington 
and his driver PVT Joof Eddrisa (Gambia) came under attack in their 
AMIS vehicle near the AMIS Level II Hospital in El Fasher while en 
route to Partington's residence from Force Headquarters.  Four 
unknown armed men attacked the vehicle with gunfire, two of whom 
were reportedly in military combat uniforms and the other two in 
civilian dress.  PVT Joof sustained gunshot wounds to his back, 
resulting in a punctured lung, and was flown to Khartoum on the same 
day for further medical treatment at a Level III  trauma unit 
hospital (only a level II clinic is available at AMIS in EL Fasher). 
 AMIS reported his condition as stable on December 16.  The 
Government of Sudan (GoS) did not object to this nighttime medical 
evacuation. 
 
2. (SBU) Note: There were initial reports of a second shooting at a 
roadblock in El Fasher just hours after this first incident, 
allegedly involving a PAE contractor or possibly a military 
observer.  These reports turned out to be false (but had been passed 
to us as "fact") and highlighted how difficult it is to get accurate 
information in and from El Fasher during periods of insecurity, 
especially when cell phone networks are overwhelmed.  Embassy 
Khartoum is working with our staff in El Fasher to upgrade Thuraya 
phones at our residences.  However, many contacts that we rely on 
for information do not have Thuraya phones. END NOTE. 
 
3. (SBU) The attackers made off with an unspecified number of 
personal effects, along with the AMIS vehicle itself.  The vehicle, 
later abandoned at Abu Shouk IDP Camp and subsequently recovered, is 
currently at AMIS Force HQ for examination.  The attack has been 
attributed to local banditry, which has increased during the week of 
December 10, including the December 12 carjacking of a PLAN vehicle 
by armed attackers in an NGO compound in Kabkabiya and the December 
13 carjacking of an IRC vehicle in broad daylight from Abu Shouk 
(this vehicle, according to the Justice and Equality Movement, was 
recovered in Carieri and will be returned to El Fasher within the 
coming days).  No arrests have been made in the AMIS incident, 
although AMIS Deputy Force Commander Karenzi and COL Partington are 
following up with the North Darfur Wali and the El Fasher Police. 
The Military and the GoS Police are jointly investigating the case, 
and AMIS Civpol is monitoring. 
 
3. (SBU) In addition to these incidents, instability remains in 
Kutum, north of El Fasher, where between 1,500 and 4,000 "neglected" 
soldiers (possibly Arab militia) are reportedly trying to join rebel 
movements in Birmaza against the GoS.  Current violence has forced 
many NGOs and INGOs to evacuate their personnel and only ICRC has so 
far considered resuming its inoculation activities north of Kutum 
(in Dar Zaghawa), which were suspended December 13.  UNDSS has put 
its security assessment of the area on indefinite hold, pending a 
stabilization of the security situation.  (Note: There are no USG 
personnel currently in the Kutum area. End note.) There are also 
reports of expected violence in Nyala and Ed Daein (southeast of 
Nyala) in South Darfur, probably connected to tensions among Arab 
tribes (both Abbala and Baggara Rizeigat). 
 
4. (SBU) COMMENT:  According to El Fasher sources, vehicle 
hijackings are expected to increase during Eid and into the New 
Year.  Communications throughout Darfur have been equally 
unpredictable, with cell phone networks down for almost a week, 
reportedly as a result of problems with the relay stations between 
El Fasher and Khartoum.  The UN changed its curfew in El Fasher to 
20:00 and recommends exercising extreme caution and heightened 
situational awareness during this time.  Embassy Khartoum has 
advised USG staff in El Fasher to avoid all unnecessary travel after 
dark.  FieldOff advised local national staff to limit nighttime 
movement in El Fasher and to observe restricted regulations on use 
of USG vehicles in this office as precautions.  This current 
insecurity should be factored into decisions regarding visitors to 
the region in the coming weeks, especially as high-level delegations 
are planning their travel. 
 
5. (SBU) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ