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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1892, DARFUR: TENSION, MISTRUST CONTINUE TO AFFLICT AMIS-SLM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1892 2007-12-02 07:47 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1263
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1892/01 3360747
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 020747Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9392
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001892 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
 
SUBJECT: DARFUR: TENSION, MISTRUST CONTINUE TO AFFLICT AMIS-SLM 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander Agwai's proposal to restructure 
payment of the MSA and the rebel movements' representation in the 
Cease-fire Commission (CFC) has set off a wave of mutual 
recriminations between AMIS and the SLM.  The incident is just the 
latest in an unfortunate history of tension and mistrust between 
both groups that, if left unchecked, will undermine the Darfur 
peacekeeping operation and political process.  Dialogue between AMIS 
and the SLM and more specificity on the post-January 1 CFC and the 
peace process can slow the deterioration in the relationship.  End 
summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
AGWAI BRIEFING EXPOSES RAW NERVE 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Racing against the clock, AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force 
Commander Martin Luther Agwai is attempting to put the controversial 
issue of the monthly subsistence allowance (MSA) for CFC observers 
behind him so that the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) can deploy 
with a clear slate.  At a November 27 meeting of the CFC, Agwai 
presented his proposal for payment of the arrears of the MSA, a 
phased reduction of the allowance until January 1, and a trimming of 
the number of CFC observers at the headquarters and sector level 
(septel).  His briefing set off a firestorm among the political 
leaders and the CFC representatives of the Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SLM)/Minawi, who interpreted the proposal as an attempt to abrogate 
the DPA. 
 
3. (SBU) Later that evening, two panicked members of the SLM's 
political leadership in Khartoum, including SLM Chairman and Senior 
Assistant to the President Minni Minawi, called Poloff to report 
that Agwai had asked the movement to withdraw its members from the 
CFC, at both the headquarters and sector levels.  Noting that Agwai 
did not have the power to change the structures of the DPA, Minawi 
requested direct U.S. intercession to remedy the situation.  Poloff 
advised that he would be traveling to El Fasher the following day 
and would examine the issue. 
 
--------------- 
Agwai's Version 
--------------- 
 
4. (SBU) At a meeting of the international observers to the CFC on 
November 28, Agwai denied that he had earlier asked for the SLM to 
withdraw from the commission.  He said he had requested that the 
movements reduce the number of CFC representatives in El Fasher to 
one "liaison officer" and return their AMIS IDs and equipment.  He 
tentatively accepted the suggestion from Poloffs that, per the DPA, 
the movements also be allotted one representative at the sector 
level. 
 
5. (SBU) Noting the inefficiency in reporting streams within the 
SLM, Poloff recommended that Agwai and Joint Special Representative 
Rudolphe Adada speak directly to the SLM leadership, including 
Minawi, to explain the proposal (CDA Fernandez is also meeting with 
Minawi on December 2 to emphasize this point).  After alluding to 
SLM banditry and threats against his forces, Agwai curtly replied 
that he had learned from previous disagreements with the SLM that 
everything should be in writing as "you couldn't trust what the 
observers said to Khartoum." 
 
------------- 
SLM's Version 
------------- 
 
6. (SBU) At a later meeting on November 28, SLM CFC observers Adam 
Ali Ware and Ahmed Ghardia told Poloffs that their impression from 
Agwai's briefing was that he wanted to suspend the CFC until the 
UN/African Union-led political process resulted in new security 
arrangements.  Ware emphasized that the SLM should be treated in 
accordance with its legitimate status as a signatory to the DPA and 
not left in limbo pending the outcome of negotiations with the 
non-signatories.  The SLM had the impression "it was being punished 
by the headmaster," according to Ware, when it was only trying to 
adhere to the agreement by continuing its participation in the DPA. 
Ghardia accepted Agwai's formula for payment of arrears and a 
reduction in the MSA rate but objected to Agwai "setting the CFC 
aside, which made it seem like he's ending the peace and giving up 
on the Abuja agreement." 
 
7. (SBU) Ware stated that Agwai had responded angrily to his request 
for a written explanation of the Force Commander's proposal.  "The 
 
KHARTOUM 00001892  002 OF 002 
 
 
proposal of the Force Commander is beyond our authority to decide," 
said Ware, adding that he wanted to forward such a document to 
Minawi and the SLM leadership so they can determine the movement's 
position.  He compared Agwai to his predecessor, AMIS Force 
Commander Luke Aprezi, who the SLM believed colluded with the 
Government to undermine the movement.  Recognizing, however, the 
importance of cooperation with AMIS, Ware said that the SLM shares 
Agwai's concerns about the inefficacy of the CFC and is open to 
dialogue.  (Note: When the SLM observers to the CFC went on strike 
in May, one demand was greater transparency from the AMIS 
secretariat, including documentation of all proceedings and the 
 
SIPDIS 
decisions of the Force Commander.  End note.) 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) The MSA issue is the symptom of an underlying illness that 
has afflicted AMIS and the SLM through every Force Commander's 
tenure: an emotionally charged relationship where AMIS blames the 
SLM for attacks on its forces and an excessive pre-occupation with 
money and the SLM resents AMIS for making arbitrary decisions and 
failing to accord it status as the only DPA signatory.  The erosion 
of trust is exacerbated by two factors.  One, in the absence of 
sound political advice, the Force Commander is ineffective at 
articulating his plans to a beleaguered movement that feels it is 
under siege on all sides.  Two, the lack of clarity on post-January 
1, 2008 UN/AU plans for the political and security tracks makes it 
difficult for AMIS/UNAMID and the SLM to establish a framework for a 
more professional relationship.  It is unclear whether UNAMID will 
continue any financial support for the CFC observers--which is 
stipulated in the Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire and, by 
implication, in the DPA.  In addition, the UN/AU is silent on the 
endgame for the peace process (i.e. a new agreement? a protocol?) 
Dysfunctional as the current security arrangements may be, Agwai's 
mandate, whether with AMIS or with UNAMID, is to implement the 
existing peace agreements, and the DPA is the only one on the 
table. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment continued: In order for the Darfur peacekeeping and 
political tracks to move forward, AMIS/UNAMID and the SLM must find 
a mechanism for at least cautious coordination.  During a November 
29 meeting in El Fasher, the new UNAMID Director of Political 
Affairs had no information on the structure of UNAMID's political 
department or whether it would support Agwai.  On November 30, 
Poloffs stressed to incoming UNAMID Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. Paul 
Davidson the need for a political advisor to the Force Commander as 
soon as possible.  We will continue to work with AMIS/UNAMID and the 
SLM to facilitate transparent dialogue and to press the UN/AU to 
articulate their post-January 1 plans for the CFC and the peace 
process.  End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ