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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1935, GEN AGWAI UPDATES ON UNAMID

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1935 2007-12-06 14:33 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5359
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1935 3401433
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061433Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9469
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001935 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GEN AGWAI UPDATES ON UNAMID 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  In a December 5 meeting with PolOff and FieldOff, 
AMIS Force Commander GEN Agwai described himself as the target of 
Government of Sudan (GoS) displeasure for his current stance on the 
Ceasefire Commission and articulated his plans to seek a sit-down 
with the GoS in the near future to agree on a more systematic way 
forward.  He was not optimistic about UNAMID deployment, stressing 
the need for the arrival of the ten battalions and for their proper 
equipping, particularly in terms of helicopter assets.  GEN Agwai, 
while still not perhaps as forthright as necessary on the CFC issue, 
is making strides in attempting to redirect the CFC issue away from 
its focus on money and more toward a focus on implementation. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
AGWAI FALLING OUT OF GOS FAVOR 
------------------------------ 
2. (SBU) In a December 5 meeting with PolOff and FieldOff, African 
Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) Force Commander Martin Luther 
Agwai reported that he was not currently in the GoS' good graces on 
account of his efforts regarding the CFC (or, as the GoS allegedly 
accused, on account of his trying to annul the CFC).  Agwai pointed 
out that the CFC had been effectively dormant since July, addressing 
only administrative issues when it actually did convene and 
diverting its focus from the actual issue of ceasefire to that of 
money.  "It is clear beyond any reasonable doubt," Agwai declared, 
"that both chambers of the Commission just want to make money." 
 
3. (SBU) When Agwai had raised these issues with the GoS in Khartoum 
(from which he had just returned earlier in the day), he had tried 
to explain that requesting UNAMID to provide guidelines on Darfur 
Peace Agreement (DPA) implementation did not equate to annulling the 
DPA.  He corrected his earlier DPA interpretation and said that the 
CFC should in fact have two members per delegation: one at 
headquarter level and one at sector level.  Agwai was firm that he 
would resist cohabitation with the GoS in AMIS camps and that it had 
been the GoS' own machinations which had prevented the CFC from 
properly functioning in the first place, citing as an example its 
obstruction of AMIS investigations into the Haskanita incident. 
 
4. (SBU) GEN Agwai resolved to collaborate with Joint Special 
Representative Adada (currently in El Fasher) to schedule a meeting 
during the week of December 10 with the CFC representatives to try 
to bridge these differences.  He also acknowledged the importance of 
presenting any changes in the structure of the CFC "politely" and in 
writing to the DPA signatories.  The meeting would be an opportunity 
for a full discussion of the issues to clear the air and for Agwai 
to reiterate that UNAMID would not provide assistance to any of the 
CFC observers. 
 
NOTHING TO SHOW BY JANUARY 1 
---------------------------- 
5. (SBU) GEN Agwai was not optimistic when it came to UNAMID 
deployment, calling into question the security of the forces and the 
estimated time of arrival, which he did not foresee in earnest 
before December 2008.  He noted that current troop rotations were 
AMIS only and that only two of ten identified UNAMID battalions were 
outfitted with accommodations and other logistical support upon 
Darfur arrival.  Agwai stated that UNAMID could be credible only 
when coming from a position of strength, but at the moment, he said, 
"we are at our weakest," due in large part to the timing of troop 
rotations. 
 
6. (SBU) In the immediate term, GEN Agwai recommended getting all 
ten UNAMID battalions on the ground as quickly as possible and on 
providing them better equipment than that of AMIS forces, 
particularly in terms of helicopter assets.  He said another six 
battalions outfitted with APCs would allow the peacekeeping force to 
take the necessary initiative and to dominate areas of control, but 
without this show of force, he predicted that "there will be nothing 
to show by January 1." 
 
7. (SBU) COMMENT. As exemplified by his revised decision to allow a 
CFC observer at both the headquarters and sector level (as 
stipulated in the DPA), Agwai often does not consider the full 
implications of some of his proposals to restructure the CFC before 
announcing them.  However, his recognition that approaching the CFC 
observers - particularly the signatory representatives - in a 
diplomatic manner is commendable, and is a tactic that we will 
continue to encourage. END COMMENT. 
 
8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ