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Viewing cable 07GUANGZHOU1272, Fujian Cross-Strait Scholars Predict Referendum Passage and

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07GUANGZHOU1272 2007-12-07 07:43 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Guangzhou
VZCZCXRO6040
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHGZ #1272/01 3410743
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070743Z DEC 07
FM AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6722
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GUANGZHOU 001272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EAP/TC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TW CH
SUBJECT: Fujian Cross-Strait Scholars Predict Referendum Passage and 
Strong PRC Reaction 
 
(U) THIS DOCUMENT IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  IT SHOULD NOT BE 
DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE U.S. GOVERNMENT CHANNELS OR IN ANY PUBLIC FORUM 
WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONCURRENCE OF THE ORIGINATOR.  IT SHOULD NOT BE 
POSTED ON THE INTERNET. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The referendum on Taiwan joining the UN is likely 
to pass with possible serious consequences, according to 
cross-Strait scholars in Fujian's Xiamen and Fuzhou cities.  They 
are concerned about actions Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian will 
take in the remaining months of his term and called on the U.S. 
government to keep him in check by not supporting any provocative 
actions.  TheQnvariably predicted a close presidential election; 
regardless of the outcome, however, they were, forQe most Qt, 
pessimistic about its implications for cross-Strait relations, 
especially whether either Ma Ying-jeou or Frank Hsieh would be able 
to move forward even on economic measures like the three links that 
could well benefit both sides.  End summary. 
 
Predicting Referendum Passage and... 
------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Scholars at Fujian's top cross-Strait research institutions 
agreed in meetings with Emboff and Congenoff in late November that 
the referendum on Taiwan joining the UN under the name of "Taiwan" 
was likely to pass.  Wu Nengyuan, Director of the Institute of 
Modern Taiwan Studies (IMTS) at the Fujian Academy of Social 
Sciences, told us November 27 that it was almost certain that the UN 
referendum would pass after the "one-step" voting system was 
approved.  He argued that most Taiwan voters would not be 
sophisticated enough to understand the referendum's implications for 
cross-Strait relations and the likelihood that Beijing would 
interpret passage as an act of "de jure independence."  On November 
29, Liu Guoshen, Director of the Taiwan Research Institute (TRI) of 
Xiamen University and one of the scholars most often consulted by 
Beijing for analysis of Taiwan intentions, commented that neither 
Beijing nor Washington could prevent the UN referendum from going 
forward. 
 
...a Strong PRC Reaction 
------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Liu also speculated that passage of the referendum could 
result in a strong PRC reaction, pointing to a State Council 
statement that passage of the UN referendum would be an act of "de 
jure independence."  Liu said that whether or not passage would 
result in a military conflict depended on the Chinese leadership's 
ability to resist pressure from the Chinese public.  In response to 
a question on whether Beijing had already decided that the 
referendum's passage would meet the conditions for "non peaceful 
means" in the 2005 anti-secession law, Liu said that Beijing has not 
explicitly made this linkage, partly because it did not want to give 
Chen Shui-bian decision-making power over Beijing's actions. 
 
Warnings on Chen Surprises 
-------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The greatest danger lies in the Democratic Progressive 
Party's (DPP) perception that Beijing will not take military action, 
according to Liu.  He fears that Chen Shui-bian will try to garner 
deep Green support by provoking Beijing, possibly by creating an 
incident near the middle line of the Taiwan Strait.  He suggested a 
military clash between the two sides was possible in the spring. 
 
5. (SBU) Continuing with "worst" case scenarios, several of our 
interlocutors speculated that Chen Shui-bian would attempt various 
political maneuvers over the next several months to help the DPP or 
even stay in power beyond the election.  The conflict in Taiwan over 
the DPP's one-step voting procedure and possible KMT defiance 
provides an opportunity for Chen to make such an attempt. Li Peng, 
Assistant Director of Xiamen's TRI, beliQs that Chen really wants 
to impose martial law, a threat he had made and then withdrew in the 
days before the Qember 30 meeting.  Qever, Li acknowledged that 
political conditions within Taiwan would probably prevent such an 
act and the United States government would not accept it.  Chen 
might try other non-democratic means, however, like calling up the 
military to prevent them from voting as he did in 2004.  IMTS's Wu 
said he would not be surprised if Chen imposed martial law next 
year. 
 
Call for Strong U.S. Involvement 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Scholars were also united in their call for the U.S 
government to continue to play an active role in keeping possible 
provocation by Taiwan in check.  TRI's Liu noted that the U.S. 
 
GUANGZHOU 00001272  002 OF 002 
 
 
government's public opposition to the UN referendum had made Beijing 
more confident and allowed it to lower the tone of its rhetoric on 
cross-Strait issues.  The U.S. government should let the DPP know 
the "danger of playing with fire," he said.  Wu called on the United 
States to send a clearer message to Taiwan.  He argued that weapons 
sales give the Taiwan people the wrong impression of the U.S. role 
in the Strait. 
 
A Close Presidential Election 
----------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Although they are confident that the Kuomintang (KMT) will 
win a majority of seats in January's Legislative Yuan election, 
scholars were unwilling to predict a winner in March's presidential 
election.  Wu expects the KMT to win 60-70 seats.  Zhang Wenshang, 
head of TRI's political section, offered a similar prediction: 65-70 
for the KMT and 35-40 for the DPP. 
 
8. (SBU) However, on the presidential election, TRI's Liu would only 
say that, even though the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou leads in polls by 15 
percentage points, the DPP's Frank Hsieh had a better chance than 
Ma, particularly because the DPP is very good at campaigning.  Wu 
said the key would be voter turnout, noting that the DPP is good at 
mobilizing voters and Green supporters generally have a higher 
turnout rate. 
 
Implications Unclear 
-------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) The scholars differed on the likely impact of a Ma or Hsieh 
victory on cross-Strait relations.  Wu was the more pessimistic, 
predicting that even if Ma wins, it is not clear that he will be 
able to implement the three direct links.  He argued that the DPP 
will create obstacles for Ma.  In addition, Wu is not convinced of 
Ma's commitment to improving relations with Beijing, pointing outQis demands that the PRC recognize the Republic of China, give 
Taiwan mQ international space, and withdraw its mQiles aimed at 
Taiwan.  Liu, on the other hand, expects that Ma will be able to 
push through three direct links.  He also said cross-Strait 
communication would become easier in large part thanks to groundwork 
laid by former Chairman Lien Chan and other senior KMT officials. 
 
10. (SBU) Hsieh faces the risk of opposition from both the light 
Green and deep Green factions of the DPP, according to Wu.  Because 
Hsieh lacks control of the party, Wu believes he will find it very 
difficult to push through three direct links and further economic 
opening in the face of opposition from pro-independence 
fundamentalists.  If Hsieh's victory is narrow, Wu predicted that he 
would find it difficult to resist Chen Shui-bian's influence. 
Furthermore, Wu speculated that if Hsieh follows a similar path to 
Chen it will lead to more severe tension in the Strait especially in 
the lead-up to the 2012 presidential election.  Liu agreed that 
Hsieh would face many obstacles to implementing three direct links. 
He also commented that Beijing lacked confidence in Hsieh and would 
be unwilling to help his administration and strengthen the DPP. 
 
Taishang Participation Not Decisive 
----------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Wu told us that Taiwan investors in the mainland are 
unlikely to be much of a factor in the election. He predicted that 
few would return to Taiwan to vote because of the inconvenience of 
indirect cross-Strait flights.  He also believes that Green 
supporters are more likely to make the effort to return, diminishing 
the KMT's electoral advantage among Taiwan investors.  Wu speculated 
that KMT voters would account for 50-60 percent of Taiwan investors 
who return too vote.  The president of Xiamen's Taiwan Business 
Association estimated that of a population of 70,000 Taiwan 
residents in Xiamen, about a third lean green, a third lean Blue and 
the rest are neutral.  He guessed that of 800 members of his 
association, only 300 would likely return to Taiwan to vote. 
 
GOLDBERG