Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1924, GUEHENNO IS LYING" ON UNAMID DEPLOYMENT, SUDAN CLAIMS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07KHARTOUM1924.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1924 2007-12-05 10:19 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3992
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1924/01 3391019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051019Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9450
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001924 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE NATSIOS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: "GUEHENNO IS LYING" ON UNAMID DEPLOYMENT, SUDAN CLAIMS 
PROGRESS, COMPLIANCE 
 
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 1906 
(B) KHARTOUM 1842 
(C)KHARTOUM 1804 
(D)KHARTOUM 1787 
 
1. (SBU) See para 8 for action request. 
 
2. (SBU) In a December 4 meeting with CDA Fernandez, State Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Al-Samani Al-Wasila decried recent UN 
allegations that the Government of Sudan (GoS) is obstructing the 
conditions necessary for the deployment of the AU-UN hybrid force. 
Al-Samani referred angrily to recent statements that UN DPKO 
Under-Secretary General Jean-Marie Guehenno made to the UN Security 
Council - that the GoS has intentionally raised barriers to UNAMID 
deployment by rejecting non-African troop contingents, failing to 
provide land for the construction of UNAMID headquarters, and 
creating operational restrictions. 
 
BOTH U.S. AND UN ON THE GROUND KNOW THERE IS PROGRESS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
3. (SBU) Al-Samani called Guehenno a "liar" and claimed the reason 
for the GoS' refusal to allow the Norwegian and Swedish engineers to 
deploy was that their requests arrived too late, after the TCC 
composition had been discussed with the UN.  Al-Samani said the 
issue of land for the construction of UNAMID headquarters had 
already been resolved, and was visibly irritated that Guehenno had 
publicly stated otherwise.  Regarding the equipment delays, 
Al-Samani scolded the UN for not presenting specifications and prior 
information about the materials, which in turn led to delays in its 
clearance and distribution.  He claimed that both the US Embassy and 
even UN officials on the ground know that there has been progress. 
He recalled the issue of "night flights in Darfur" had shown that 
Sudan was not lying or intentionally obstructing deployment (Emboffs 
in El Fasher have essentially confirmed his view on the night flying 
issue). 
 
4. (SBU) CDA Fernandez reassured Al-Samani that the USG understands 
the difficulties of UNAMID deployment are not entirely due to GoS 
obstruction (reftels).  However it is important to take all 
necessary steps to facilitate deployment and rapidly approve 
materials and other items for the mission. This is very important 
given the very deep lack of credibility that Sudan has on the 
international stage.  CDA acknowledged the USG's awareness of the 
lack of UN organization in the preparation and deployment of UNAMID. 
 
 
5. (SBU) Regarding troop contributions, CDA urged Al-Samani to 
convince his superiors "at the very least" to allow Thai and 
Nepalese units to be deployed soon to Darfur.  CDA stated this would 
be a good way to put a stop to the UN's allegations that the GoS is 
not cooperating on UNAMID roll-out.  CDA said that if the GoS were 
to allow these Asian units to deploy, it would gain credibility with 
the UN and the U.S. at a point when US-Sudanese relations could 
improve or further deteriorate. CDA warned Al-Samani not to think 
they can solve one issue and obstruct on another - "don't think you 
can accept the Thais and then obstruct American companies like 
Dyncorp which are providing logistics for UNAMID and that we'll be 
happy with this." 
 
SOFA SOLVED FOR NOW, COMMO FOR NEXT WEEK 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Al-Samani responded saying "we must talk about these 
issues, rather than forcing them" noting that companies like PAE and 
Dyncorp are chosen without Sudanese input but promised to discuss 
the proposal on the Thai and Nepalese units with his superiors. He 
said that the Nordics had already been rejected as part of the HSP 
and were not wanted. There was also the issue of the Scandinavian 
cartoons on the Prophet Muhammad and the fact that high profile 
Western troops would be a magnet for Al-Qa'ida.  He said that he 
expected the UNAMID communications equipment to be cleared by next 
week (delays caused by improper UN paperwork and lack of follow up 
by them) and that Sudan had cleared up misunderstandings on the 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the acceptance of the Model 
SOFA until at least the end of the year.  He pulled out the minutes 
of a meeting with the UN's Muhammad Yunus which showed progress on 
land use for camps which seemed to directly contradict Guehenno's 
public complaints. 
 
7.(SBU) Comment:  Although reports from the field indicate that 
UNAMID has made plenty of mistakes that have delayed deployment, it 
is also clear that the GoS is not doing everything possible to 
facilitate deployment.  The GoS is certainly maneuvering to control 
the timing of deployment, as well as the composition and 
capabilities of the Mission.  Although the GoS has some valid points 
 
KHARTOUM 00001924  002 OF 002 
 
 
on troop contributions (the Nordic unit was not among the TCCs 
initially proposed for the mission) its habit of making an issue out 
of every step of UNAMID deployment - from clearance of equipment to 
flight permissions - is certainly not gaining it any points with the 
UN and the international community.  The GoS' passive-aggressive 
actions will continue to set back UNAMID deployment and ensure that 
it is a long, arduous, painful process for all involved. Sudanese 
actions are not helpful, and its long history of dishonesty and 
delay is a cause for deep skepticism, but the greatest factor for 
delay is the very cumbersome, clumsy and deliberative process an 
apparently reluctant UN has for setting up peacekeeping activities 
in Darfur. 
 
8. (SBU) Recommendation: At the very least, the US and international 
community should push for the early inclusion of Thai and Nepalese 
troops since the Sudanese have been vaguely positive about the 
acceptance of these units.  The GOS has no ready excuse for not 
accepting these units (except that African infantry contributions 
are over-subscribed and that the Thais are "not needed") and its 
allies on the UNSC should be encouraged to press them on this point. 
 The inclusion of these units plus a tactical helicopter element 
could qualitatively improve the force on the ground. 
 
FERNANDEZ