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Viewing cable 07KABUL4153, BAGHLAN BOMBING AGGRAVATES KARZAI-QANOONI SPLIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL4153 2007-12-18 13:39 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4807
OO RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #4153/01 3521339
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181339Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1994
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004153 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV AF PTER
SUBJECT: BAGHLAN BOMBING AGGRAVATES KARZAI-QANOONI SPLIT 
 
REF: KABUL 3774 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The November 6 Baghlan bombing, did not 
unite Afghans of all ethnicities in their revulsion for the 
insurgency and its methods.  Instead it provided the latest 
proxy for the ongoing political contest between President 
Karzai and Lower House Speaker and United Front leader 
Mohammad Yonus Qanooni (reftel).  Within a day of the 
atrocity, Qanooni had castigated government security services 
for incompetence in securing the Baghlan and national 
populations from terrorist attack.  He demanded the immediate 
dismissal of several provincial officials, including the 
Karzai-appointed governor.  Reluctant to surrender 
presidential prerogative on senior-level personnel 
management, Karzai demurred, but promised to suspend the 
officials pending a Ministry of Interior investigative team's 
report.  When a parallel parliamentary investigation revealed 
Karzai had not executed his promise, a petulant Qanooni 
attempted to shut down the Lower House for the remaining 
month of its term.  Ultimately, Karzai did opt to transfer 
several of the officials, but preserved presidential 
prerogative by acting on his Minister of Interior's 
recommendation, not Qanooni's insistence.  MPs, discomfited 
by the prospect of a constitutional crisis, and the possible 
loss of their own parliamentary pay and privileges, pressured 
Qanooni to abandon his walkout.  The Karzai-Qanooni power 
struggle will likely deepen as the country moves towards the 
2009 presidential elections.  END SUMMARY 
 
Step by Step from Tragedy to Political Farce 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Qanooni acted quickly to exploit the Baghlan bombing 
for political advantage in his ongoing struggle with Karzai. 
Two days after the attack, he commissioned a parliamentary 
inquiry, implying the unreliability of the Ministry of 
Interior investigation already under way.  He also 
orchestrated a parliamentary request that the president 
dismiss seven provincial officials, including the 
Karzai-appointed Baghlan governor, on grounds of incompetence 
or even possible complicity in the attack.  Though this 
request lacked constitutional justification, Qanooni's office 
argued that parliament's role as the representative of 
Afghanistan's people gave it a right to encroach upon the 
president's senior-level personnel management prerogative. 
When Karzai demurred, Qanooni claimed that the president was 
defying the will of the people.  In a November 15 press 
conference, Karzai appeared to yield by agreeing to suspend 
the seven Baghlan officials pending the Ministry of Interior 
investigating team's report. 
 
3. (SBU) Returning to Kabul November 26, neither team was 
able identify the perpetrators; both focused on the 
provincial government's failure to forestall the attack. 
Parliament's team revealed that Karzai had not acted on his 
promise to suspend the seven Baghlan officials, and alleged 
that those same officials had obstructed the investigations. 
Qanooni declared Karzai's failure to suspend the officials an 
insult to parliament and called for a suspension of Lower 
House sessions for the remaining month of its term. 
 
Qanooni's House Divided 
----------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) United Front MPs departed the chamber en masse, 
asserting that, if Karzai continued to flout parliament's 
will, its work would be meaningless.  Karzai supporters 
remained and made statements to the press denouncing 
Qanooni's departure as illegal.  Independent MPs, however, 
discomfited by the prospect of a constitutional crisis, which 
might cost them their incomes and privileges, sent 
delegations to Qanooni's office in an effort to get the 
speaker to relent.  Later, they arranged a meeting between 
Qanooni 
and Karzai. 
 
5. (SBU) Qanooni told Karzai he would not reconvene 
 
KABUL 00004153  002 OF 002 
 
 
parliament until the president fired the seven Baghlan 
officials.  Qanooni attempted to goad Karzai by implying that 
his refusal to dismiss the officials was merely an effort to 
conceal his own government's incompetence.  Qanooni's 
strategic goal was likely to establish a precedent for 
parliamentary review of presidential personnel actions. 
 
Situation Defused 
----------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Over the next few days, senior government officials 
reacted to Qanooni's verbal offensive by, rather artfully, 
diffusing possible blame for the bombing across several 
offices and levels of government.  Interior Minister Zerar 
Ahmad Muqbel said November 27, "the incident occurred due to 
the negligence of the provincial officials from top to 
bottom, as well as officials in (Farouk Wardak's) Ministry of 
Parliamentary Affairs."  He added, "the officials who have 
neglected the orders of the government need to be either 
fired, transferred, or prosecuted."  In a private meeting 
with Qanooni on the same day, Karzai said he would consider 
suspending, dismissing, transferring or prosecuting nine 
Baghlan officials; however, he would be acting on the 
recommendation of his minister of interior, not Qanooni's 
insistence.  Qanooni declared victory, but without 
establishing precedent for parliamentary review of the 
president's personnel actions. 
 
It Will Likely Get Worse 
------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) The Karzai-Qanooni power struggle will likely deepen 
as the country moves towards the 2009 presidential elections. 
 Nevertheless, it may constructively serve to turn the theory 
of the constitution into the practical procedures and 
protocols that will define the relative limits of 
presidential and parliamentary power. 
WOOD