Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07DAKAR2417, IDENT REVIEW RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT SENEGALESE PASSPORT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07DAKAR2417.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DAKAR2417 2007-12-20 10:36 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXRO6536
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #2417/01 3541036
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201036Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9783
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1092
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0167
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0718
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 002417 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KCRM KFRD XY SG GA
SUBJECT: IDENT REVIEW RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT SENEGALESE PASSPORT 
APPLICATION SECURITY 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (U) Embassy Dakar recently reviewed the cases of refused 
Non-Immigrant Visa (NIV) applicants whose IDENT hits revealed mala 
fide identity changes.  This review identified several instances 
when legitimate Senegalese documents were obtained using fraudulent 
information.  Two patterns of identity change are especially 
apparent: refused applicants from Banjul have changed their identity 
and reapplied - without luck - in Dakar as Senegalese applicants, 
and a number of Senegalese applied for asylum or to adjust status in 
the U.S. using a different identity than in their visa applications. 
 This cable aims to share our findings and these trends. 
 
---------------- 
THE SENEGAMBIANS 
---------------- 
 
2. (SBU) A review of IDENT and Facial Recognition (FR) "hits" from 
the last two years shows at least seven applicants with Senegalese 
passports who were previously refused under Gambian identities.  Of 
these, five of the applicants were women, and the alleged age of all 
seven applicants ranges from 25 to 38 years.  In Dakar the 
applicants spoke either Wolof - a local language common to both 
countries - or insisted on interviewing in English.  (Few 
Senegalese, even students with good English, request to interview in 
English.)  Interestingly, most of the applicants changed their names 
only slightly, from the Gambian English to the Senegalese French 
spelling of the same family name.  For instance, Gambian "Rohey 
Gibba" became Senegalese "Rokhayatou Djiba," and "Alassan Demba Joll 
Ceesay" (DPOB: 15-Aug-1970, Banjul) became Alassane Demba Diol (DOB: 
10-Aug-1970, Pikine, Senegal). 
 
3. (SBU) In the latter case, the applicant went to creative - if 
futile - lengths to explain the fingerprint match, returning to the 
consulate with a man he claimed was his fraternal twin.   They 
insisted that their mother had given birth to Mr. Diol in Pikine, a 
Dakar suburb, making him a Senegalese citizen, before she traveled 
many hours overland to The Gambia to give birth to his twin brother, 
Alassan Ceesay, in Banjul five days later. 
 
-------------------------------- 
THE SENEGALESE IDENTITY CHANGERS 
-------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) While at least seven applicants changed from Gambian to 
Senegalese, there are only four NIV applicants we know of with 
Senegalese passports under two different identities.  None of these 
applicants applied with compelling stories under either identity, 
and the officers refused the applicants under section 214(b) before 
receiving the IDENT results.  Only one applicant retained a similar 
name, but changed his date of birth by ten years.  Others changed 
their biographical information dramatically.  For example, Fatou 
Diouf (DOB: 20-Jan-1982) became Diariatou Sakho (DOB: 19-Sep-1984). 
Three of the four applicants actually changed their date of birth to 
make them as much as ten years younger in their second application - 
something which may reveal misguided "wisdom on the street" of how 
to improve one's chances on the visa line. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
THE ASYLUM SEEKERS AND STATUS CHANGERS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) IDENT also exposed at least eight Senegalese (all men) who 
applied for asylum or to change status in the United States using 
one name and/or date of birth while consistently using a different 
identity in all other visa applications In these cases, no CCD 
record exists for the names and dates of birth provided to the 
Citizenship and Immigration Services officer.  In their post-asylum 
claim NIV interviews, Consular Officers' notes indicate some of 
these applicants also insisted on interviews in English, and none of 
them admitted to prolonged stays in their NIV interviews.  The 
timing of the IDENT hits indicates that these individuals filed new 
visa applications almost as soon as they returned to Senegal.  The 
fastest re-application we know of is Ibrahima Taha (DOB: 
03-Jan-1978) who told us on June 26, 2006 that he was going to buy 
goods in the U.S. and had only been there once, in 2001.  In this 
and a later interview in 2007, the officers noted that he did not 
appear to be a legitimate trader and appeared evasive.  After the 
interview, IDENT revealed that he had applied for CIS services just 
six weeks earlier on May 7, 2006 as Ousmane Sangare (DOB: 
23-Dec-1965). 
 
---------- 
THE OTHERS 
---------- 
 
 
DAKAR 00002417  002 OF 002 
 
 
6. (U) IDENT shows other individuals with Senegalese passports who 
were previously refused as Guinean, Mauritanian, or Tunisian NIV 
applicants.  We also found two cases of recent Visa 92 (asylee 
follow-to-join) applicants (one applying as a Gambian and one as a 
Senegalese) in their early thirties who changed their identities 
after being refused a diversity visa and an NIV, respectively. 
(Before 207, Visa 92 applicants were not fingerprinted or ru 
through FR.  Now that they are processed in theNIV software, we 
anticipate finding further FR o IDENT matches and identity 
changes.) 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. (SBU) Despite the effortsthese applicants made to change their 
identity, hey did not, apparently, invest the same time and ffort 
in polishing their stories - all but one wre refused 214(b) upon 
the initial interview, andin several cases the interviewing officer 
noted fundamental inconsistencies in the applicant's story or 
excessively nervous behavior on the applicant's part.  Nor did they 
attempt to dramatically change the "qualifications" -- i.e., 
economic and social profiles - which had earned them a refusal in 
their original identity. This unpolished approach to fraud leads us 
to believe that these cases do not represent the efforts of 
organized or sophisticated groups. 
 
8. (SBU) We are surprised at the high incidence of Gambians 
perpetrating identity fraud here - 10 of our 18 IDENT cases involved 
an applicant holding at least one Gambian passport, despite  the 
fact that Gambians account for less than one percent of our NIV 
applicants.  As the processing post for Gambian immigrant visa 
applicants, we have long known that Gambian civil documents are 
easily faked or fraudulently obtained.  The IDENT results reviewed 
here have heightened our awareness that Senegal, as well, has 
exploitable weaknesses in the production of its passports or 
"founding" identity documents.  Post raised the issue of 
vulnerabilities in the Senegalese passport application process with 
Ministry of Interior officials in the summer of 2006, when the first 
of these cases came to our attention.  We will seek future 
opportunities to reiterate the message. 
 
PIAZZA